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Tribulation Good Cheer

HAMPTON ADAMS

IF JESUS had not been a "Man of sorrows and acquainted with grief" some things that He said about suffering might be passed over as not making sense. "Blessed are they that mourn" sounds to those who do not comprehend the mind of Christ like an offense to the brokenhearted. Equally strange are the words recorded in John's Gospel (16:33) in a parting message to the apostles: "In the world ye have tribulation: but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world."

Several of the modern translations of the New Testament, including Goodspeed's "An American Translation," make this statement more understandable by changing the phrase "good cheer" of the older versions to the word "courage." "In the world you have trouble; but take courage! I have overcome the world." One wonders if the reason for that change of phrasing in the modern translations is an unfortunate change in the spiritual outlook of the modern age, a change that associates good cheer with health, success and pleasure, and has difficulty in thinking of good cheer as a characteristic of spiritual well-being. Perhaps the failure of our generation to fathom the deeper satisfactions of the soul, when the anchor of life is dropped to a depth that holds against every storm, is the reason that "good cheer" is better translated "courage."

"In the world ye have tribulation." Jesus is speaking to our time. The peoples who have been in the war for more than five years, and for more than three years, to whose cities devastation has come, to whose families personal tragedy has made its rude visitation, know tribulation. Most of us here in America do not know tribulation yet, but gold stars in the windows of our homes will multiply as the war continues.

Until we more fully comprehend the mind of Christ, perhaps we must be content to meet tribulation with courage. Later, there may come the understanding and grace to transcend courage with good cheer.

We can take courage as we face tribulation in the conviction that God does not want us to be overwhelmed. We may be assured of this not only as we bear the calamity that has befallen our world, but as we, at any time, are brought to suffer the most grievous personal sorrow. The bitterest dregs of the cup of sorrow is the knowledge that we were broken and

defeated by it. Something of the peace of God comes to the soul that bears tribulation with courage. In the history of the early Christian Church, when persecution was the price of being avowedly a Christian, there is a great body of testimony from many martyrs that the sublime peace of being in accord with God made them practically insensitive to the torture of their bodies. To everyone who bears his tribulation faithfully there comes as a reward a peace that the world cannot give, a peace that God gives to those who trust Him through their trials.

There is only one great tribulation in war. In comparison with it every other sacrifice is inconsequential. That tribulation is the maiming and death of our loved ones. In face of this tribulation it is not easy to heed the Master's admonition, "Courage!"

After he had written of those who died after living their lives faithfully, the author of the Hebrew letter said, "Apart from us they should not be made perfect." What a sobering and reinforcing thought! By giving up we stop the influence of our loved ones. By carrying on with their spirit, their purposes, their faith, they will continue to live through us. "Apart from us they should not be made perfect."

A certain girl in the middle teen age, who held the ideals of Christian youth, whose character reflected the wholesomeness of her thought, was the chief inspiration of the high-school department in her church. Death that came as a thief in the night snatched this lovely girl from her parents and friends. Her work would have ended if her parents in their grief had not realized that apart from them the ideals and the hopes of this girl could not be made perfect. They, therefore, offered themselves as sponsors of this department of young people and made their daughter's influence live on through them. By apprehending and following this Christian principle they have achieved courage that is adequate for their tribulation. In the deepest experiences that have come to them in allowing their girl to live on in them, courage itself has been translated into good cheer.

One reason that within a quarter of a century after the first World War the fighting had to be resumed on a vaster and more deadly scale was that people generally did not comprehend that if the influence of those who made the complete sacrifice was to continue, and if they were to be made perfect it would have to be done by the devotion of those who still lived.

Another reason for courage in the face of tribulation is that tribulation,

when one does not allow himself to be prostrated by it, increases wisdom, the wisdom that is essential to victorious living.

One article of Christian wisdom that has been forced on us by the necessities of prosecuting the war is that the common welfare comes before our personal welfare. This principle holds in time of peace as well as in time of war. Because it is not voluntarily adhered to in time of peace it must be forcefully imposed on us in time of war.

In our tribulation we shall learn more about true values, learn to discriminate between the things that are really important and the things that are not very important. Once it seemed necessary to have the house spic and span; we shall learn that it is better for the house to be comfortable and homelike to the children and their friends. Once it seemed necessary to labor continually to lay by in store for the future security of our family; we shall see that it would have been better had we given our children more time as they were growing up. Once grand visions of great honors and luxurious living possessed us; we shall be satisfied to know that we can have the companionship of loved ones and enjoy the simple things. Once we passed up the reward of the day, expecting the greater rewards of a tomorrow that never came; we may learn to cherish the love and life of each day as it comes. Dean Sperry in his book, *Reality in Worship*, has a chapter on "The Kingdom of Ends" in which he writes of the mistake and tragedy of making every day and every period of life merely a means to another day and another period. Because of that mistaken way of looking at life some parents let their children get away from them before they have ever really had them or enjoyed them. Babyhood was not enjoyed because they were planning for childhood. Childhood passed while their thought was on adolescence. Adolescence in like manner was sacrificed to youth, and youth to adulthood. The war which has raided the tomorrow in which we had stored so many of our hopes may teach us the wisdom of making the most of each day as it comes.

The most important lesson that tribulation teaches is the need for inward, spiritual strength. Profound sorrow pushes one out into utter loneliness. Those who are delicately sensitive to the sorrows of others know that there is a great gulf fixed between the point that even the closest friend can go and the Gethsemane in which the soul has to fight its battle alone. And over beyond in the soul's Gethsemane, victory comes to him who says with Jesus, "Alone, yet not alone, for the Father is with me."

A SPIRITUAL CHECKUP

A spiritual checkup is needed as we face tribulation. The physical health of our citizens is watched with deep concern, now that man power must be fully utilized. Schools and colleges are giving unprecedented attention to body-building. Factory management is quick to adopt every newly discovered health protection for employees. Wives are instructed in the preparation of well-balanced lunches to ward off fatigue for husbands who must not weaken on the production lives. And the health of soldiers is guarded with extraordinary care. All of us have been made aware of the importance of the periodic physical checkup. The spiritual checkup is even more important. The seventh chapter of Romans is the record of Paul's spiritual checkup. If he had not so thoroughly examined himself and courageously faced the unpleasant facts he undoubtedly would have sunk into a fatal spiritual apathy and weakness, and we would not have heard of him. The religious development of Paul, like that of every other person, waited on the spiritual checkup.

Aristotle outlined four states of moral development that are possible to a person: the first state in which he neither knows nor desires what is good; the second state in which he knows what is right but fails to do it; the third state in which he succeeds in doing what is right by constant effort and struggle; and the fourth state in which the personality is so harmonized that the right is done without struggle. When Saul of Tarsus said, "For the good which I would I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I practise," he made known that he was in that low, second state of moral and spiritual development. But the fact that he was making a spiritual checkup and that he was determined to struggle for victories over his lower nature showed that he was already climbing to higher levels of spiritual living. And one day he exclaimed that he had attained the high level of doing good not because he was forced to do it but because he desired it. Christ dwelt in his heart, and his desires were Christ's desires. Courage was translated into good cheer. Paul's difficulties were not over. Aristotle had not known Christ when he spoke of the fourth stage of moral development where the right is done without a struggle. The higher righteousness with which a true Christian must exceed the righteousness of scribes and Pharisees is never fully attained; it calls for continual struggles. It drives Jesus Himself to Gethsemane to pray: "Father, if it be Thy will allow this cup to pass from me. Nevertheless, not as I will but as Thou

wilt." The Christian never attains a level in his struggle against sin or in his endeavor to endure tribulation which is the end of all striving. The more of the Spirit of Christ he achieves the more sinful sin becomes to him, the more inexcusable weakness in tribulation is to him.

We are educated not to wait until we are past going to have a physical checkup. Our dentists and our doctors teach us to have examinations frequently and regularly. The New Testament and the Church give us a similar admonition about the spiritual checkup. The neglect of the spiritual checkup has meant that some people were not strong to stand against temptation when it came; that some wasted their strength on inconsequential things; that some pursued happiness down disappointing ways; that some unconsciously suffered the deterioration of their spiritual life; that some were inadequate for the burdens and sorrows that life inevitably brings; that some are unready for this time of tribulation. Peter wept bitterly because he was not strong enough to stand the test at the place where it was dangerous to be recognized as a friend of Jesus. If he had really known his spiritual condition before that ordeal he might have been strengthened to withstand it. Had Saul of Tarsus not become aware by critical self-examination that he did not have sufficient power within himself he would not have been led to that Power which is from above, the Power that was manifest in Jesus Christ.

It would be well for each of us during the Lenten season in this year of tribulation, 1943, to make a spiritual checkup at four points:

(1) *The Point of Sincerity*

The Sermon on the Mount that deals with the most vital religious and moral truths devotes more time to this question of sincerity than to any other subject. Jesus reminded them of a common type of person that they all knew, the person that gave alms, sounding a trumpet, to have glory of men; or prayed, standing in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, to be seen of men; or fasted, with a sad countenance, to be seen of men to fast. Some of them recognized themselves as this person. Said Jesus, "If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is the darkness." Insincerity is the great darkness at the heart of life.

Ministers have the subtle temptation to insincerity that comes to all professional religious leaders, who being laborers in the vineyard of the Lord receive their hire from the Church. It is the minister's job to be

at the Church; his professional reputation will allow no serious moral lapses; he is expected at all times to show a buoyant Christian faith. One minister upon retiring from the Church and taking a job in the business world was heard to exclaim with obvious relief that now he could be himself. Unless a minister of the gospel in a lonely vigil, with only the eye of God on him, can say sincerely, that while he is dependent on the Church for his living, he preaches Christ with conviction and serves the Church with devotion, he must know in his heart that as a minister he is a broken reed.

In the realm of friendship, do our motives check with our pretensions? Perhaps the reason that Judas was not able to be true to Jesus in the Master's crisis was that his motive of friendship for Jesus had never been pure. He had thought that he would benefit by this friendship, that he would gain the favor of the one who would be King of the Jews. Is there anything more disheartening than the sight of little men paying lip service to and doing the bidding of men of power in the name of friendship, when their eye is single to the main chance?

Sincerity is not only a virtue to be upheld; it is the core of a strong personality. Lives do not break because they are crushed without, but because they collapse within. Hear Paul's ringing words to the Ephesians (6:10ff), "Finally, be strong in the Lord, and in the strength of his might." What does he mean? The rest of the passage is a symphony on the theme of sincerity: "Wherefore take up the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to withstand in the evil day, and, having done all, to stand. Stand, therefore, having girded your loins with truth, and having put on the breastplate of righteousness, and having shod your feet with the preparation of the gospel of peace; withal taking up the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the evil one. And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God."

(2) *The Point of Personal Force*

The spiritual checkup should make this inquiry, Do our jealousies expose our failures? This is at the point of personal force.

Æschylus in his great drama has Agamemnon say:

"For few are they who have such inborn grace,
As to look up with love, and envy not,
When stands another on the height of weal."

There is a character in the New Testament who is mentioned only once whose biography we would read with great interest if it had been written. That man is Justus. If the reader does not remember him on the moment, he is not convicted of ignorance of the Bible; Justus passed so quickly across the apostolic stage just that one time. He was one of the two men nominated to fill the important vacancy in the company of the twelve apostles, caused by the betrayal of Judas. Two men were thought to be worthy of consideration for that place; Justus, who was named first by Luke in his history of the early Church, and Matthias. According to their belief that God would point out His choice to them the eleven apostles prayed that God would show them the one whom He had chosen, and then they cast lots. The lot fell on Matthias. From that point on he belonged to the inner circle of those who had been closest to the Lord, and who had the greatest responsibility for His Church. But we wonder what happened to Justus. He was subjected to one of the hardest tests that have to be faced, that of seeing the other person win the position that he wanted. We like to think that Justus was able to stand that test. If he did conquer jealousy of Matthias it was because he experienced that courage and peace that come as the reward of life well lived, courage and peace that are marvelously independent of the fickle approval of men and the tribulations of the world.

Psychologists have given us the term that explains jealousy. It is the word "compensation." The person who is not doing his best tries to compensate his feeling of inferiority and failure by jealously criticizing those who are living victoriously.

In 1922 William Tilden and William Johnston contended for the national singles title in tennis in one of the most notable series in the history of the game. Each contestant hoped to come into permanent possession of a great trophy which each man had won twice. Tilden won the series by a very close margin. This is his tribute to his unsuccessful opponent: "Johnston met me in the lockerhouse, and congratulated me in all sincerity. I shall always remember what he said in that moment of disappointment. It was the most sportsmanlike thing imaginable: 'Bill, I played the best tennis of my life; but it just wasn't as good as yours.' In all the years I have played Johnston, sometimes beating him and sometimes having him beat me, I have never seen him display any undue elation over a victory, or heard him offer any alibi in defeat."

When a person can say to himself, "I did the best I could," it is strange how he can rise above jealousy. He has inward force.

Self-pity is jealousy turned inside out. It thinks of the other people who have escaped hardship and tribulation. Like jealousy, self-pity is an effort at compensation for inward weakness. A spiritual checkup at the point of jealousy and self-pity will reveal whether or not we have sufficient spiritual force for this time of tribulation.

(3) *The Point of Happiness*

A spiritual checkup confronts us with this question, Do we sacrifice the ultimate good for the immediate pleasure? That is at the point of happiness.

There come to mind the schoolboy who played when he should have worked, and later suffered the shame of failure; the youth who pursued pleasures and later had no profession nor skill to offer any employer; a world that was so occupied with selfish interests that it did not arouse itself to safeguard the peace of the world, and later was engulfed in this terrible war.

At the heart of life there is the principle of sacrifice. To the ancient Greeks it was foolishness; to the Jews it was a stumbling block; but to those of spiritual discernment, like the Apostle Paul, it was "the wisdom of God and the power of God." The fulfillment of that principle was the Cross of Calvary.

The profoundest happiness—blessedness, it is called in the Sermon on the Mount—is the reward of the sacrifice that seeks the ultimate good, rather than the immediate satisfaction. Jesus spoke of this happiness as He approached the Cross as "My peace."

In a notable devotional book entitled *High Country*, Rev. Alistair MacLean has a chapter headed "The Future Is Born Today." The nature of that future both for the individual and the world depends largely on the way we look on immediate pleasures in their relation to the ultimate good.

(4) *The Point of Personal Worth*

We need to make our spiritual checkup at one other point. Are we trying to make an impression or build a character? This is at the point of personal worth.

This raises the fundamental question, Is the chief end of life to get

something or to be something? If it is to get something we might well seek every device to win friends and influence people. There is no denying that the go-getters do "get" in our world. But the question is, In all their getting do they get the one thing that is worth while, the justification of their own life, the experience of life's deepest satisfactions?

A day of great spiritual victory in the life of any person is the day when he decides that the only impression that he cares to make on other people is the impression that his character will slowly make on those who really know him. A woman was heard to say that the happiest day in her life was the day she decided that she would no longer try to be pretty. It is a great day in the life of any person when he decides to be himself. And this does not mean to be satisfied with oneself. Quite the contrary. If you are going to be yourself, and if you are going to rely on the integrity and force of your character, you must be the very best self possible.

Character is worth, our greatest worth to the world. We cannot say that what we do is not important to the world. Production is essential. But one's unique worth is his character, and his character is his personality. One workman can take the place of another workman on the production line. One personality can never take the place of another personality in the human family.

And, finally, if one has been chiefly concerned with character, he may know when his work is done, with Milton, that

"They also serve who only stand and wait."

SPIRITUAL HEALTH AND COURAGE

The four points of this suggested spiritual checkup may not seem to bear directly on the problem of meeting tribulation with courage and good cheer. But just as happiness is not achieved by directly pursuing it, the victory over tribulation is not gained by a direct attack. Spiritual health, characterized by sincerity, inward force, profound happiness or peace, and an abiding sense of personal worth, is the strongest bulwark against the ravages of tribulation.

And when one discovers that he has been made spiritually strong to endure tribulation, the courage with which his healthy spirit confronted the trial is transcended by the very peace of God. Then the mind of Christ is comprehensible: "In the world ye have tribulation: but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world."

The Condition and Task of the Present-Day Church

EMIL BRUNNER¹

THE shattering events of these present days, and their dark forebodings for the future, oblige the Church to give special thought to its own condition and to basically review its strengths and deficiencies. We are experiencing in the political-military area the tragic consequences of a certain civic *laissez faire*, an inability to rise to the necessary special exertions, or even to a realistic appraisal of the situation, in the face of a threatening danger. Who would contend that we are not confronted in the Church with something analogous? Who would say that all in the Church is well?

We do not desire to paint the devil on the wall; but are we armed against events like those we have seen transpiring during the last two decades in great "Christian" countries where the functions of the Church have been either destroyed or greatly compromised through political revolutions, without the Church as a whole even making an effort to offer serious resistance? Is it so out of keeping with the times today to raise the clarion cry: Church, awake; act, as long as there is day, for the night is coming when no one can act any longer?

I. *The Plight of the Church*

1. The most evident problem is that of the widespread shrinkage of participation in church life. Statistically, this is not to be observed in an especially frightening degree. The greater part of the population of German Reformed Switzerland continues to hold to the national Church. The grasping about and the somewhat disquieting confessional-missionary activity of the Catholic Church in Reformed Zurich can be explained, if one is optimistically inclined, on the grounds of population movement; the relatively insignificant withdrawal of church membership and the continuingly small percentage of persons without any confessional affiliation can be regarded as evidence that the church life of our people is still intact. Moreover, the number of unbaptized, particularly in country areas, is

¹ This article was translated for RELIGION IN LIFE by R. H. Edwin Espy. It was written on the basis of conditions in the European Church; but the challenge it presents is universal in scope.—Ed.

still very small in comparison with the baptized. We get quite another picture, however, when we examine the relative number of those who participate with regularity in the life of the Church, in the Sunday and weekday services, in communion, in Bible classes or in practical church activities. When we remind ourselves that in certain urban communities, both middle-class and so-called workers' sections, the population has doubled, trebled and even quadrupled in the last fifty years, while the Sunday church attendance has only barely maintained itself, or that in both urban and rural communities the number of people attending church is often only five per cent of the population, then the language of statistics suddenly acquires another significance.

The question as to how actively the young people, the workers and the leading figures in political, commercial and cultural circles participate in the life of the Church leads to a similar conclusion. How large is the number of our active politicians, businessmen, high-school and college teachers who show themselves at all interested in the Church as an appreciable factor in determining their life outlook? Although it is only in exceptional cases that one can speak of outright opposition to the Church, one cannot escape the fact that in all levels of the population there is fearfully little acquaintance between the Church and the people. We are naturally aware that visible participation in the life of the Church is far from being a proof of one's Christianity, and similarly that lack of participation is not necessarily a sign of denial of the faith; but we also know that a vital Christendom cannot exist in the long run without a vital congregational expression, and that as a rule disinterestedness in the life of the Church itself is a sign of at best a scanty Christianity.

2. But the widespread decline in active membership, which cannot be denied, is not necessarily a bad sign in itself. On the contrary, it could very well happen that precisely a Church which was filled with the spirit of God would become a decided minority; the minority character of a Church can be a sign of its spiritual power as well as of its spiritual weakness. The Church has never been promised that, wherever it had opportunity to exercise its influence over a long period of time, it would gradually embrace the entire people. The Constantinian-Theodician identification of State Church and a Church People which dominated the entire Middle Ages, the Reformation and the post-Reformation period and which began to totter only after the French Revolution and the Renaissance, was pos-

sible only as a result of a terrific secularization of the Church, a lowering of demands upon the individual to certain external forms compatible with what could be accomplished through state compulsion. A realization of the widespread falling off in active church life can only have a meaning, therefore, in relation to a corresponding *reduction in intensity* characterizing evangelical life in "Church circles."

To be sure, this second factor is less easy to determine than the first; our conclusions here must be more cautiously formulated if they are to be free from the charge of arbitrariness and arrogance. But in this area, too, there are actualities which cannot be interpreted by any competent observers except as evidence of *reduced intensity*.

The following facts stand out:

(a) The Church makes very small demands on its members, and its members do not permit appreciable demands to be made upon them. Neither in the matter of confessional teachings nor in the matter of general Church-Christian upbringing would the "Church people" permit themselves to be controlled by definite norms or even to be measured by such. The great majority of them would immediately protest most violently. Theoretically, the Christian piety which the Church demands of its members may be according to the New Testament, but in practice there prevails a very superficial Christianity, both in teaching and in living. One can scarcely distinguish the difference between the "churched" and the "unchurched" either in essential faith or in works.

(b) Such practices of the Christian life as regularity in prayer, in attendance at services of worship, in family devotions, in Bible reading have progressively deteriorated even among the small minority which one might describe as Church-related. This, of course, is a fact which cannot be statistically determined, but the judgment is fully grounded in many observations which are characteristic. One may evaluate the actual extent of this deficiency either optimistically or pessimistically, but no one who knows the life of our people can deny that it is great.

(c) It is only in relatively exceptional cases that one can speak of a life of Christian fellowship, especially in the cities. Whereas people in rural areas at least know one another and display a certain neighborly sense of mutual responsibility, particularly in circumstances of distress, the members of the city congregation are for the most part strange to one another and show little disposition to become acquainted. And why should they? They have their own friends and associates, with whom they carry on their community and social existence. Even the awareness of what a truly

Christian fellowship would be, is completely foreign to most of them. Thus the Sunday worship service and the Lord's Supper can scarcely be understood as anything but a personal matter, and not as a community experience.

(d) The knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, and even of the most elemental Christian teachings, which at one time were taken for granted as the possession of even those who knew very little of the Bible itself, is disturbingly meager; and naturally a genuine understanding of what these teachings actually mean for the life of the Christian is even rarer. Similarly the fundamentals of the biblical-Christian code of living are unfamiliar, and there is distressingly little apprehension of the demands of God upon the individual in the varied circumstances of his practical daily life.

(e) A consciousness of responsibility on the part of the individual to the Church is seldom to be found, and it follows that the readiness and the initiative for participation in the work of the Church is extremely sparse. All manner of other activities take precedence and are brought forward as the reason why one "could not possibly find the time."

(f) Thus it is not to be wondered at that the Church as a community of the faithful exerts a small determining influence on the life of the people as a whole. People are naturally astonished to discover that at least the Catholics do expect demands to be made upon them as members of the Church, and that many of them go to great pains to be faithful churchmen.

(g) On the basis of many pastoral experiences it can be quite reliably concluded that very few of the people, including those active in churches, know anything whatever of the meaning of "the prayer life," "wrestling for salvation," "the experience of the power of Christ and the Holy Spirit in my own life," "walking in the paths of God," or anything else which could be regarded as a definite Christian experience, even when one bears in mind that such experience can exist without any biblical stimulus whatever.

(h) It is thus understandable that the Church and the Christian life arouse no admiration, annoyance or desire on the part of others, but rather are disregarded. Young people in particular are little attracted by the Church, as they are bound to have the feeling that the Christian life is monotonous, that nothing worth mentioning ever happens within the Christian group as such, and that the Church will never make real demands or call a person to high stakes. Their appraisal might well be: the Church seeks to enlist us, but it offers us nothing and demands of us nothing. This may be the exaggeration of youth, but it is not without a large measure of truth. When we consider the eras in the life of the Church when it was

the most dangerous or the most glorious to be a Christian, when the teaching of the Church moved the best minds more than anything else, when the claims of the Church attracted precisely the most courageous, when even the norms of the Church still were valid and were thoroughly recognized even when they were not obeyed—when we remember these things we can measure the depth of the “intensive deficiency” in the Church of our day.

This is not to say that nothing of the Christian faith and life still prevails in our Church. On the contrary, experience teaches us that there are many Christians whose belief and whose zeal for Christ are deeply earnest, who genuinely live their faith in prayer and obedience, in intercession and active love.

Nor have conditions especially deteriorated just recently. On the contrary, there exist many gratifying evidences of growth and strengthening in the life of the Church, which can be points of departure for a new awakening. And the demand for the true Church, for solid spiritual food, for the ministry to souls, for fellowship, for definite guidance in practical life, is great. This brings us to a second question which leads us deeper than the mere factual situation.

II. *The Causes of Our Present Plight*

We shall necessarily confine ourselves to those sources which lie within the Church itself or for whose consequences the Church is primarily responsible.

1. There is no doubt that the most important is what one might call the *disintegration of the substance of the Church*. In recent centuries the Church has lost increasingly the consciousness of what the Church is and what the Church is for. We can observe this best, though not at all exclusively, in the secularization of theology. The congregation suffers increasingly from spiritual undernourishment and from substitutionary nourishment. What has often been offered has not been that which builds, sustains and increases the Church—the Word of Life. The biblical Gospel was either presented in a lifeless manner that bore no witness, in a manner that was not begotten of a living faith and could not beget a faith; or it was handed forth as the wisdom of men, idealism, moralism, instead of the Word of God, stones instead of bread.

2. The Reformed National Church, stemming from the national Church of the time of Constantine, has not become aware of the change in its situation and task as a result of the collapse of confessional coercion

by the State. For more than a thousand years the Church of coercion prevailed in Europe; membership in the Church through baptism and also a certain minimum of Church practices was required and forced for purposes of the State, with the result that there developed an identity of the state-folk and the Church folk through a process of neutralization. This condition continued also in the great Churches of the Reformation until the French Revolution. The entire Church organization as well as all Church activity were built on this foundation of a State-created Church. The Church was not allowed to recruit and did not want to evangelize; it rested on the fiction that all the members of the nation were baptized Christians, and it could make the pretense that everyone could at least hear its Word because everyone was obliged to hear it. This ended externally with the French Revolution, and with the Renaissance and the awakening of modern humanity the believing Christian community cut itself loose from the world in an inner sense. The situation became somewhat similar to what it had been before Constantine. But the Church did not understand this turning of the road, and accordingly retained its Constantinian heritage in organization and manner of work. It continued to concern itself with the maintenance of the fellowship rather than with a mission, with the advancement of those who were already Christian in faith rather than with the creation of faith. In organizational structure, in preaching, teaching and pastoral ministry, the orientation was toward the existing congregation and not toward *missionary expansion*. In this regard the Church of the past two hundred years has been asleep.

3. The Church has digested no better the tremendous *social upheavals* which have sprung from technical-commercial revolution. The Church of the Middle Ages, the Reformation and the period following the Reformation could reckon with the family, the solidarity of the clan and the clearly defined community as the natural basis for the proclamation of the faith and the building of the congregation. Modern society, however, is largely atomized and disorganized into an unorganic concentration of human beings by machines and mass production and by the liberty of movement of the population. The complete unacquaintance of great masses of people with Christian mores has a contagious influence also on those who are closer to the Church and in this way threatens the sense of fraternity from within; the large city rolls the atomized human masses unorganically together, like coal dust into bricks. Clubs and social groupings for special purposes replace natural groupings with artificial ones. Yet the Church has scarcely

taken notice of this terrific change, or at least has done nothing practical to meet it. Instead of concentrating on fellowship and cell-groups all the more, it has entirely neglected this function which was so central in apostolic Christianity, because the Church of the intervening centuries, which worked under such completely different presuppositions, offers no pattern! The Church, which according to the teaching and example of the New Testament above all else is a fellowship, has itself been atomized and has concealed from itself the evil of this condition by invoking the teaching of the invisible community of the faithful!

4. The Church of the Reformation was oriented in its functional structure around the fact that the minister of the congregation was the natural leader and that the Sunday sermon—as well as the weekday sermon—stood alongside the Bible as practically the only spiritual nourishment of the people. Today it is scarcely true that the officers of the Church belong to the leading circles of the community; quite different spiritual elements have assumed the leadership: the school, the high school and university, technicians, newspapers, writers and artists. The sermon must stand up against powerful competition in the forms of a voluminous offering of knowledge, culture, entertainment and pleasure. Whereas the word of the Church was formally almost the only significant public word, today it is disappearing under the plethora of what is spoken, printed, seen in the cinema and heard on the radio. In consequence of this condition the Church should have made numerous and energetic adjustments in the manner of its work. But the Church has done as well as nothing. It continues to be oriented entirely around the minister and his weekly sermon, and shows great surprise when this preoccupation no longer commands the former attention.

5. The life of the people in earlier centuries was confined by custom and natural necessities to definite molds; life was comparatively simple. Modern civilization with rushing tempo, its entanglements and its incomprehensibility, with its continuous shoving about of human beings and its changes of conditions, constantly confronts people with new situations and new problems which previously were unimagined. It makes claims upon people in an entirely different way than formerly. The Church should have objectively adjusted itself to this situation, in order to offer help to people in the frightening immensity of their problems and to interpret the meaning of being a Christian in the face of these new conditions. What new tasks the Church could have undertaken for the new type of youth and of working women! But here also the Church, except

for praiseworthy exceptions, *rested immovable on an outworn basis* which—though under entirely different conditions—had established itself in the past.

6. Modern civilization with its gigantic extensive and intensive development of schools of all grades, with the tremendous expansion of the press—from the daily press to the illustrated weeklies—with its external comfort and its broadening of cultural demands, has created for the Word of the Church an audience—often no audience at all—which no longer responded or could respond as in earlier centuries to the outmoded methods of proclamation and teaching. The person of today is worn down by a thousand attractions, he is completely saturated by the mass of reading and listening that is at his disposal. It might have been expected that the Church would take counter-measures to meet this terrific aggravation, through the form of its worship services, in its sermons and its methods of instruction. This has indeed happened almost instinctively to a limited extent, but nowhere consciously and according to a plan, nowhere in commensurate degree.

7. The Church has taken small notice of the tremendous increase in population and the even more visible concentration of the population in the large cities. In the seventeenth century a Lutheran pastor complained that in his city there were only seventeen ministers for eleven thousand people. How could one be shepherd and minister to such a congregation? This numerical relation which for him was unbearable and irresponsible, has in the meantime become seven or eight times worse in most of the larger congregations, even though conditions have become not easier but unimaginably more complicated and the individual is no longer implanted in definite and natural social organisms. How can one be surprised, therefore, if the spiritual ministry to individuals is entirely unknown to the majority of the people? Instead of the Church dedicating its entire attention to this predicament and seeking to solve the problem of the cure of souls with entirely new means, it has handled this question more and more like a stepchild, so that the role of personal ministry to the average Christian has entirely disappeared from his consciousness. Precisely this personal ministry would have been the kind of proclamation which would have been best suited to an atomized society and which could have dealt most effectively with the complexity of general conditions and with chaotic inner disunity. But instead of this, the personal approach is what has been neglected especially, apparently on the ground of the understandable feeling on the part of the ministers that

they are not up to this responsibility. But the Church should have taken the opposite position: here is a problem which must be tackled and organized in a new way. Above all, the most natural deduction would have been that an effort should be made to break up our *monster Church jurisdictions in the cities*; but this conclusion which one would take for granted was wrecked on the opposition of the Church officials and even of the ministers out of senseless motives of prestige.

8. But even if we disregard the breakdown of the concept of the inclusive priesthood of believers, and leave aside the smallness of number and the onesided preparation of the ministers, there still remains the evil fact that the churches have at their disposal no proper instrument for the enlistment and selection of their future ministers. They leave to chance the question as to who should offer himself for the service of the Church. The Church takes into its service whomever gets past the two sieves of the preparatory and theological examinations. It has not yet occurred to people that it is somewhat strange for a church of Jesus Christ, in the *choice of its workers*—the only really active workers it gives itself—to set up exclusively intellectual criteria, and even these in accordance with a certain concept which was normative at the time of the Reformation! It is no wonder that the ministry as a whole confronts problems which it is in no way competent to handle, entirely apart from the piling up of problems which the individual minister seldom, and the majority never, are prepared to undertake.

At the conclusion of this critical analysis, let me say that in accusing the Church, we are accusing ourselves. If the Church has slept, so have we all slept, and we who in a very special way should be the watchmen of the Church have been especially irresponsible. I place myself all along the line under the judgment of this analysis of the causes of our predicament.

And now what? If I make bold in what follows to set forth certain postulates which seek to show the practical way to improvement, certainly this does not suggest that I consider myself able to meet our evil plight in its totality. These propositions constitute only a beginning in a process which will require time and in which the most competent people must take active part.

III. *Proposals*

1. It may well seem questionable whether the recovery of the Church can be brought about in the main by its *official leaders*; but there is no doubt that this is one place where it must start.

(a) First of all, the Church must concern itself with better recruiting, both positively and negatively. It should take initiative—as is done in a widespread way and with good results in America—in placing before both young people and parents, through word and pen, the significance of professional Christian service. Especially today, when we have a surplus of theological students, this could best be done without the danger of misunderstanding under the slogan: quality, not quantity. Above all else, the Church should begin to be selective. In place of the present system, the Church should institute a thorough examination by consultation for every prospective theological student at the beginning of his study, to determine his aptitude for the ministry. Such an examination should be of a deeply personal and sympathetic character and its result should be communicated only in the form of earnest counsel.

(b) The Church must make an effort to institute varied kinds of ministerial training, even in the framework of the present system, which would of course presuppose that a corresponding differentiation of types of ministerial service should be inaugurated. This should apply particularly in regard to religious instruction in higher education and to special work with young people.

(c) The Church must make a fundamental change in the manner of training regular ministers. At present a training in theology as a science is our only concern; the spiritual-social area, and the area relating to the distinctive practical functions of the Church, except for the most stepmotherly treatment of practical theology, are almost entirely ignored.

I may point here to what I have written elsewhere in regard to the training of ministers in America. I would regard as ideal a combination which would bring the university and the seminary, the scientifically theological and the spiritual-churchly social, to a certain degree into balance. The creation of a "Preachers' Institute," to come at the end of the strictly theological study, could be attempted as a means of transition to this ideal. This, however, would be only an emergency expedient.

(d) But even the strictly theological preparation itself must be radically revised. It is now abstractly scientific and too onesidedly historical. To be sure, a pastor cannot have enough of such knowledge; but if this prevents him from securing other things that are more important, the good becomes the enemy of the best. The theological training of today is not a very good schooling in the bringing of the gospel of Jesus Christ to the modern man. The equipment for the practical tasks of the Church, as much through the sermon and religious instruction as

through the cure of souls and missionary contact with people, is decidedly lacking. I make bold to say this as a teacher of practical theology.

(e) No one should become a full-fledged minister without at least two years of experience as an assistant with a modest stipend. We may take medicine as an analogy, in which a period of internship is required after thirteen semesters of study. In general it would be desirable that no one should become a pastor at less than twenty-three years of age.

(f) There should be compulsory and regular courses of study to keep ministers alert, except where voluntary organizations for this purpose already exist, and a special commission of theological professors and ministers should be created to bring this about.

2. There should be a *rebuilding of the system of Church wardens* from a purely administrative body to a spiritual-ministerial group, as they should be divided into elders and deacons in accordance with the Reformed pattern.

3. The existence of *factional parties* within the Synod, which is patterned according to the system of political parliaments, is a derision of the Church. The necessary grouping together of people of equal rights and the justifiable expression of their viewpoints must be accomplished in some way that does not completely contradict the character of the Church. Anyone who has attended the great synodical meetings in other Protestant countries knows that the demand for a churchly as against a secular concept of the Synod is not utopian. But first of all we must create an awareness of the present intolerable situation.

4. The *mobilization of laymen* is probably the most important of all the measures we would propose, but it can only be carried through when something happens among the clergy along the lines of our first proposals above.

(a) The very concept of "laymen" is misleading, both because of its Roman Catholic origin and because it is an anachronism in the modern situation. To these so-called laymen belong university professors, members of government, doctors, writers, journalists; in other words, people who are at least the equals of the ministers in education and knowledge and who are, therefore, if they are genuine Christians, just as well qualified to serve the Church as are those who have prepared for a special type of service in the Church through theological training. The Church permits these tremendous resources of power to lie fallow; yet it should not only

be using but awakening them. The ecumenical movement has rendered pioneer service in this regard through the co-opting of nontheological experts for particular problems of the Church, primarily in the area of Christian social ethics. Here are great possibilities and tasks: the creation of a Christian journalism, a Christian literature, a Christian philosophy and other spiritual sciences, the laying of foundations for a Christian politics and economics.

(b) The need for individual spiritual ministry can be satisfied under today's numerical conditions, only by the drawing in of extraofficial helpers.

The difficulties are chiefly of a more practical nature: are there enough suitable people who have the time? There are already many lay ministers who accomplish a great deal in the cure of souls alongside their own occupations. There are in particular many women who are not only qualified to do such work but who do have the time.

(c) Church members could and should also *be mobilized* for simpler but equally important tasks in the service of the Church; visitation in the homes of new members of the congregation; various types of colportage—what a role was played by Bible colportage during the Reformation!—visitation of the sick, cultivation of neighbors. Beginnings in these directions have been made, but only sporadically and timidly. Small Bible study circles is another area, of which we shall speak forthwith.

(d) In the mobilization of laymen nothing is more important than the creation of cells and the cultivation of Christian fellowship. Luther provided the watchword and developed the basic ideas for this aspect of the Christian life in his German Mass. Unhappily, the Church later contested the creation of such groups as smacking of conventualism. We can no longer afford the luxury of such opposition any more than we can afford the luxury of ignoring the matter. Rather we should give it most emphatic promotion. The abyss between the Sunday sermon and the six days of the week must be filled, the Church must become again a community, not only invisible but visible.

The creation of cells, particularly since the Group Movement, is under way within the life of the Church itself and partly in connection with the official duties of the minister. Practical interpretation of Holy Scriptures, with exchange of personal experience, brotherly admonition and consolation, *mutua conversatio et consolatio fratrum*, that is the slogan under which Luther incorporated this problem in his Schmalkald Articles,

his only confession. In Reformed circles Wesley undertook and accomplished something similar.

Here also schooling is necessary, and in the general manner of the Sunday School monitor system. The pastor, preferably together with a few experienced nontheologians, provides the leaders of such cells every week with a "preparation," or a didactical treatise on a particular biblical passage, and the leaders communicate this to their respective cells.

5. When the Church finally recognizes its new situation as missionary, it must orient itself not only around the care of the congregation but above all else around its *missionary responsibility*.

(a) The present Sunday School worship services are burdened by the effort to be at the same time missionary and yet within the congregation. In this combination neither aspect is allowed to come into its own. We must therefore first of all take seriously the fact that there are two kinds of people: Christians, who are certain of their faith in the God revealed in Jesus Christ and in His salvation, and non-Christians, who either believe nothing at all or have a religious faith which is not Christian. We ourselves cannot distinguish these two types of people with certainty, although the confession of faith is at least a provisional relative basis of differentiation. He who confesses the opposite of the Christian faith cannot be counted as a part of the Church, even if he is externally a member.

But this distinction should not lead us to a parting of the ways. The chief question is whether we address ourselves to the two problems with the methods which are respectively valid for them. That is exactly what the ancient Church did. It had different arrangements for the "hearers" who were not yet Christians, and for the actual believing congregations. The Lord's Supper, for example, clearly belongs only in the congregation of the faithful, not in missionary activities. The same holds true for liturgy. There is no liturgy in the mission, because there is as yet no praying congregation. There is also no hymnody, because there is no congregation praising God. We must develop a method of proclaiming the Word which will lead to belief, to the Bible, to the life of prayer, and this should be sharply distinguished from the proclamation to those who already confess Jesus Christ with heart and voice. The first will have no different content than the second, but a different form. It will not be in the technical sense biblical exposition, as this belongs where people believe in the Bible as the Word of God. Rather, it will proclaim

the Gospel of Jesus Christ in a form which will meet the understanding and arouse the consciences of those who are far from this truth.

On the other side, if the worship service of the congregation is freed from the attempt to make it at the same time a missionary service, it can conform to a much higher standard that is appropriate to a congregation of confessing Christians. One can go deeper into Bible study and even enlist the active participation of the congregation in the service through congregational reading of Scripture, united spoken prayer, responsive readings and so on. It is here that the hymn has its true significance, similarly the treasures of the liturgy of the early Church. It is here that a truly Churchlike atmosphere can be created.

(b) A great difficulty is the vacuum between Sunday and Saturday. The time of the Reformation was familiar with the daily service of worship. This we must have again, even though we might have to select for this purpose a less elaborate form in order not to overburden and exhaust the minister. Daily morning and evening devotions in a simple form would not be impossible either in the city or in the country. Why should we leave to the Catholics their great headstart with the daily mass?

(c) There exists a tremendous need for true Christian schooling, in the catechism as well as in the Bible. The usual form of "Bible hour," half preaching and half teaching, is not sufficient to meet this need.

(d) Our celebration of the Lord's Supper is in need of much reform. Most people feel that it is unsatisfying in its present form, because the sense of a fellowship meal is not really conveyed. But I do not desire at this point to enter into details.

6. We do not have in the Protestant German-speaking Church what might be called a *Christian home library*. The *Zwingli-Verlag* has spontaneously seized on this suggestion and is extending invitations for a competition to create such a library. I have in mind small, widely understandable booklets which would contain the necessary accoutrement for a Christian life, insofar as the printed word has this power. Thus:

A short introduction to the Bible, together with references to Bible readings;

A guide to prayer, with some really good sample prayers;

A catechism for adults;

A short church history (naturally not a dry compendium like the Zürich instruction booklet);

A booklet on being a Christian, containing the most important directions for: family devotions, orientation concerning Christian sexual morality and sex relations in general; concerning marriage, the relation of the Christian to money, to pleasure, to the State and to political questions.

The catechism should not have to be burdened with these matters and on the other side the treatment of these practical things should not be confined to the necessary limits of a catechism. Perhaps it would be good to handle the separate problems as separate books. In all of this, however, moral truisms would have to be carefully avoided. The books would have to speak with realism and competence.

7. The most far-reaching means of preaching which we have at our disposal, namely, *the radio and the press*, are usually left to accidental chance. A Church radio and press committee should be commissioned, with the help of constant contact with the strategic people of the country, to secure the greatest possible publicity for outstanding achievements. Only the best preachers should allow themselves to express opinions on the radio, and it is immaterial whether they are situated in Zürich, or somewhere else. The committee should pay attention to no special interests, whether they be regional or theological. A few men enjoying fullest confidence should comprise this committee and be given full power, including that of the theological direction referred to.

Herewith I come to the end of my propositions. I am aware of the discrepancy between the presentation of our plight and the interpretation of its causes. It is unavailing to try to obviate the most important dangers merely by bringing forth propositions. And many postulates have no significance until others have already been fulfilled. Yet I believe nevertheless that the connection between the postulates and the analysis is visible at every point and that the postulates all live up to the condition that one must always place upon postulates: they should not be Utopian but realizable demands, even though their fulfillment might require a long time. This much is clear: *things dare not simply continue as they have been in the past*. The Church must make a start and stir itself to earnest measures for improvement. It looks as though our Swiss people will need more bitterly than ever in the years ahead the courageous mighty help of the Church. May God find us not as faithless slumberers, but as true and watchful servants.

Satan Returns From Holiday

PAUL S. MINEAR

THE signs of the time point to a renewed appreciation of the demonic as a major determinant of destiny. Grappling with the contradictions and frustrations of human history, modern writers are forced, often against their will, to reckon with the "principalities and powers in heavenly places" that exert baleful tyranny over the course of events. Novelists from Dostoevsky to Gide and Mann have been alert to the demonic dimensions of the human dilemma. Mitya Karamazov confesses in anguish:

"What's still more awful is that a man with the ideal of Sodom in his heart does not renounce the ideal of the Madonna, and his heart is on fire with that ideal. . . . God and the devil are fighting there and the battlefield is the heart of man."

Even the literary novice may detect in *The Magic Mountain* the mythological overtones that transform the private fortunes of Hans Castorp into a universal tragedy. Hans is unable to escape the plague which becomes articulate in psychological, sociological and philosophical forms and which drives contemporary culture over the precipice to self-destruction. Mann's short stories, *Mario the Magician* and *Death in Venice*, employ different symbols but weave the same spell about the reader. He comes to see that the fabric of his own life is patterned by threads of demonic controls which become quite inescapable.

Modern poets, like the novelists, have found destiny dependent upon the dramatic conflict between God and Satan. We are perhaps too familiar with Dante and Milton to apprehend the rigorous realism of their testimony to the activity of his infernal majesty. Not so familiar with W. H. Auden, we may be startled by the bold presence of the devil in *The Double Man*.

"The Devil, as is not surprising—
His business is self-advertising—
Is a first-rate Psychologist
Who keeps a conscientious list
To help him in his ticklish deals,
Of what each client thinks and feels,

His school, religion, birth and breeding,
 Where he has dined and what he's reading,
 By every name he makes a note
 Of what quotations to misquote,
 And flings at every author's head
 Something a favorite author said."

So we see that the Tempter is quite at home in the best circles. As Andrè Gide and Denis de Rougemont insist, we can only catch the devil "seated in our own armchair," looking very much like ourselves. And such a discovery is protection both against the "woozier species of religion" and against the hypocritical inclination to identify the devil and our personal, social or political enemies.

Even in the current frenzy of discussion over the nature of democracy, consideration of superhuman forces has found a place. When angels, which have shared oblivion with demons, dare to show their faces in academic conferences, we can hardly doubt their return from holiday. More than one rationalistic and scientific eyebrow was raised at a conference of scientists, artists and philosophers in New York, 1941, when Mark van Doren insisted that one mark of our ignorance of human nature was our lack of interest in angels, because to know what men are we need to know what angels are. To misunderstand them is to misunderstand men. To ignore the distinctions between animals, men, angels and God is to open the way to hasty identification of men with animals, angels or even God. And that has brought and will continue to bring disastrous results.

In the fields of sociology and history, the sway of positivistic naturalism and scientific objectivity has inhibited discussion of the demonic, yet even in these areas there are signs of astounding reversals. A. J. Toynbee, for example, in his monumental *Study of History*, defends both the necessity of using myths and the validity of the biblical drama of God's conflict with Satan.

But to the majority of liberal Protestants, Satan's return to popularity is nothing short of bewildering. He has been relegated to the limbo with hobgoblins and elves, fairies and magic carpets, too long to be easily resuscitated. In fact, these other figures still retain a priority: they continue to hold sway at least in bedtime stories and children's fables. To suggest Satan as a living force in all men's destiny is to remind Americans of the dialogue between Alice and the White Queen:

"Alice laughed, 'There's no use trying,' she said; 'One can't believe impossible things.'

"I dare say you haven't had much practice,' said the Queen. 'When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour each day. Why, sometimes I believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.'"

Satan's return to adult conversation may seem utterly absurd, but this very absurdity should provoke more vigorous discussion.

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The purpose of this essay is to suggest the relevance of the New Testament to this surprising latter-day emergence. However far we may have moved from early Christian ideology, Protestantism remains rooted in its biblical tradition and must orient its life ever anew in terms of biblical perspectives. In the New Testament the Christian perennially confronts the devil not simply as a category of speculative analysis, but as a force whose reality one cannot doubt, as a tyrant who harasses us in every moment of our personal-social history. Early Christians accepted his existence and power as implicitly as modern Christians reject them. The understanding of the early Christian ethos may therefore contribute to our renewal of acquaintance with Satan.

The fact of the devil's importance to early Christians requires little argument. In the New Testament he is the third most important actor. Without him the plot evaporates; there is no conflict, no suspense, no climax, no denouement. His existence and power are reckoned with on every page. His role is as prominent as that of God or Christ, as real as the roles of Peter or Judas, Paul or Pilate. As befitting his character, he appears under many aliases and in protean disguises: Accuser, Deceiver, Tempter, Enemy, Angel of Light—countless demonic agents in his army.

In the Synoptic narratives, he is the chief adversary of Jesus; nor is this surprising, for Jesus comes for the avowed purpose of banishing him from earth. Jesus knows that God has already expelled Satan from heaven, whence he has seen him "fallen like lightning." Satan is also fully aware that the theater of war has shifted from heaven to earth, where the forces of the two kingdoms are locked in final conflict. The war is being fought on many fronts with many strategies. At Jesus' appearance, Satan tries to dissuade him from his mission with most alluring bribes: security, popularity, power. Only after Jesus penetrates Satan's disguise and repels his advances is He fully qualified as Messiah. Im-

mediately He invades Satan's province and casts out his demonic underlings. By superior authority He frees men and women who have been bound "lo, these many years." He enlists disciples in His army and shares with them power to repel demons. But the devil does not yield the field easily. He protests the exorcisms, spreads misunderstandings of the exorcists and countercharges into territory freed of his rule. He divides the forces of the disciples by the subtle use of propaganda. For a time he succeeds in confusing Peter, so that the chief disciple stumbles over the thought of a dying Messiah. Only Jesus is able to penetrate this wily strategem. Even after this incident, Satan forces Peter into denial, "sifting him like wheat," and it requires Jesus' prayer to save His leading deputy. This protection is denied to Judas and to the priests and scribes, and they succumb to temptation. Minions of Satan reach their maximum striking power in encompassing the death of Jesus, which thus becomes a supreme manifestation of their power over men within history. Through God's intervention, however, the kingdom survives even this blow. God raises Jesus from death, exalting Him to new power and authority in heaven. The resurrection thus becomes a supreme manifestation of God's ultimate power over Satan, though a power exerted from beyond history. From Jesus' new vantage point as Lord even of "principalities and powers" He continues to direct the historical struggle.

Satan's final doom is sealed by the resurrection, but the period before the return of the Messiah offers him a breathing spell and he turns all his energies into bitter attack upon the followers of Jesus. He inspires persecution in synagogue and courtroom; while "the farmer sleeps," he sows tares among the wheat; he fomented personal jealousies and heretical wrangling by masquerading in "sheep's clothing." There is no limit to his ingenuity. Yet the Christian community, through the power of its Lord, is able to repel his invitations to compromise and his counterfeit claims to piety. As the return of Christ draws near, Satan will appear openly in the field as anti-Christ and will risk his fate in an all-out battle. To Christians of weak faith, the outcome of that battle may seem doubtful. But to the faithful, those in whom the power of Christ has availed in lesser conflicts, the outcome can only be complete victory for Christ.

"The prince of darkness grim—
We tremble not for him;
His rage we can endure,
For lo, his doom is sure."

Until such doom is administered, however, men must resist the devil "and all his works" with the only effectual weapons, the armament of the spirit of the Living Christ.

Such a summary of the role of the devil in early Christian thought can be indefinitely expanded, but this may serve to demonstrate how indispensable he is in the dramatic perspective of the New Testament. So pervasive is demonology that its presence can hardly be dismissed as due to naïve ideas superficially assimilated from environment or to adventitious and extraneous elements easily sloughed off by more sophisticated Christians. If the struggle with this superhuman adversary be deleted, neither Peter nor Paul would recognize the gospel as good news of God's saving help.

Early Christian experience of the demonic is rooted in the entire biblical view of history, within which it appears as an indigenous and essential growth. History may be described as the autobiography of God, for He is the major and ultimate actor, always present in determining destiny. It may also be described as a perpetual revolt against His purpose, for history begins with rebellion and ends only when that rebellion has been quelled. The Bible is as striking a monument to human intransigence as it is to divine power and purpose. Israel perennially has a stiff neck, hard forehead, stopped-up ears, uncircumcized heart. God has a controversy with each generation—adulterers, harlots, thieves, murderers. In none of these biblical legends does any hero or generation appear blameless in God's sight. "We have sinned with our fathers" is a typical confession. The fact that this sin is everywhere described as idolatry and adultery indicates that history's intransigence is due to loyalty to false gods and false "husbands." There were gods many and lords many that deceived men and diverted their loyalties from their true Creator, thus defeating his purpose and defying his control. To these deceptive masters men repeatedly entrusted their decision and destiny. But God, the only true God, was a jealous God who struggled to show His people the vanity and futility of "whoring after strange gods."

A developed demonology appears late in the Old Testament period, but the basis for it is found in this history-long conflict between God and all that opposes His creative intention. The biblical dualism is not the familiar one of flesh vs. spirit, for the source of rebellion lies within spirit as well as within flesh; nor is the antithesis that of God vs. the

natural world, for God created the world and called it good; nor is the struggle joined between men and God as mutually exclusive realities set over against each other, for God created man in His image and works within every human choice and every historical event. The biblical dualism springs from the tension arising within immediate personal experience when man meets God, senses His purpose, hears His demand for unconditional loyalty and becomes at once aware of forces that impel him to deviate from the Creator's purpose for his life. And in the events which follow his divided loyalty, he experiences the futility and the failure of behavior that cuts across the grain of the divine intention. Over and over again he finds that his decision and destiny are compounded of the sin of serving two masters, both of whom prove to be stronger than himself, neither of whom will relinquish the claim to control his career. The omnipresent conflict assures him of the reality of a Tempter, a Deceiver and Enemy, whose dynamic historical influence infects and aborts the fulfillment of human hopes.

Although the focus of this struggle lies in immediate personal choice, the character of the antagonists is not to be comprehended in purely psychological or moral terms, or in the subjective aspects of experience. For the battle stems from forces that transcend the individual participant. The rebellion against God's will is organized, purposive, pervasive, persistent. Its ramifications reach backward and forward, involving the entire past and the entire future. Its roots lie deep in the texture of human relationships; its fruits jeopardize the outcome of all man's striving.

This orientation to the reality of resistance to God explains the unique aspects of biblical demonology. First, we may make three positive observations: (1) In biblical thought, Satan and his hosts are always conceived as subordinate to the ultimate sovereignty of God. The conflict in personal experience is precipitated by a revealed word or deed of God; the war is a civil war and not an international one. (2) As history is the primary sphere of Satan's activity, dualism is made provisional not by metaphysical distinctions among the relative power of cosmic beings but by the temporal distinctions between this age and creation, between this age and the final restitution. (3) Personal progress in apprehending God's will and historical movement toward the final Judgment alike serve to heighten rather than to diminish the conflict with Satan. Every revelation of God's purpose is countered by a deceptive

artifice on Satan's part; every divine deed aggravates the rebellion. The present human decision is thus always a crisis within which a superhuman drama is enacted; every event is an incident in an age-long war that is waged on both earthly and heavenly planes.

The uniqueness of the biblical viewpoint is also evidenced by the striking absence of three types of speculation: (1) Virtually no attention is given to cosmogonic explanations of the origin of evil. Stories tracing Satan's genealogy to fallen angels are extrabiblical. Attention is focused rather on the end—the ultimate banishment of Satan. (2) Equally scarce are philosophical efforts to describe the ontological status of Satan. The logical contradiction of God's sovereignty and Satan's freedom does not weigh heavily on biblical thinkers. They were absorbed in the practical problem of defeating Satan's wily attacks, a defeat that required personal commitment and fresh access of divine power rather than impersonal knowledge of Satan's cosmic status. (3) Nor do we find in the Bible psychological analysis of the subjective aspects of Satan's control over men. To be sure, men are well aware of Satan's use of pride and prejudice for blinding them, but they do not try to "locate" Satan in one area of psychical reaction by separating spirit from flesh or by distinguishing thought, feeling and will. Throughout the Bible, the rebellion against God is reckoned with as a dynamic pervasive personal force to be overcome and not as a cosmic, metaphysical, psychological entity to be studied. Hence we find testimonies to his influence rather than data on his names, numbers, personal physiognomy, his location in space and his origin in time.

* * * * *

We return now to the former question: how is the New Testament experience of Satan relevant to his modern return from holiday? First, let me suggest that the biblical viewpoint should help us detect unjustified modernizations of Jesus and Paul. For in their own distaste for the demonic, liberal interpreters are prone to denature and devitalize the early Christian gospel. Separated from the context of mythological conflict the teachings of Jesus become insipid and innocuous. The reader may check for himself by consulting the "liberal" biographies of Jesus most widely used in Protestant churches and schools. Perhaps the following will describe his findings. References to demonic forces in the index are scarce. Most of these references deal with the subject of Jesus' healings.

The authors treat the exorcisms as a problem to be rationalized in ways consistent with each author's world view, a world view which includes in *a priori* fashion the possibility of the existence of demons. Consequently, the solution of the problem is limited to a few alternatives. (1) Jesus "knew better" but accommodated His ideas consciously to the thought patterns of His contemporaries. (2) He inherited these patterns unconsciously but gradually transcended them. (3) He accepted them consciously, a pardonable error, but restricted them to unimportant areas of His thought. But does the typical modern author deal with the demonic as a major and dominant element in the mission and message of Jesus? Does he suggest that Jesus understood His whole mission in terms of divine-demonic conflict? Does he help the reader see the drama of history as it appeared to Jesus Himself? No. By his desire to portray Jesus in intelligible and meaningful terms, the biographer has virtually excluded Satan. But what would Paul or Mark or the Fourth Evangelist have said of such a portrait? Would it retain its significance to them? We may well wonder.

Or the reader may prefer to check the modernizations current in books of "liberal" theology. Study the standard texts used for theological students or the more popular summaries of Christian faith. At few points are they more distant from the New Testament than at this point: the interpretation of history as continuing conflict between two kingdoms, one of which is the kingdom of Satan.

Modernizations of the early Christian gospel would not be serious if they reflected ignorance of the Bible. But adequate knowledge of biblical thought is readily available. Nor would they be serious if they reflected improved command over the human situation today. But that may be doubted. They seem rather to spring from weaknesses in our faith: from romantic idealization of human nature, from sentimental and utopian attitudes toward history, from complacency about our own ability to conquer sin and transcend death. We have been so confident of advances in psychology, sociology, history and metaphysics as assuring mastery of destiny that we have termed biblical attitudes primitive and credulous and have prided ourselves on progress as *distance from* rather than *nearness to* their insights. But it is we who have been naïve and superstitious—and unsatisfied. Jesus, Peter, Paul testify to actual victories over the tyrant Satan, victories for which our souls are starved.

But we have stifled our hunger by denying its existence and are thus doubly under the power of the kingdom of this world. No less slaves than they, we ignore the existence and power of our masters. How then can we give faithful witness to the power of God in Christ?

Not only does the New Testament help in locating spurious modernizations and in assessing their causes, but it can also illuminate the current revival of demonology by insisting that *first questions be placed first*. The fact that early faith in Satan appears today as an archaic superstition is simply an indication of the huge chasm between the world of modern speculative analysis, that proceeds by impersonal objective exploration of the natural world, and the world of biblical existentialist thinking, that proceeds by personal confrontation with the invisible determinants of one's own destiny. The first world insists that the prior question must be: "Does Satan exist? Can we demonstrate his objective status in space and time?" And it would maintain that, if his existence cannot be proved by empirical observation or sound epistemological argument, to introduce him into the situation is unnecessary and even confusing. The second world, on the other hand, assumes as a prior, "given" fact of experience the activity within man's life of historical forces that transcend his own person in terms of control, interpenetration, persistence, knowledge and volition. This second world does not even raise the question of *metaphysical* status but witnesses to the operation of *metahistorical* purposes, made inescapably real by the presence of conflict and struggle, aspiration and frustration, the "end" of divine creation and all that resists the realization of that "end" in human history. For this second world, the "first" questions deal with the revelation of God's will, free from demonic corruption, the means of apprehending divine help in the struggle with evil, and the assurance of ultimate security in a kingdom of God from which Satan has been permanently exiled. If one moves from the first world into the second, he enters a dimension within which demonology is not a shattered superstition but personal testimony to confrontation with forces which struggle for his soul. In this world God and Satan are real masters contending for our loyalty; from their struggle stem the contradictions that rend us; their purposes—though future in fulfillment—actually invade our present and compel us to fateful decision. But if we spend our lives in the first world, we can never arrive at belief in Satan (or in God) by waiting for conclusive rational demonstration

of his objective existence. The avenue to an appreciation of biblical demonology lies not through the jungle of metaphysical theories and debate but through the discovery that our world, viewed from within, is in fact the same world of personal struggle as theirs.

In John Bennett's latest book, *Christian Realism*, the resurgence of demonology is faced, but with an opposite conclusion.

"There is a tendency at present in Europe to return to the idea that there are superhuman forces of evil, fallen angels or devils, which prey upon human life and greatly extend the power of evil in the world. . . . The only question is whether or not such things exist. I believe that the present plight of humanity can be explained without resort to them. . . ." (p. 32.)

Within the perspective of the world of speculative analysis, Mr. Bennett asks the appropriate "first" question, and his answer is, of course, correct. The present state of affairs considered in the abstract has always been capable of explanation without recourse to demonology. But Mr. Bennett refuses to adopt for himself the biblical standpoint or to ask first the questions indigenous to it. One may not, perhaps, question the ground upon which an objective theologian chooses to stand. But one may question his logic. For the existence of God, to which Mr. Bennett subscribes, belongs to the same world, to the same dimension of human historical experience, as does the existence of Satan. And the same reasons may be adduced for denying the existence of God which Mr. Bennett has used to deny the existence of Satan. This logical contradiction in liberal thought, i. e., the insistence on the existence of God while renouncing the existence of Satan, has been demonstrated by Edwyn Bevan in his little book *Sibyls and Seers* (cf. p. 30f). But the contradiction does not exist for New Testament writers. To them no moment in history can be understood apart from the revelation of God's word and deed, and no revelation of God's powerful purpose is mediated apart from the revelation of a will, an activity, a kingdom in rebellion against God. The enduring function of the New Testament may well be that it repeatedly reintroduces us into its world, a world of concrete human experience within which we meet God and Satan as metahistorical forces contending for the control of our decision and destiny. And then, perhaps, God's defeat of Satan in the death and resurrection of Jesus may regain its pristine power as a fully contemporaneous event in our own history.

Paul and His Persecutions

W. A. SMART

THE history of Christianity has until recent times been studied almost solely from two viewpoints: the history of its organizations and the history of its doctrines. The traditional required courses in the seminaries have usually been the history of the Church and the history of doctrine. Knowledge of these two was supposed to bridge the gap between the First Century and the present, and to make perfectly clear the way by which we have gotten from where we were to where we are.

And until recently each of these lines of study has been carried on in a vacuum, or more accurately, each has been treated as an isolated, independent chain of development, with little regard to what was happening in the world outside, and frequently with little regard even for the other. The organization or the doctrine at a given point in the process was adequately explained by the stages which lay immediately behind it, and in turn provided adequate explanation for the stage next to follow. The organization of the Church was the achievement of the Church statesmen (or politicians), and the doctrines of the Church were the achievement of her theologians. Each stream was represented as running through history as the Nile runs through Egypt, with no tributaries from the area through which it flows.

Modern historians are changing this. It is being increasingly recognized that religion is, at every stage of its development and in every place, one factor in the complex structure of society. Its form and its conduct and its thought are largely determined by the total milieu of which it is a part, not only because it consciously seeks to influence the world around it, but more fundamentally because it is part of that world. Its very life is in the interplay between itself and the forces by which it is surrounded, and the only alternative is death.

This means that as Christianity struggles to establish itself in the world it must deal with all the forces which are operative, whether political, or racial, or economic, or domestic, or whatnot, and it is an oversimplification to imagine that the problem is merely to get its doctrines accepted, or even to get its code of conduct practiced.

This makes the study of the past stand out with increased vividness and interest, for while the path of doctrinal development seems often dry, and even irrelevant, as we look back on it, we find the human ambitions and prejudices and passions in the earlier days surprisingly like our own.

All of which is a rather long introduction to some comments on the experiences of the apostle Paul. Everyone is familiar with the fact that Paul met opposition and even persecution as he tried to introduce Christianity into the Mediterranean world, and it is common to assume that this was because of the strange and unwelcome gospel which he preached. In fact, Luke gives some basis for such an idea, for in his eagerness to show that Paul was always acceptable to the Roman authorities he places much of the responsibility for the opposition on the Jews and the differences in doctrine between them and Paul. But it is interesting to look just a little more closely at the four chief instances of persecution recorded in Acts, realizing that Paul also suffered many other hard experiences of which we know almost nothing.

The first trouble of which Acts tells us was in Pisidian Antioch, on the first recorded missionary journey (Acts 13). In this case Acts is very explicit as to the reception of Paul's gospel and the cause of the subsequent trouble. Paul, as a good Jew, went to the synagogue service on the Sabbath and took his seat. But the ruler of the synagogue recognized him as a man worth hearing, probably as a rabbi, and asked him to speak. Paul preached Jesus as the fulfillment of their Messianic hope, and delighted them. Far from resenting a strange doctrine, they engaged him then and there to return and tell them more about it on the following Sabbath.

But on the next Sabbath something happened. When the time for service arrived the place was crowded, and with Gentiles as well as Jews. "When the Jews saw the multitudes (of Gentiles), they were filled with jealousy." There was nothing wrong with Paul's message. In fact, he probably had not yet delivered his message when the Jews looked around and saw the place filled with Gentiles. But the Jews were furious, and when Paul saw that the old race issue had been drawn, though he was a Jew himself, he did the gracious thing and took the side of those who were being rudely treated. He withdrew with them. "And as the Gentiles heard this, they were glad, and glorified the word of God."

The issue seems to have been clear enough. There was no objection

to Paul's preaching Christ, for the only time they heard him they approved. But when preaching the gospel cut across racial lines and outraged their most cherished prejudices, that was another matter. It always is. It is just as dangerous for the gospel to interfere with race prejudice today as it was then, and modern parallels would be easy to imagine. It matters not how eloquent the preacher nor how orthodox his message, if the average white congregation should go to its accustomed church on Sunday morning and find the seats taken by Negroes, the scene which would result would make it easy to understand the change of attitude toward Paul in Antioch. And if, when the unwelcome guests were forced to leave, such a preacher should leave his own people and go with them, he would be a marked man from that time on. Paul was run out of the city, for the Jews "stirred up a persecution against Paul and Barnabas, and cast them out of their borders."

Paul and Barnabas fled to Iconium, the next town, and persecution followed them. The immediate cause of the trouble there is not clearly stated, but it is fair to assume that outraged Jews from Antioch had followed them there and stirred up trouble, for when the apostles fled from Iconium to Lystra and Paul was lynched there, it is expressly stated that it was due to Jews who "came thither from Antioch and Iconium."

So Paul was run out of two towns and lynched in a third without a word of criticism against his gospel being recorded. His offense was that he was a "Gentile-lover."

The next instance of persecution which Luke describes is possibly even more illuminating. Paul had crossed over into Europe after his "Macedonian call," and his first visit was to the city of Philippi (Acts 16:11ff). There seem to have been few Jews in Philippi, for there was no synagogue, and Luke implies that there were no men present at the little Sabbath service by the riverside where Paul first preached his gospel of the crucified Messiah.

Again there is not a suggestion that Paul's message gave offense. If any of those present did not like it, they had a perfect right not to be convinced, but Luke does not even mention any such difference, and certainly there was nothing of a threatening nature. Lydia, who was probably a woman of some prominence, felt honored to have Paul as a guest in her home, and so far as one can see from the account in Acts, the entire incident was pleasant and harmonious.

The trouble in Philippi started not in the synagogue but in the street, not over theology but over an act of mercy, and the men who precipitated it were not Jews, and were no more interested in religious differences than crooks and charlatans usually are. They were unscrupulous scoundrels who had gotten possession of a poor, unfortunate girl who was possessed of some sort of "spirit." Pretending that she was a voice of the gods and could tell fortunes, these men exploited her and deceived the public, with the result that they made "much gain."

When Paul cured the girl, she was of no more value to her owners, and they were enraged. Religion had nothing to do with the case, but when their easy income was interfered with, then Paul became an intolerable troublemaker. "When her masters saw that the hope of their gain was gone, they laid hold on Paul and Silas." They dragged them before the city magistrates, not before a body interested in deciding religious questions, and lodged complaint that they "do exceedingly trouble our city." It was not entirely accurate or logical to claim that interference with their little racket was a danger to the prosperity of the city as a whole, but it has a familiar ring. The subsequent beating, imprisonment and invitation to get out of town are familiar.

It would be too much to claim that Paul never stirred up trouble by the gospel which he preached. More of that in a moment. But the severe persecution in Philippi was not related to the gospel which he preached there any more than were the persecutions in the Galatian cities. An act of kindness to an unfortunate girl had put an end to the unholy gain of unscrupulous men, and such men usually do not yield without a fight.

The same motif runs through the next scene. Ephesus was evidently important in Paul's eyes. He made unsuccessful effort to enter it on his second missionary journey, and when he did finally enter, he seems to have stayed and labored there longer than in the other cities which he evangelized. And he must have made a decided impression, for Ephesus was a large city, and it probably took a movement of considerable size to interfere with the trade in images sufficiently to upset the guild which made and sold them.

Soon after Paul's arrival in Ephesus there was some little friction because some of the Jews objected to his message, but it could not have been very serious. Paul was allowed to "speak boldly for the space of

three months" in the synagogue, persuading the Jews that Jesus was the Christ. When some Jews finally objected, he left the synagogue and secured another place to teach, but there he was left undisturbed for two years so far as preaching religion was concerned.

It was not direct opposition to his religious ideas which caused the trouble. When "no small stir" was finally made, it was, as in Philippi, because he interfered with the making of money.

The mob scene in Ephesus is too familiar to need description. Demetrius, who stirred it up, was not a Jew, and was utterly uninterested in the correctness or the incorrectness of Paul's religious ideas. So far as he was concerned, Paul could have preached what he pleased, about Judaism or Christianity or any other religion, so long as he did not interfere with business. But any religion which made profits fall off was by that very fact proved to be dangerous.

All the familiar notes of the mob scene are sounded. First was Demetrius' direct appeal to the purse as he got the members of his image-making union together. "Ye know that by this business we have our wealth," and therefore anything that interferes with this business is wrong, Through Paul there was "danger that this our trade come into disrepute," and therefore Paul should be suppressed. The other alternative never occurred to them, that possibly Paul might be right, and therefore their business should be suppressed.

But business would piously identify itself with religion, and the image-makers' union became concerned for the standing of the Goddess Artemis throughout the world. They actually shuddered to think "that she should even be deposed from her magnificence whom all Asia and the world worshippeth." Business was devoutly interested in religion when religion underwrote the success of business, just as it was hysterically opposed to religion when, as in the case of Paul, it threatened such success. The mob that was forming probably glowed with the warmth of its religious feeling.

In addition to the appeal to profits and the appeal to religion, there was a slogan which was used as a rallying call and an incentive to passion. "They were filled with wrath, and cried out, saying, Great is Diana (Artemis) of the Ephesians." All the elements for the making of a mob were present. "The city was filled with the confusion," and the mob scene in the theater resulted.

Paul was not hurt in this outbreak, so far as we can learn from Acts. It must have been on some other occasion that he fought with beasts in Ephesus (I Corinthians 15:32). This time his friends wisely restrained him from entering the theater, and after the mob had milled around a couple of hours shouting "Great is Diana," it was finally dissolved. But it was one of the most extensive and most savage attacks ever made on Paul, and it seems to have terminated his relatively long stay in Ephesus. "And after the uproar ceased, Paul . . . departed to go into Macedonia." He must have learned by this time that it was not particularly dangerous to preach the gospel of Christ, but that it was very dangerous to violate race prejudice or to interfere with the ways in which people made their money.

The final persecution of Paul, the one which actually succeeded in putting an end to his travels, occurred at Jerusalem, when he paid what was probably intended to be a brief visit to deliver the collection which his Gentile churches had raised for the church in Jerusalem, before turning his steps toward Rome and eventually toward Spain. But he was to see Rome only as a prisoner, and Spain probably never at all, because again, as at Antioch, he stirred the racial prejudices of his people.

Tragically enough, the whole issue was precipitated because Paul was trying to avoid it. Solely in order to hold out an olive branch and to advertise to the Jews his respect for their customs, he consented to join some Jews in the temple and to pay for their release from some vows they had taken. But some excitable citizens jumped to conclusions, and because they had seen him elsewhere with Gentiles, they assumed that those who were with him in the temple were Gentiles also, and Gentiles were not allowed further in the temple than the outer Court of the Gentiles.

The scene which followed would be almost humorous in its much ado about nothing if it were not so tragic. A perfectly insane mob gathered, which never thought of investigating the facts or of listening to the perfectly simple explanation which Paul could have given, but merely lusted for blood. "All the city was moved, and the people ran together; and they laid hold on Paul, and dragged him out of the temple." Word was taken to the Roman officer that "all Jerusalem was in confusion," and he had to lead a band of armed troops to rescue Paul from the beating. It was typical of a lynching mob that "some shouted one thing,

some another" when they were questioned, and the soldiers had to lift Paul and carry him above their heads so as to rescue him from the lynchers and make him safe in prison. And with this scene Paul's freedom to travel the Mediterranean world as an ambassador for Christ was ended, for while he lived at least five years after this and possibly more, he spent them confined in Caesarea and in Rome waiting judgment for a crime which he had not committed.

We have said that these four major attacks on Paul were not due to what we would call religious issues, but to entrenched interests and prejudices which are, unfortunately, perennial. In Antioch and in Jerusalem he had run counter to strong racial prejudices, or was thought to have done so. In Philippi and in Ephesus he had interfered with profits. But the case was not quite so simple. Many times opposition to Paul is represented as having been due to religious differences, though usually those cases did not inflame the people so deeply nor incite to mob action. In Syrian Antioch, for instance, some caused "no small dissension and questioning" by insisting that "except ye be circumcised after the custom of Moses, ye cannot be saved." Similarly in Thessalonica some of the Jews, "being moved with jealousy," put the city in an uproar because Paul was "saying that there was another king, one Jesus." In Corinth they "opposed themselves and blasphemed" because he taught that Jesus was the Christ. And in Ephesus "some were hardened and disobedient, speaking evil of the Way."

Such opposition seems to have grown directly out of Paul's preaching, and not out of the outraging of local prejudices and passions as in the more serious cases already reviewed. But we must remember that the distinction between religion and race was very narrow for the Jews of that day. So long as racial lines were not threatened, the Jews could make place for wide differences in religion. There was room for the priests with their emphasis on animal sacrifices and for the Essenes who repudiated all sacrifice, for the Pharisee with his faith in resurrection from the dead and for the Sadducee who denied it, for the apocalypticist who waited with what patience he could for God to end the present evil age and for the Zealot who wanted to get a sword and end it himself. Judaism was able to make room for many differences, and for many who had claimed to be the promised Deliverer. But what it could not tolerate was the breaking down of its feeling of superiority to the Gentiles

because God had made them a superior race and had entrusted them with His law. Racial prejudice and religion were inextricably interwoven, and lesser breeds were accursed because they knew not the law. The only way for an outsider to accept the Jewish religion was by becoming a member of the Jewish race, and the only way to be naturalized into their race was by accepting their religion.

When we remember this relationship and also remember that wherever Paul went he insisted that in Christ there could be no Jew nor Greek but that all were one, we can realize that any objection to him and his preaching which the Jews made on the ground of religion must have been based largely on this racial prejudice. It is significant that the Christians who stayed in Jerusalem and preached this same Messiahship of Jesus, but preached it to Jews only, seem to have gotten into no trouble at all after those first few weeks before Paul had joined the movement. The observance of the law, which was the point at issue between them and Paul, was as much a matter of racial distinction as of religious orthodoxy. All of which is another way of saying that even the opposition to Paul which appears to rest on religious grounds was largely based on Jewish prejudice against Gentiles, which was just as stubborn as modern Gentile prejudice against Jews, and often just as vulgar and as bitter.

Such seem to have been the experiences of Paul, culminating in his execution. As he sought to win converts, his bitterest opposition came from the greed and the narrowness of the people who did not want the *status quo* disturbed. And so, probably, it has always been. The historian as he looks back is naturally interested in the development of doctrines and of organizations, and in the conflict of ideologies. But Christianity meets its most serious testing times when it dares to interfere with those things which people hold more dear—pride of race, pride of purse and all the other unhallowed features in the familiar social system. Until, like Paul, it can successfully challenge such strongholds, there is little danger that it will receive the unintended tribute paid to him and his followers, "Behold, those who turn the world upside down."

The Misprint That Made Good

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

AT A DINNER party a few years ago, Humphrey Milford—now Sir Humphrey Milford—the head of the Oxford University Press, was asked why he did not correct the misprint “strain at a gnat” in the twenty-fourth verse of the twenty-third chapter of the Gospel of Matthew, in the King James version. Sir Humphrey is, of course, one of the leading publishers of that version.

“Is that a misprint?” he politely asked.

“Oh yes,” said his questioner, “it certainly is. Isn’t it, Sir William?” For Sir William Craigie, the editor of the Oxford Dictionary, was sitting at the publisher’s side.

The great lexicographer did not hesitate.

“Of course it’s a misprint,” he crisply replied. “Everybody knows that!”

Some years have passed since this lively bit of table-talk, but “strain at a gnat” still stands in the Oxford printings of King James, as in all the others. For it is that rarity in printing history, a misprint that made good. People have become so attached to it that they actually prefer it to the original.

Thirty years ago there was not a riper biblical scholar in Britain than Alfred Plummer, but he said of this text, “‘Strain at a gnat’ was originally a misprint for ‘strain out a gnat.’” But if it was that originally, isn’t it that now? Clearly Doctor Plumer thought not; he felt that the reading had established itself so strongly that it could not—perhaps should not—be corrected. Many people feel in just that way. They are not keenly interested in what Matthew actually wrote, or what Jesus actually said. They have always heard it this way, and they are entirely satisfied with it the way it is.

It was, of course, an allusion to the Jewish prohibition in Leviticus 11:23 of eating certain insects. If such a creature fell into a Pharisee’s drink he would scrupulously strain it out. This is the plain meaning of the Greek, as it appears in all the ancient and medieval manuscripts of the Gospel of Matthew, from the fourth century to the fifteenth. On many other points they vary, but in this passage they always use this word. There

is nothing of the idea of great exertion implied in "straining at" to be found in any of these manuscripts in this passage.

This is just as true of the ancient versions—the early translations of the Gospels into Latin, Syriac, Coptic, Gothic, Armenian, Ethiopic and Arabic, made from the second to the eighth centuries, though there were five different Syriac versions of the Gospels, and as many in the different dialects of Coptic. Neither the Old Latin version, nor the Vulgate revision of it made by St. Jerome about A. D. 382, shows any different understanding of the word, which both understood as meaning "straining out" as one strains milk to clear it of anything that may have fallen into it.

The Greek dictionaries, classical or biblical, give no support for any other meaning than "straining out" for the word. Modern European translators, so far as I know without exception, have rendered the word in this way, from the earliest German version, made from the Latin Vulgate in the fourteenth century, down. Luther in 1522, translating the Greek text of Erasmus, rendered it "Seihet," and Weizsaecker in 1875 simply used the modern form of the same word, "seiget," "strain out." Italian, French and Spanish versions do the same.

The English Bible seems to have begun with Wyclif, who in 1382 translated the New Testament from the Latin Vulgate into English. He quaintly put it "clensynge a knatte." Tyndale, in 1525, in the first English New Testament to appear in print, wrote "which strayne out a gnat."

Seven English Bibles appeared after Tyndale and before King James, and no one of them reads "strain at a gnat." Most of them follow Tyndale closely in this verse. Coverdale, Rogers, Taverner and the Great Bible (these in 1535 to 1539) read exactly as he did. The Geneva Bible of 1560—the well-known Breeches Bible—varies the spelling, "straine out a gnatte." The Catholic version made at Rheims in 1582 read "that straine a gnat," evidently meaning the same thing.

The King James version was professedly a revision of the Bishops' Bible, and the first rule laid down for the revisers directed them to alter its wording "as little as the truth of the original would permit." How then, did they come to change the standard and long-established "strain out" to "strain at"? This was much more than the change of "out" to "at"; it put a wholly different meaning into the word "strain," and one for which neither the original Greek nor any ancient version gave any basis. In fact, it completely reversed the sense, substituting the picture of over-

exertion for the very mild activity of straining a fly out of a cup of wine or water.

The Bishops' Bible was very fluid in text—that is, it varied constantly in details from one edition to another. But the four printings I have examined on this reading—1568, 1572, 1576, 1582—all read “strayne (or straine) out a gnat.” And yet King James, from the very first printing of 1611 on, invariably reads “at” instead of “out.”

There seems to be no possible explanation of this reading except that it is a misprint pure and simple, which it should require no more than a post card to the publisher to have corrected. But what is the likelihood that such a misprint might have crept into that stately version? How careful were the printers of the great English Bibles from 1535 to 1611 in their proof reading?

Of course English spelling was not yet standardized; Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster had not yet appeared to create a new propriety in printing, any infraction of which now so shocks the cultivated eye. Tyndale in 1525 knew twelve different ways to spell the word “it,” and used pretty much all of them. An English Bible of those days exhibits literally thousands of spellings which anyone today would at once stigmatize as misprints. Yet they were correct enough, in their day and generation.

There were, of course, in those Bibles, oddities of expression, too, which amuse and divert the modern reader, but were quite correct in their time. One of the most famous of these is the promise in Psalm 91:5, Thou shalt not be afraid of “eny bugges by nyght,” which goes back to Coverdale (1535) and was repeated by Rogers (1537) and Taverner (“any bugges,” 1539). Of course “bugges” meant “bogies,” or evil spirits. In the Great Bible (1539) it was changed to “terroure.”

Another word of which much has been made was “treacle” in Jeremiah 8:22, where what we know as “Is there no balm in Gilead?” read “There is no more triacle at Galaad.” This has been assigned to various Bibles, but as a matter of fact it first appeared in Coverdale, and reappeared in Rogers (tryacle), Taverner and the Great Bible, the last one reading, “There is no more Triacle at Gylead.”

The familiar name of the Geneva Bible of 1560, the Breeches Bible, is of course derived from its reading in Genesis 3:7, “They sewed figtre leaves together and made themselves breeches.”

But these are none of them misprints, such as have given popular

names to some Bibles—the Judas Bible, the Wicked Bible, the Wifehater Bible, the Murderer's Bible and the Printer's Bible, which Cotton Mather declared read, in Psalm 119:161, "Printers have persecuted me without a cause." A man in Wisconsin has a King James Bible of 1746 which reads in Mark 7:35, "The sting of his tongue was loosed." The famous "Vinegar Bible" of 1716, printed by J. Baskett, contained so many misprints that it was described as a "basketful of printer's errors." In a chapter-summary it printed "Vinegar" for "Vineyard."

The first printings of the King James version were full of typographical errors. In fact, it is by one of these that the first issue is most readily distinguished from the second, for in Ruth 3:15 the first reads by mistake, "He went into the city," which was promptly corrected in the second to "She went into the city." It is this difference that has led collectors to call them the "Great He Bible" and the "Great She Bible," respectively, "Great" meaning that they are tall copies, designed for pulpit use. The most impressive misprint in the first printing of King James was the repetition of three whole lines in Exodus 14:10.

There were scores and even hundreds of minor misprints in the first issue of 1611, but these were gradually corrected, though new typographical errors were constantly finding their way into the text. It has been bitterly observed that for every error corrected in a seventeenth-century printing of the Bible, two fresh errors were usually introduced. There was in short no such insistence upon typographical accuracy as we now expect. It is little wonder, then, if out of all the misprints originally carried by the edition of 1611, one should have escaped correction and survived until its publishers evidently feel that to correct it would evoke more blame than praise.

The New Testament has been revised or retranslated more than a hundred and fifty times since 1611, and it may be interesting to look in this wide range of texts for signs of possible influence of the King James reading in this passage. The Revised versions, both English and American, abandon it at once, and the private versions almost without exception pay no attention to it. I have looked at only twenty of these, but the only one to imitate the King James translation on this point is the recast of the Bible put forth in 1867 by the Reorganized Church of Latter Day Saints, a small sect of Mormons located at Independence, Missouri, which is based on the King James version and read, "strain at a gnat."

No printed Greek text of the New Testament, from Erasmus down to Tischendorf, Westcott and Hort, Von Soden, Nestle and Souter, gives any support to "strain at a gnat." They cannot be translated in that way. Nothing in these modern printings of the Greek lends any countenance to that translation. They are just as definitely against it as all the ancient manuscripts and all the ancient versions are. Modern commentaries pass the reading by in silence. In short, it has no support anywhere. It is just an out-and-out misprint, and nothing more, except as usage through three hundred years has enriched it with reflection, imagination and association. These are of course real values, so real that some as we have seen would compromise with the reading as only "originally" a misprint.

But that these values cannot outweigh what Matthew wrote, and Jesus, according to Matthew, said, is shown by the procedure of the English and American revisers, the commentators, and all the modern private translators who, ever since the beginning of the eighteenth century, have been following the Greek, not the King James reading.

This is an amazing picture. On one side, all the Greek manuscripts, ancient and medieval, the greatest number of manuscripts that exist for any work of literature in the world; all the ancient versions, oriental and European; all the printed editions of the Greek text, from Erasmus to the present time; all the modern European versions; all the English translations from Wyclif and Tyndale down to King James; all the English translations since King James—the private translations, the Revised versions and the modern speech translations—all the commentaries—these on the one side. And on the other, this misprint, meaningless and unsupported. One is almost sorry for it.

But we must not be sorry for it. It has had its day, and far more. It has been multiplied in millions and millions of copies, through three centuries and a quarter, and is still being circulated by the million every year. Full justice has been done it. It is now time to let the voice that first uttered the saying be heard, since there is no shadow of doubt what it said. There can be no sense in going on concealing from the readers of King James the meaning of this phrase, which all the rest of the world knows perfectly well and has always known.

The King James version may not remain forever the favorite version of the English-speaking world, but it bids fair to remain so for a long time to come. In either case it seems to be the duty and the responsibility of

its publishers to set this little matter right. The smaller and more unimportant it may seem, the less reason there is for perpetuating it. It cannot be defended as rhythm or as poetry, or as giving a sense easier to understand. After all, how does one go about straining at a gnat, and what picture do the words raise before the mind?

If the modern printers of King James really do not care about the rules by which that version was ordered made, or what Matthew wrote, or what Jesus said, and prefer a meaningless misprint created by some drowsy compositor in Robert Barker's printing office in 1611, to Jesus' incomparable imagination, and Matthew's fidelity and King James' Excellent Majesty, as reflected in the rules aforesaid, another course is open to them; they might at least put in the margin some such note as this, suggested by the cautious observation already quoted:

at: Originally a misprint for out.

But the obvious thing to do with a misprint is of course to correct it. It is not as though the publishers of King James had not through the years made many and many a change in the original wording of their version—Hierusalem, and Marie, charet and murther and damosel, shalbe, creeple, fet and moe. This process was still going on up to 1769, when it abruptly ceased. But it should not have ceased; no one imagines that the work of Doctor Paris in 1762 or of Doctor Blayney in 1769 possesses any peculiar finality, so that after them no further correction of the King James version would be in order. It is not a question of the finality of the King James version of 1611; no one advocates that. If he did, he would be bound to the Great He Bible, with all its recognized defects. It is a question of the finality of Benjamin Blayney's revision of 1769. Is anyone seriously concerned for that? Of course not.

Most modern printers of King James do not hesitate to drop two hundred and ten pages of the Apocrypha out of the original contents of King James, without even mentioning it to their readers. Surely it is no great thing to ask them to correct the one remaining misprint, of two letters, in the great historic version which time has put in their charge. If it be thought a matter of no importance, it is enough to quote the judgment of a great eighteenth-century scholar, Robert Lowth, professor of Poetry at Oxford, and later Bishop of London, who at seventy-three declined the archbishopric of Canterbury. He said of it, "It completely destroys the sense of the passage."

Religion and the Issue of Ethical Relativism

EDWARD THOMAS RAMSDELL

THOROUGHGOING relativism is a widely prevailing mood in current ethical thought. It assumes that there are no objective standards of morality. All moral judgments are entirely relative to the immediate historical situation and to personal desire. The notion of universally valid moral distinctions is a figment of the imagination. What men have called the moral nature is nothing but the product of mechanisms of one kind or another. There is no such thing as any spiritual life of man. The rational function is capable of nothing but rationalization. Freedom is a fiction.

Ethical relativism is not, of course, a new phenomenon in western thought. Protagoras, along with other Sophists of ancient Greece, could affirm that "man is a measure of all things," and Plato, in the *Theaetetus*, could attribute to Protagoras the view that "whatever appears to a state to be just and fair, so long as it is regarded as such, is just and fair to it." Thomas Hobbes in the early modern period frankly avowed in his *Leviathan*: "Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire: that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion evil for these words are ever used with relation to the person that useth them; there being nothing simply good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves." Shakespeare gave classic expression to the relativistic point of view in the famous line, "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."

In our day, however, ethical relativism is no longer the view simply of a few isolated scholars. It has become a world-wide mood. Indeed, it has assumed the proportions of an epidemic at a time when more rigorous moral discipline and more devoted moral loyalties are the desperate need. It shows itself in popular attitudes. The good life is doing what one wants to do. To talk about universal moral standards is obsolete. It is puritanism. Moral obligation in any categorical sense is a myth. The only real authority is desire. Politically, too, the point of view finds violent expression in fascism. The Nazi, for example, assumes that nothing is right or wrong

except the will of the state. The Fuehrer embodies that will and his voice becomes the only ultimate standard. National expediency is the only law. Promises are solely utilitarian; when their usefulness has passed they are forgotten. Justice is relative to national needs. Honor is relative to racial destiny. Though commonly using the language of objective morality, fascism consistently interprets that morality in relativistic terms.

The epidemic of relativism, however, is not confined to popular thought and to fascist theory and practice. Indeed, before it ever appeared in common attitudes and in current statecraft, it had become deeply rooted and strongly articulate in science and philosophy. Consider, for example, the point of view of many sociologists, that moral distinctions are relative solely to the cultural context in which they arise. The mores or standards of behavior of any group are determined by its survival and developmental needs. The moral ideas of a society, therefore, are valid for it in a biological sense, for they express and help to realize the impulse to life and power within the group, but they have no universal validity. The norms of one culture in no way hold for any other. The wide differences in moral judgments between different societies, it is affirmed, reveal this basic and inevitable relativism. Indeed, the moral ideas of a particular group are not constant; they change with the evolving needs of the group. Morality is through and through relative to its immediate cultural context. The current conflict in moral judgments between the people of Germany and those of Britain and America is exactly what the sociologist would expect. It only confirms the view that ideas of right and wrong are determined entirely by the survival and developmental needs of the group.

Based upon different grounds, a similar relativism is held by many psychologists. All human behavior, it is affirmed, is determined by the basic drives of the organism. All motivation, therefore, can be reduced to the demands of the ego, the sex and the herd impulses. We choose in accordance with these drives, doing the thing that we most desire to do. Any notion that we can deliberately determine our actions in the light of so-called moral ideals is quite false. True, indeed, we rationalize—that is, we devise “moral reasons” for our actions—but such reasons have nothing to do with determining the actions.

Ethical relativism has found vigorous expression, too, among certain philosophers. This commonly takes the form of holding that the analysis of value reveals no logical content. Value-experience is altogether sub-

jective. Its essence is the satisfaction of desire. It is entirely devoid of any objective meaning-element. Bertrand Russell, a frequent expounder of this view, holds that the only fact which we express in a moral judgment is the fact of our own feelings or desires. A desire is a desire, and that is all that we can say about it. It has no logical status. It can be neither true nor false. Alfred J. Ayer, a logical positivist, in his *Language, Truth and Logic* (p. 161), puts the matter thus: "Sentences which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth or falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable."

The net effect of all this relativism in popular thought, in fascist ideology and in science and philosophy is a repudiation of ethics as a normative science. It is a denial of the significance of deliberate moral action. It affirms that loyalty to such ideals as truth and justice cannot determine human behavior. It rejects the notion of any categorical obligation. Not even rationality itself is an obligation, except for the person who "wants" it to be. For ethical relativism, therefore, all imperatives become purely hypothetical. They are simply matters of expediency. There is nothing more binding in the moral life than desire. *Ought* means nothing more than the hypothesis that if a particular end be desired, certain procedures must be followed. As for any universal duties of mankind, there are none. Ethical relativism, therefore, denies both the moral capacity of man and the universal validity of any possible moral distinctions.

In confronting this epidemic of relativism in our day, Christian thought has two possibilities. It can accept the relativistic description of man's moral capacity as essentially true in the alleged interest of religious faith or it can reject it as inadequate because only half true. Christian faith, of course, can never accept the idea that there are no ultimate moral distinctions, for its center of gravity is the goodness of God. Christian faith assumes the reality of God's revelation. The Divine Word has been spoken. The question which arises in Christian thought, therefore, is not that of ultimate moral distinctions, but whether the moral nature of man is in itself capable of valid moral judgments. Is it true that the moral nature of man is so corrupt that it is entirely untrustworthy in itself and therefore dependent upon a revelation which in no sense involves norms of the human mind? Or is the moral nature of man, created as it has

been by God, capable of valid moral distinctions so that man can interpret the will of God through his own moral understanding? Those who take the first alternative may be called theological relativists; those who take the second, theological objectivists.

Theological relativism assumes that the relativistic descriptions of man's moral experience are essentially true, that man has no dependable moral nature, that he is incapable of objectivity, that his moral ideas are always and necessarily relative to his cultural context. The point of view roots, for the most part, in the tradition of Christian voluntarism, represented by such Christian thinkers as Tertullian, Augustine, Duns Scotus, Ockham, Luther, Calvin and, in our day, Karl Barth and his followers. Theological objectivism, on the other hand, regards the relativistic analysis of moral experience as inadequate because it is only half true. Man does have a potentially valid moral capacity. He does have the possibility of transcending the relativities of impulse and social context; he can distinguish real differences in moral worth; he can guide his conduct by valid ideals. This point of view roots in the tradition of Christian rationalism, a tradition which has persistently viewed faith as harmonious with reason. Some of its most notable representatives have been Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Arminius, Kant and, in our day, both Catholic and liberal Protestant theologians.

To look more closely at theological relativism, it accepts in particular the sociological view that moral judgments are relative to the cultural context and the psychological view that moral judgments are relative to the basic drives of the organism. Whether the theological relativist means to do so or not, he is to this extent reducing the behavior of man to a complex of mechanisms. In any event, he is meaning to deny the moral capacity of man. More pertinent to the view of the theological relativist, however, is the influence of sin. Human reason, it is held, is so blighted by original sin that it is incapable of moral objectivity. It can achieve no kind of dependable value-judgment. It cannot escape the relativities of the historical situation. It is unable to transcend the immediate cultural perspective. It cannot avoid the bias of subjective interest. The very notion that there are trustworthy norms of human reason is itself a conspicuous example of man's self-assertion against God. Further, as Prof. Reinhold Niebuhr puts it in his *Gifford Lectures*, not only is man incapable of objectivity, but he makes himself believe that he is capable. Blindly

he absolutizes those norms which define his personal and cultural interests. Continuous self-deception, therefore, runs through and vitiates his entire rational life. The only escape from this vicious relativism, these theologians hold, is to be found in the absoluteness of God's revelation. God alone is the source of moral obligation. His will can never be discovered in any human idea of right.

The motive of theological relativism is perfectly clear. It is thoroughly religious. It is the desire to conserve the notion of the absolute sovereignty of God. Only as man is completely humbled can he have saving faith in the righteous power of God. Man's confidence in himself must be destroyed. The glory of God requires the damning of man. Only by denying man's rational nature as an instrument of dependable knowledge can man realize his utter dependence upon divine revelation. All of this is to say that the motive of theological relativism is thoroughly pragmatic. It is not a question primarily of what is true, but a question of what will make faith more absolute.

Should the theological relativist protest that his motive is, in part at least, the finding of truth, he finds himself in an impossible dilemma. Either he must assume that his own rational judgment of the matter is sound or he must hold that the truth of ethical relativism has been divinely revealed. He is automatically barred from any sound judgment of his own because, by his own premises, human reason has been so corrupted by original sin that it is incapable of objectivity. On the other hand, he cannot well appeal to revelation, for the Bible certainly assumes, for the most part at least, the moral capacity of man. Or, if he were to hold that ethical relativism is the implication of God's revelation of Himself as absolutely sovereign power, he would still be trusting his own rational capacity for valid inference.

We have, then, two questions before us: Is the relativistic account of man's moral experience true? And is it actually a dependable support for Christian faith, as the theological relativist assumes?

Concerning the question of the truth of the relativistic account, it must be admitted at once that there is a certain plausibility about it. It is at least partly true. Moral judgments do indeed diverge. Not only do individuals differ widely in their moral appraisals, but cultures differ; and the same person or the same group may hold quite different views of moral worth at different times. Clearly, too, the sociologist is talking about some-

thing very tangible when he points to the influence of the social group upon moral ideas. Thinking does indeed commonly reflect cultural control. Just as certainly, too, are we influenced by our physiological and psychological mechanisms. There is no minimizing of our glandular and impulsive creaturehood. It is perfectly clear that the rationalistic interpretation of man through the centuries has been greatly exaggerated. Though man has a rational function, he is not primarily rational. Most of his actions are indeed anything but rational.

But while it is now necessary for any careful student to recognize the obvious relativities and irrationalities of human life, it ought to be equally incumbent upon the careful student not to overlook the element of rationality that is present. To attempt to correct an exaggerated rationalism by an equally exaggerated irrationalism is certainly not compelling. No half truth can be safely substituted for any other half truth. Man is indeed a creature of impulse, but he also has a capacity for the rational. This is to say that he has the capacity for generalizing from particulars, for seeing particulars in the light of general or universal principles. He has a capacity for discovering meanings, for formulating norms, for guiding thought and action by judgments of what ought to be. He can rise above himself; study his own nature with detachment; distinguish the motives which drive him; reach sound scientific conclusions; interpret his experience coherently.

The most obvious argument for man's rationality, for his capacity for objectivity, is that all rational discourse presupposes it. Such a discussion as the present one, for example, would be meaningless without the assumption that the mind of man can sufficiently detach itself from its own impulsive desires to judge the truth or falsity of a proposition. Norms of rationality, therefore, are presupposed wherever ideas of truth or falsity are discussed or implied. Curiously enough, this very crucial point seems frequently to be overlooked by the relativist. The sociologist describes human behavior and thought as determined by the social context, but he assumes that his account is somehow exempt from the distortions of social pressure. People in general cannot think objectively, but he can. Similarly, the psychologist in describing human behavior and thought as controlled by the basic drives of the organism is assuming that his description of the process has an objectivity that reaches beyond glandular or impulsive determination. And in quite the same way the theological relativist, as

he seeks to analyze man's nature and moral experience, assumes that his analyses are correct. In other words, he believes that he has arrived at a true description of the moral life in spite of his own sinful nature. Like every skeptic, these relativists constantly employ reason in their descriptions of man as rationally impotent. They use reason to negate reason.

But the rational function is not simply theoretical. It is also practical. It is not only potentially scientific and philosophical; it is also deeply moral. Indeed, truth itself is the most obvious moral ideal. Truth demands integrity of the person seeking it. There is a sense of imperative about it. Intellectual integrity is recognized as normative by the mature mind in every advanced culture. Even the relativist, so far as he is critical, and regardless of his cultural context, acknowledges the obligation to intellectual honesty. He knows that no one would pay any attention to him if he were suspected of intellectual dishonesty. In other words, he acknowledges honesty as at least a matter of expediency. But sooner or later he will learn, if he has capacity for wisdom, that expedient honesty is not enough. Those whom we honor most deeply in the fields of science and philosophy are those who give the impression that the intellectual enterprise has laid an inescapable hold upon them. They dare not fail it. Their scientific habit of mind, their genuinely philosophical interest—these are not affectations or expediences. Rather they are profound loyalties. Honesty is the first virtue of the intellectual life. To call it relative to psychological mechanisms or to social pressures is to deny the possibility of valid knowledge of any kind. To dismiss it as a mere expedient is utterly to misunderstand human loyalties. Any kind of relativist, therefore, who ignores the imperative demand for integrity implicit in the rational function itself or who denies the capacity of man to think and act under the control of that demand is reducing his own intellectual life to an absurdity. Patently, intellectual honesty is one moral quality, at least, that transcends the mechanisms of relativity.

Another reason for believing in the moral capacity of man and in the objectivity of moral distinctions which that capacity implies is found in our experience of the good will. Human nature is capable both of realizing the good will and of recognizing it wherever it occurs. This is to say that it is a fact of experience. We know it when we meet it. We are conscious of it when we ourselves embody it. However greatly particular moral judgments may differ, there are common and universal standards for recogniz-

ing the good will. The formal aspect of the good will is found in the intellectual integrity which we have already noted. It is the will to reasonableness. It is loyalty to that which is true. It is the acknowledgment of honor as an imperative of life. The material aspect of the good will is found in its implicit judgment of the worth of persons. Personality is literally the *end* of the good will. It is the goal which materially defines its goodness. The good will acts so as to realize both its own potentiality of selfhood and that of others. The good will, therefore, is always the will to justice. It is always the will to benevolence. Now the fact is that the good will is universally recognizable. It is not defined in terms of any one age or culture. Obviously it is not relative to personal desire. It is an attitude of mind springing from a value-judgment, implicit or explicit. Persons who do not speak the same language have no difficulty in commonly understanding a kindly act. There is nothing provincial about the good will. Nor does one have to be a Christian either to realize or to recognize the good will in its fundamental quality, although the Christian religion has been a powerful influence in cultivating our understanding of it. Clearly, therefore, man has the capacity for the good will, however infrequently he may realize it; and man can recognize the good will, no matter how evil he may have become. Such moral capacity manifestly presupposes the objectivity of the norms by which the good will may be judged.

Moral objectivity and moral capacity are shown in still another way, namely, by those qualities of character which result from habitual practice of the good will. Such moral qualities, or virtues, can be compared in their objectivity with sense qualities. In spite of the subjective relativity involved in all perception, no one seriously doubts that our judgments of sense qualities are essentially objective. If we make a mistake in a perceptual judgment, we can recognize it and correct it by further perception. Exactly the same kind of essential objectivity is involved in our judgments of the qualities of persons. Prudence, disinterestedness, integrity, justice, moral courage—these are qualities of character which are, in the long run, unmistakable. As in the case of a sense quality, we may judge wrongly because of some subjective influence; but just as certainly we can correct the erroneous judgment by further perception. We can learn to distinguish distorting perspective in the case of moral qualities quite as certainly as in the case of sense qualities. In either case the quality can be socially veri-

fied, although it is true that moral qualities are not so public as sense qualities. A person must be known fairly well before the qualities of his life can be adequately judged; whereas the color of his hair is immediately evident. But this difference in the publicness of a quality in no sense alters its objectivity.

Certainly moral qualities are not confined to persons holding the Christian faith. Indeed, most people could testify that membership in the Christian Church is not itself a guarantee of fundamental moral quality. No one can read of Socrates without sensing the depth of his moral capacity and earnestness. Epictetus, too, stands as a moral giant in the midst of a disintegrating culture. Confucius towers above the mass of mankind in his moral insight and influence. Now this is not to say that the Christian revelation is not morally significant. It is profoundly so. But it is to say that moral qualities of human personality represent both norms and capacities inherent in personality itself. God has made man a moral creature. To neglect or to minimize that fact is to destroy one of the most certain grounds for faith in the Divine Lawgiver.

To have faith in man's moral capacity is not to suppose that he will always be moral. Unfortunately much of his behavior remains simply expedient. This is the central meaning of the traditional Christian doctrine of original sin. Man is constantly asserting himself over against the ideal, over against the interests of others, and over against God. Recognition of his own limitations as a finite self, therefore, is prerequisite to any coherent organization of his experience. Man must take account of his weaknesses before he can use effectively the strength which God has given him. And only in the consciousness that that strength itself is ultimately God's gift can he use it most fully. The theological objectivist neglects neither the persistent sinfulness of man nor the need of divine grace; but he does insist that our recognition of that sinfulness shall not blind us to man's potential moral capacity. Faith in the redemptive grace of God does not negate the rational function; rather such faith grows out of actual data of experience which reason itself must recognize. God speaks to and through the full mind-life of man.

Nor does faith in the moral capacity of man imply that earnest moral persons will always agree in their judgments. Patently they do not so agree. To take a typical case, there will always be different notions as to what constitutes justice in a particular situation. But such differences,

where no element of expedient bias is involved, represent almost entirely differences in moral maturity. Two persons may agree, for example, that the Negro must have justice, but justice will imply equality of economic opportunity for one, while the other will understand it in terms of a subordinate status. But the latter judgment is not morally mature. It does not see that the worth of a person, conceived either as a rational agent or as a child of God, does not depend upon race. In other words, it is a judgment that leaves room for moral progress. But moral progress would be a meaningless concept without the assumption of man's capacity for moral growth and the objectivity of the ultimate norms of morality. Differences in judgment, therefore, are inevitable within the development of moral maturity. What seems right for a person or for a group at one level of development may be seen to be less right or positively wrong at a higher level. The history of the Hebrew people is a conspicuous example of such moral growth. From the primitive level of unrestricted requital for injury to the level of the *lex talionis*, and from that to the prophetic ideal of a universal justice, the Hebrews experienced the process of moral evolution. Given the good will, differences in fundamental moral judgment indicate differences in moral maturity.

We must conclude that theological relativism fails to do justice to the moral nature of man. It denies his moral capacity. It assumes, implicitly if not explicitly, that man *as man* is incapable of distinguishing justice from injustice, honor from dishonor, benevolence from unrestricted egoism. He can formulate no universal ideals. No moral insight can lead to God. No judgment of what ought to be can be interpreted in terms of God's speaking to man. Man is condemned to relativity except by a divine act which negates his human functions.

Such a denial of man's moral nature seems to the objectivist both naïve and unchristian. The moral nature of man is the most divine thing about him. It is that which most certainly drives him beyond himself. It makes him sense his own insufficiency. In the light of the ideal, man knows his need of help beyond his own power. The moral nature of man, with its potential capacity for universal judgments, is the surest ground for our faith in God. It is the ultimate basis for distinguishing between primitive and prophetic views of God. It makes possible our response to the ethic of Jesus. We become certain that God has revealed Himself through Jesus Christ because we are capable of recognizing the

moral and spiritual superiority of His person. Our acceptance of that revelation is inseparable from our insight into His moral worth. Indeed, it is inseparable from the demands which Christ has always made upon the moral capacities of men.

The issue between the theological relativist and the theological objectivist, therefore, is not whether there is such a thing as revelation. It is rather the question of whether revelation is completely nonrational or whether it does indeed involve man's rational function. The relativist can only say of his idea of right that it has been revealed by God. If he be asked how he knows that the idea is of God, he can only say that he knows that it is and that that is the end of it. He cannot even claim the authority of the Bible except in the face of the widely divergent and contradictory moral ideas which can be found within its pages. He can give no reason for his affirmation other than a heteronomous one. He cannot say that he knows it to be of God because of the unity and meaning which it gives to experience. He cannot say that it speaks to his moral sense. The objectivist, on the other hand, is certain that the whole mind is involved in man's response to God. He sees valid insight as ultimately a revelation of God. He sees the moral imperative as at once inherently binding and as revelatory of the demands of God. He accepts a particular revelation-claim as authentic because of its inherent conformity to the highest norms of value he can conceive. The absolute goodness of God can have meaning for us because we know in our own experience the idea of honesty, the loyalty which truth demands, the worth of persons, the redemptive value of love. Theological objectivism is motivated as much as theological relativism by the desire to conserve the idea of the sovereignty of God; but it is also concerned to save the root of man's dignity and worth: the moral capacity which God has given to him.

The appeal to philosophical and moral skepticism in behalf of Christian faith is not new. Such alliances have often occurred, particularly in times of cultural stress. Skepticism seems to offer an easy refuge. If we will only confess that we know nothing ourselves and can know nothing, we shall then be ready to fall back utterly and unquestioningly upon the revealed Word. But however much such relativism and irrationalism may serve as an incentive to faith in time of stress, it can offer no stable basis for faith in the long run. After all, God has so made man that unless he uses his rational powers he cannot survive in the world of nature. Unless

man accepts his responsibility for the best thought of which he is capable and the most thoughtful control of conduct, integrated living and genuine community life are not possible. The truth which the Christian needs to see is that the capacity for rational living and moral control which he has is itself a *gift of God*. But that is implicit in his faith. The Christian knows his utter dependence upon God. He knows the illumination which has come to the moral experience of men through the Incarnated Word. And he knows both the need and the reality of Divine Grace as he seeks to live the good life. But no faith which repudiates the moral capacity which God has given to man can long sustain itself.

The issue of ethical relativism in Christian thought is no academic one. It is a question of truth, of an adequate understanding of human nature, of a solid basis for Christian faith. The Christian life is a life not only of revealed truth as apprehended by the mind of man, but it is also a life of thoughtful study of the implications of that truth. Blind allegiance to what is taken as revealed truth invariably brings men closer to primitive tribalism in ethics and religion than to the universal insights of the prophets. The great ideals of the Christian faith are not *prima facie* obvious. People do not automatically comprehend them just because they stand within the stream of Christian revelation. They must be studied, related to life, understood in the light of actual conditions. The constant need of the Christian life is thought and the best thought of which we are capable. Not that theological objectivism guarantees careful thinking on the part of those who assume it. No, careful thinking never occurs except at the price of intellectual discipline. But the objectivist leaves the door open of reason, obstructs and discourages it.

The need of our tragic times is a new affirmation of prophetic religion. Men must again make faith in God the central fact of their lives. They must reaffirm the imperative character of moral obligation and of man's capacity for it. They must submit to new moral discipline. God has made us moral creatures, not moral morons. His is a moral universe, and we are called to live as citizens in it. We understand that call because it alone can give ultimate meaning and unity to life. It alone can give a coherent basis for organizing our experience as individuals and as members of a world community. God's revelation speaks to us and receives our response because we unmistakably recognize its truth.

How to Listen to a Sermon

GEORGE M. GIBSON

MORTIMER ADLER'S excellent book on *How to Read a Book* reminded me that no one, so far as I knew, had ever written on "How to Listen to a Sermon."

Preaching is a peculiarly Christian institution. Other religions developed along the lines of liturgical ceremony or teaching, but Christianity, taking over the prophetic tradition, made the most of preaching as its distinctive method of propagation and instruction. Its distinctiveness was not only in comparison with other world religions, but in its extension of the prophetic into the apostolic spirit. Drawing heavily upon the courage of the prophets in their zeal for truth and justice, the apostles sought to overcome their individualism through the *organic witness of the fellowship*. P. T. Forsyth once said, "The one great preacher in history, I would contend, is the Church." In this he recognizes the New Testament idea of preaching as the co-operative act of witness, equally engaged in by speaker and people. This was the joint conception, even of conflicting groups, and fully expressed both in James and Paul, as the former urges the fellowship to be "doers, not hearers only," and the latter expresses an entire philosophy of preaching in the familiar passage in Romans 10, sometimes called the "*scala coeli*," or the "ladder to heaven":

"For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent?"

Considering the importance of the hearing group to the total act of the preached witness, certain very elementary points are in order.

Attendance itself is important, and all the disciplines have made a point of it. Grant that, at least, and the preacher has his chance "to catch you," as Latimer said, "on his hook." Withhold it, and he must, as Saint Francis, preach "to the fishes of the sea and of the river since the miscreant heretics scorn to hear." It was one of the conceits of the liberal temper that took the sense of obligation out of attendance on preaching, and hoped for a heightened *interest* to follow a lessened *loyalty*. Modern preachers aided this tendency, hoping to free themselves and their people

from all traces of authoritarianism. But the appeal to simple interest is not an appeal to Christian motives, and really rises no higher than an invitation to entertainment. Nor does the appeal prove effective as a substitute for a sense of obligation to the fellowship and participation in its common witness, as average attendance in present churches shows, as compared to total enrollments.

One divine expressed his preference for those "who come with a naughty mind" over those who remain away entirely, and even curiosity is a better motive than none, for it was this that brought Augustine under the spell of Ambrose.

Others have made their appearance at divine services "to avoid the penalties of the law" or "to escape suspicion of the magistrate," which legal compulsions being now removed would leave free people to exercise their liberty the more fully if they chose. And again there was the old lady whose preference was for the chapel of St. Thomas of Acres since she "never failed of having a good nap there."

Such a catalogue of immature motives suggests the need for saying some very primary things on the role of the hearer and his attitude *after* arrival at the house of worship.

Sit front if you would properly hear a sermon. Close the dread No-Man's Land which normally divorces the message and messenger from the communion of saints. A man cannot shout loudly enough to be really heard across that gap of indifference as a preacher of the Living Word should be heard. The Greeks in their auditorium architecture served the psychological need for an audience to be an entity. The horseshoe shape, with all seats converging upon the focus of interest, meant that everyone could "sit front" though the room was crowded. More recently public gatherings have been measured for attention-values, with the finding that attention varies through horseshoe zones directly with the distance from the platform or pulpit, and that those occupying back-corners are almost as effectively cut off from active participation as if they had stayed at home.

Sit elbow to elbow, for only so is the circuit closed which lets the flow of fellowship go from person to person and from heart to heart, and which makes an entity out of which were otherwise a crowd. When preachers call for another verse during which the flock can gather itself together, they are acting in accordance with good psychological as well as spiritual principles. And any experienced public speaker can anticipate a failure if his

audience is scattered about as individuals or island groupings. "That ye may be one" is part of real preaching, and physical nearness may be the means of spiritual unity.

Settle down for an adequate season of communal experience. Forsyth discouraged "the position of those who are impatient of the sermon, who walk out when it comes on, or who paralyze preachers with a demand for brevity." The seventeenth century, with its three-hour sermons, may have overdone the tyranny of the pulpit over the pew, but the radio age apparently turns the tables with a tyranny of the pew over the pulpit, enforced by such stale comments as "No one was ever saved after the first twenty minutes." Indeed, there may be a reasonable question of the salvation of anyone who can stand no more than twenty minutes of the eternal Word in a whole week.

But though a low level of attendance and attention is better than none at all, and a twenty-minute interest more acceptable than nothing, it is better to come with *expectancy*, adding one's own prayerful faith and vital interest to the preacher's contribution. George Conrad Rieger wrote: "One should go to the Lord's house as to the awakening hour, and should be able to say on returning home, 'I come from the hour of awakening and am awakened, aroused, strengthened, bettered and made thankful, willing, joyful.'"

Come with *silent hearts and minds* as those did who listened to Chrysostom the "Golden-Mouthed." It was not the charm of his speech alone that produced that reverence, but a sense of order. Though Latimer was a most exciting preacher who deserved the wrapt attention of all comers, his disorderly crowd of Londoners walked up and down and in and out during the sermon, making "a huzzing and buzzing and great shoveling of feet." Neither the eloquence nor the prominence of the preacher is the answer, but a sense of quiet reverence in a people who have a real experience of God. Without that they would still be restless though a Chrysostom addressed them. But average folk may listen to average men if they come prayerfully, lending to Church, gospel and minister the strong support of devout spirits. They set their man the example of their own humility, and surround him as by a cloud of witnesses. For one has not truly listened to the echoes of the gospel which give overtones even to the most indifferent sermon, without being sometime overwhelmed

with a sense of his own need and insufficiency, or being moved to reach out though dumbly to a power not himself.

Thus the young Frederick Robertson heard Dean Archibald Boyd of Exeter "with a sort of admiring despair"—not despair of the preacher, but of himself and his possibility of ever attaining the dream aroused by his hearing.

Almost equally with those seldom or never at Church, those who are *often in evidence there but whose lives are unchanged* are the bane of the preacher and a hindrance to the gospel. William Law spoke of them as the handicap of the Kingdom, and Bishop Gore exclaimed of the sermon-tasters who frequent the "preaching-shops" in search of popular pulpit entertainment, "Dreadful, O dreadful, quite dreadful!"

It is not strange that most of the comments on hearing preaching, being in the nature of chance expressions of servants of God who have been harried by the customary sins against good listening, have been in the form of negative "don'ts" rather than positive guides. Taken altogether, this impressive catalogue of "don'ts" indicates the lines of a positive philosophy which would help restore our unique art to its original organic character and send it forth for new creative accomplishments as a co-operative witness of the total Christian fellowship.

I. *Gullibility.* Forsyth writes of "those who are ready to accept any kind of a message from a magnetic man," and who thus "lose the gospel in mere impressionism." Pascal regretted that due to the general religious illiteracy, pagan wisdom could readily pass for true divinity. Many have observed the extreme subjectivism of contemporary liberal preaching. This is encouraged by the lack of even passing familiarity with the classic tradition on the part of the average congregation, and an openness of mind toward "every new thing" which amounts to gullibility. Henley's "Invictus" has often stirred our modern pagans with its Stoic self-reliance, and Tennyson's "Flower in the Crannied Wall" has moved the sentimental with its shallow pantheism. And Wordsworth's cry, "Great God, I'd rather be a pagan suckled in a creed outworn" has appealed too often to the romanticism with which tired modern Christians seek a return to the primitive.

True congregational participation in the Christian witness waits upon

patient instruction in and study of the objective characters of Christian teaching.

II. Over against that tendency to gullibility is a *critical unbelief* that sits back as though daring the preacher to make one believe even while denying the possibility of proof.

Noticeably the critical spirit becomes a *paralyzing pessimism* as to the reality of religion itself. It marked and marred a great deal of public religion of the past two decades during which time the pulpit was never stronger in the ethical demands of Christianity, while men of feeble faith but of strong economic views and political convictions tried to define the limits of preaching to permit no offense against their privileged immoralities, and cried heretic or communist at every mention of the Golden Rule. Amos Wilder attributed it to "a guilty conscience which manifested itself in a soreness at every mention of the ethical demand of Christianity."

This anger-response to the rebukes of righteousness is nothing new. Hugh Latimer cried out, "O London, London," as Jesus earlier yearned over unbelieving and ill-behaving Jerusalem. "London cannot abide reproof," he added, seeing its hardness of heart as no mere sign of the times but as "a mark of the human condition." Christian preaching has had its gainsayers since Christ was ejected from the Nazareth synagogue, or Paul had to defend himself in chains for offending the goldsmiths. Too much has the preaching of our time been a contest between pulpit and pew, whereas the effective organic witness would unite them against the spirit that rejects righteousness as a public possibility and seeks innocuous comfort for the separate self.

III. *Sensitivity* is another effective bar to resultful listening. An overwrought subjectivism of near-neurotic personalities causes them to apply everything to themselves as though the minister singled them out alone. Sometimes he does, but such betrayals of pastoral confidence are regarded by the preaching fraternity as the lowest thing a man can stoop to, on the same plane with the anonymous letters such people send him. The average sermon, striving, as Augustine said, "to make the truth plain" intends no insult to the separate listener.

In a sense the sermon is "just for you," and when it produces that feeling it is a good sermon well delivered to a good listener. Edward VI once thought the preacher had selected the lesson of the day just for him, so apt was its application, though it was the prescript reading for that

Sunday. It is when application to self is accompanied with pique and suspicion of the preacher's motives it needs curing either through prayer or psychiatry.

IV. Even so, it may be better than a *callousness* which applies nothing to the self. Sensitivity may be converted to a tender awareness of the unsearchable riches, the unutterable beauties of God, and of the needs of others that too often lie beyond our dull ability to apprehend them. But hardness of heart may easily be the unpardonable sin, perfectly insulating the hearer from any inflow of saving grace, as self-righteously he applies nothing to himself, but judges his neighbor by every spoken precept. William Law's *Flavia* was this sort of person:

" . . . very orthodox, talks warmly against hereticks and schismatics, generally at Church, often at the sacrament. She once commended a sermon that was against the pride and vanity of dress, and thought *it was very just against Lucinda*, whom she takes to be a great deal finer than she needs to be. . . . A quarter of a year after this, she hears a sermon upon the necessity of charity; she thinks the man preaches well, that it is a very proper subject, that people want much to be put in mind of it; but she *applies nothing to herself*, because she remembers that she gave a crown some time ago, when she could so ill spare it."

A studied discipline of self-examination for a year would be helpful if such self-satisfaction could be brought to it. More, a profound soul-shaking penitence is indicated.

V. *Indifference* has always been a bar as deadening to the hearer as disheartening to the preacher, and one which blocks the flow of witness to the world at its source. John in the Revelation pays his respects to those "neither hot nor cold but lukewarm" as having the property of an emetic.

We may wonder whether the hearers at Brighton, England, might have prayed more earnestly for their man, encouraged him more warmly, or demonstrated more clearly the effects of his works upon their lives, had they known that once in a mood familiar to all preachers, Frederick W. Robertson could have written to a friend; as quoted by George Buttrick:

"I wish I did not hate preaching so much, but the degradation of being a Brighton preacher is almost intolerable. . . . All I say and feel is that by the change of the times the pulpit has lost its place."

The congregation, down to its last member (and the first, too), must keep its commitment fresh and vital, "being continually transformed by

the renewing of minds" if slow paralysis does not ultimately claim them, killing the heart of the preacher in the process.

VI. The indifferent make common cause with the *hobbyists*, those whom Hooker condemned for "bringing their curious speculations to the house of prayer," ready to criticize the man and his message together if they did not "play on the string they look for." These specialists in one pet doctrine would give relief if their zeal gave way to an interlude of indifference. They may hear a fair discourse on the Incarnation and afterward chide the minister for omitting the Atonement if this be their hobby. Or they would cast out a good talk on the Prodigal if the preacher failed to drag in the Second Coming. "The string they look for" may be Karl Marx or Henry George as well as a doctrinal matter. The point is against making a hobby of the part against the whole. For though there is truth in the part, its meaning depends upon its enlightenment by the whole, without which the little truth becomes arrogant and absurd.

We do not seek congregations who, suspending all powers of judgment, supinely listen to sermons as Pascal said some listen to vespers. There is give and take in preaching, a vigorous action and interaction, and liberal disagreements between pulpit and pew are part of the general stimulation. We do expect that some piece of truth at least may be "taken home" as Clement very literally demanded, saying:

"Let us not merely seem to believe and pay attention now, while we are being exhorted by the elders, but *also when we have gone home* let us remember the commandments of the Lord, and let us not be dragged aside by worldly lusts but let us come here more frequently, and to make progress in the commands of the Lord."

What we are suggesting is that *preaching is a co-operative art*. Only Christianity produces it and develops it to the highest power, for Christianity has the largest community life of all the world religions.

Preaching is co-operation *between God and the preacher*. The pulpit prima donna is not a preacher in the Christian sense, for how can he preach "except he be sent"? Preachers are God's sounding boards; but more, they act and interact in a living relationship with the Divine.

And preaching is co-operation also *between preacher and the folk*. The congregation brings its interpretative contribution, and if they are

truly gathered in His Name, all saints and all souls are present with them as a cloud of supporting witnesses. People and minister act and interact in living relationship with each other.

Speak to your preacher, write him a note, quote him in the community. Even when, as Carlyle said, "the speaking man has missed the point," he is your man still; maybe he voices the errors and confusions of the people whose representative he is. Do not praise always; it is bad for the souls, especially of the very young. "Woe when all men speak well of us," so Providence has arranged that this does not happen too consistently.

Demand much. Great preaching emerges from the base of a vital fellowship. Such a fellowship will make a preacher out of what God sends them, or God and the pulpit committee will get them another. Every Christian has a stake in every sermon. It is his witness, and he may help to make it effective, even great!

And poor preaching will come from a poor and shoddy fellowship. Brastow commented on the low grade of Anglican preaching in a certain era when pulpit utterance was a drawling liturgical monotone, devoid of spiritual life, mental excitement or moral imagination, and assessed the blame where it belonged, on the self-satisfied congregations which required nothing better of its men in orders.

Practice faith—know its language. Pascal paid his quick respects to those who spend a half hour with a book of divinity and think they have made a great effort to master it, thereafter holding strong opinions of the clergy and expounding their choice convictions with the consummate assurance denied those who give a lifetime to the same issues. The popular complaint that ministers speak a language common men do not understand is an oblique confession of religious illiteracy. Religion cannot be recast in the vocabulary of psychology or sociology and remain distinctly religious expression. Those who would understand its genius are under obligation to learn its speech from its fountain-springs in the Bible.

Even as it is commonly accepted that no preacher should enter a pulpit unprepared, no worshiper should enter the pew without adequate preparation of mind and heart. For, together with the speaking man and the worshiping congregation he bears his share of the communal witness to God the Father of the Lord Jesus and the redemptive mission to the nations of the earth.

The Gospels and Civilization

FREDERICK C. GRANT

HOW are the Christian sacred books, the New Testament and specifically the Gospels, related to modern civilization? How are the sacred books of a world-renouncing religion, primitive Christianity, to be geared into the emerging world culture of today and tomorrow, which appears to be growing more and more secular as time goes on? How were these Gospels related to the civilization of their own time, whether religious or secular?

Certainly primitive Christianity owed most to, stood closest to, Judaism—which was really a civilization, not simply a religion of a type sharply contrasted with the Hellenistic-Roman culture of the rest of the ancient Mediterranean world. But even as compared with Judaism, the Gospels say little about civic virtues; how then can these books teach *our* world? The only answer is this: Civilization stands in danger of perishing, not for want of a code but for want of a new spirit, a new ethos, a power of social cohesion strong enough to hold together men of all races in a new and better world order. That is where Christianity comes in! That is where the Gospels have their direct bearing upon civilization—for Christianity is not so much a religion, one among many, as the prophetic announcement and forerunner of a total civilization, dominated and inspired by a new Spirit, which is to succeed where the civilizations and religions of the past have failed; in a word, Christianity is itself a civilization, and the spirit of the Gospels is the very heart of that promised, not yet achieved, but inevitable order where the will of God is to prevail “on earth as in heaven.”

I

It is clear that modern civilization is steadily becoming a world civilization. Earlier civilizations were national or, at most, international: for example, the ancient Greek, Roman, Hebrew, Egyptian, Babylonian and Chinese cultures were national; the Hellenistic, the Islamic, the Medieval, were international. But the emerging culture of today is more

than international, and tends to embrace the whole inhabited earth. Like the present war our emerging civilization is global.

At the same time, whether in contrast or in conformity with earlier civilizations, ours is certainly tending to become more and more secular. The old religious motives and sanctions are apparently becoming steadily less important. What the final outcome will be, no one can predict. We cannot say that the final stage of every civilization or of every religion is one of inevitable decline and extinction, for the simple reason that every civilization, every religion, is to some extent unique and *sui generis*. History does not "prove" that civilization runs through a series of inescapable cycles, each patterned upon the preceding. History knows no "laws" of this kind—for history is still in the making, and nothing, so far, has compelled us to assume that a final permanent civilization is impossible. If there is no "law" of inevitable progress, neither is there any "law" of inevitable decline. A growing secularism and materialism at the present time may be only one transient phase through which a genuine world culture is passing in the course of its emergence. And the preceding civilizations may be only first attempts at a system which will succeed eventually; one may hold that a world civilization, of one kind or another, is inevitable on a planet this small with as large a population as the human race is producing.

No preceding civilization has ever been purely religious: each has had its material, secular aspects, which were of real importance for its survival. Nor has any earlier civilization been purely secular—that is to say, no civilization which continued for any length of time, exercised an influence beyond its own borders or its own era, and thus really deserved the name of civilization. Even the Assyrians, even the Romans—races whose energies were devoted largely to the externals of life—were profoundly and characteristically religious. The Chaldean "sacrifices to his net" (Habakkuk 1:16), and the Roman adored *Roma dea*; but the strength of the imperial *cultus* was in each case derived from an ancient heritage of *pietas* deeply ingrained in the national character. Hence it is not at all likely, in spite of present tendencies, that our modern civilization will become completely secular—if for no other reason, at least for this one; viz., man is "incurably religious." And man, as Goethe observed, does not change: "Mankind is always advancing; man remains ever the same."

II

The civilization that has thus far come nearest to being completely religious is the ancient Jewish. It was even more religious than medieval Europe, chiefly by virtue of its exclusiveness. For medieval Europe was a society, partially dominated by the Catholic Church, made up of a heterogeneous variety of races, nations and tribes; ancient Judaism was the religious culture of one people, one nation, whose leaders from the days of Ezra had espoused the cause of national homogeneity, blood purity and the rule of a priestly theocracy with (in theory) no king but God, no law but the Torah, no duties or obligations beyond those prescribed in its civil-religious code.

It was partly in reaction against the confining rigor of this code, and against the resulting narrowness and repression of the religion and the society which it controlled, that primitive Christianity took its rise. At the same time, primitive Christianity owed an immense debt to the older religion, of which it was in a sense a liberalizing or emancipating movement. That is, as some scholars maintain, the best in Judaism was thus set free from racial and national limitations and made a possession of all mankind. (See T. H. Robinson, *History of Israel*, i. 50.) But the dependence of Christianity upon Judaism was so great, in its origins, that neither can the earliest Christian records be understood nor can the history that lies behind them be made out apart from the Judaism which provided the setting, the matrix of the new religion. For its earliest interpreters, Christianity was not a new religion but the true expression of the old; the Church was the New, or rather the True, Israel; and Moses had announced, long ago, the coming of Christ, "the prophet like unto himself" (Deuteronomy 18:15; Acts 3:22). Without the Old Testament, the New is meaningless; apart from contemporary Judaism, the Gospels simply cannot be understood.

From the point of view of the history of civilization, then, the early Christian literature represents the "documentation" of a new departure in religious history. That religious movement was a part of the general confluence and amalgamation of East and West, of the ancient Semitic Near East and the Hellenized, now more recently Romanized, West. The amalgamating process had already been under way for some three and a half centuries when Jesus of Nazareth appeared, and it was

destined to continue for six centuries more, until with the swift and ominous rise of Islam the current was overloaded, and reactions set in which continue to this day.

The Gospels (we are still speaking from the point of view of the history of civilization) reflect the views of the career and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth which were held by His followers from one to three generations after His death. They are not biographies; they are based, not upon private recollections put together in literary fashion and from a literary motive, but upon community tradition. This was the way of the ancient Near East and of the Orient generally. Tradition was handed down orally for a time, in some cases for several generations, before it was finally fixed in writing. It would be a mistake to assume that any very great and revolutionary changes took place in the tradition during the period of its oral transmission: the old rabbinic literature affords ample evidence of the generally conservative character of tradition (though the difference between legal tradition and biographical must be recognized). And yet much was lost by this process—many of the details of Jesus' life and teaching, which modern readers would like to know, were simply never transmitted or recorded.

The Gospels reflect not only the life and teaching of Jesus, but also the hopes, beliefs, standards and motives which men had learned from Him, and the attitudes which the early Church had taken toward Him and His teaching during the period up to the writing of the evangelic records. The religion of the gospel—i. e., that central phase of primitive Christianity which they reflect (largely though not wholly Palestinian, non-Pauline, non-Gentile)—is accordingly not to be understood apart from the traditional Jewish religion, both prophetic and legal, as interpreted by Jesus and His earliest followers. Taken alone and in isolation, the Gospels are too incomplete to be understood. They require for their background the Jewish religion of Jesus' day, its institutions and its piety, the Old Testament scriptures, the reformed (or refounded) Old Testament religion as practiced by the early Synagogue and interpreted by the scribes; and they also require, for their foreground, the whole movement of still further and quite differently reformed Judaism, of primitive Christian faith and practice which the Gospels were designed to serve as sacred community books. For the understanding of the

Gospels, then, the whole Hebrew-Jewish-primitive-Christian religious development must be taken as a unity, a unity with variety enough in expression and emphasis, and yet continuous and fairly well integrated. We do not require, for example, Greek philosophy, Hindu metaphysics or mysticism, Stoic ethics or the religion of "the mysteries" in order to interpret the Gospels—at least the first three, the "Synoptics"; on the other hand, a thorough knowledge of the Old Testament and of ancient Judaism is simply indispensable.

III

It appears to some persons that the Gospels can be related to civilization only by misinterpreting them, either (1) by viewing their teaching as a moral code, intended to apply to society as a whole (which is manifestly impossible), or (2) by ignoring everything they contain which does not square with the doctrine or practice of the actual, empirical Church (which obviously does not rise to the level of the Gospels as a whole). The teaching of Jesus is an example of "the high that proved too high, the heroic for earth too hard"; He had nothing to say to the judge on the bench, burdened with responsibility for meting out justice in a world of tangled human relationships. (So, for example, Joseph Klausner writes in his *Jesus of Nazareth*.)

But it is not fair either to take Jesus' teaching as a code, or to complain that it is not a code! The gospel and ethics of the Kingdom of God as set forth by Jesus, for example, in the Sermon on the Mount, proclaim the principles by which men must live if they are to please God perfectly (Matthew 5:48). These principles are stated in all their finality and absoluteness, and without regard for the involved situations that everyday human life presents and which must be reckoned with by the jurist on the bench. (See Martin Dibelius' *The Sermon on the Mount*.) And yet this same heroic motivation, this "new law" of the Kingdom, is still only the full statement (Matthew 5:17) of the principles implicit in the ancient code; moreover, this sublime "ethics of heroism" is indispensable if men are to rise above the level of the brute and the savage, the merely animal and self-centered.

Why does the gospel, then, have so little to say about civic virtue, about self-denial for the sake of the State, the community, the welfare of society, and not for personal salvation only? For one thing, the early

Church was a group within the State, often segregated, often persecuted—in Palestine as also in the world outside, as the Gospels themselves represent (Mark 10:28-31; 13:9-13). But this Church, this group of the followers of the Messiah Jesus, was really the saving remnant, the leaven that was to leaven the whole lump, the seed of the new harvest, the "first-fruits," the beginning of the new order. And that order was to be not merely international, but universal (Matthew 8:11; 12:50; 13:32, 38; 21:43—all these passages are from Matthew, at the same time the most Jewish and the most ecclesiastical of the Gospels). The Kingdom of God, whose partial realization is the Church, but which is fully defined only as the goal and expectation of the Church, not identical with it—the Kingdom of God is above all earthly states, and includes, ideally, all of humanity. This was a renewed affirmation and further advance upon the old prophetic conception of the universal Reign of Yahweh (Isaiah 11:9; 19:23-25, etc.). It is a supernational and indeed supernatural Kingdom, the finally realized and henceforth everlasting Reign of God Himself over His whole creation. Its central principle is the absolute will of the supremely wise, loving, just, eternal God.

IV

Neither this principle nor the teaching which elaborates it in the Christian Gospels has ever been put in practice on a wide scale. As the late G. K. Chesterton rightly insisted, "Christianity has not failed; it has merely never been tried." And yet the best things in our civilization, the ideals of justice, mercy, equality of opportunity, equality before the law, the sacredness and inviolability of individual personality, freedom of conscience, the rights of childhood, woman's equality with man, liberty of worship, the beginnings of international peace—all these go back to the ancient Jewish and early Christian religion enshrined in the Gospels. True, Stoicism thought and spoke nobly of some of these ideals, and exercised a humanizing influence upon later Roman law; but only the Christian religion has had the power to make them, even in a small degree, a part of the accepted standards of society generally. And even in the limited measure of their present realization, they are real achievements, and not the result of some kind of automatic progress in social evolution. That fact ought to be clear enough, not only from past history but also from the present situation; for in those parts of the world where

Judaism is persecuted and Christianity is threatened, these basic qualities in a truly civilized human life are either already crushed out or in process of extinction.

Once more, as the editor of *Christendom* affirmed, when that journal was first projected, "Christianity is a civilization." If our present order does not conform wholly with the ideals of the Gospels, that need not discourage us—for the future lies before us, and "greater things than these shall ye see." If the present order, or any order, runs wholly counter to those ideals, then alas for the contemporary order—it cannot permanently stem the tidal current of the universe, the will of the eternal God as revealed in the gospel of His Son. Unattainable as is the ethic of Jesus in the present world order, it nevertheless sets forth the only worthy goal of a civilized human society. Hence it is the Christian Gospels, which enshrine that ethic, along with their proper background and setting in the ancient scriptures of Judaism and of primitive Christianity (chiefly the Old Testament law and prophets and the Epistles of Paul), which are pre-eminently suited to be the sacred books of the emerging world civilization of today and tomorrow.

It is the glory of Christianity that it is a religion of redemption, both social and individual—the religion of the Redemption effected, and effectual, in Christ. It is not limited to an event in the past; that was the starting point, and the guarantee, of the Redemption which is to be applied and carried into effect in every private life, every public institution, every group, the world over. This proclamation lies behind and is enshrined within the Gospels. However conceived in the past, the full relevance of the Good News cannot stop short of the whole of human society. Its final meaning, whatever the temporary necessities facing Christians along the way toward the ultimate goal, is not world renunciation, nor yet world affirmation, but world transformation. Hence the relevance of the Gospels to our modern civilization is no merely academic question: it is the most vital and timely question men can ask. For their concern is not only with the "one, far-off, divine event" lying "beyond history," but with that power of God which is even now invading and transforming history, both the private lives and the social institutions of mankind. History is no closed cycle, where "what has been shall be as before," but the work of the eternal God who, sitting upon the throne of the universe, makes all things new.

War, Peace and the Minister

JUSTIN WROE NIXON

I

MORE than a year has elapsed since the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Protestant churches of this country are still deeply divided over their interpretation of the war. This division is apparent to all who have read the statements of the various denominational bodies. It is evident in the sermons of the clergy where the attitudes expressed range all the way from the disavowal of war under any circumstances, through silence concerning the issues of the present war, to the militant support of the government and the United Nations. Meanwhile the conflict waxes apace and the churches are being drained of their youth who go forward to the fighting fronts, without having received much help from their religious leaders in understanding the cause for which the soldiers die. The net impression made by this state of affairs has been summarized editorially by *The Christian Century* in the assertion that "at the moment the Church is in a negative position. It cannot maintain itself in a negative position indefinitely. . . . Its ministry is pathetically confused for the lack of ecumenical counsel and guidance."

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America in a statement on the war, adopted at its recent biennial meeting (December 10-11, 1942), has begun to furnish some of this "ecumenical counsel." But the deeper sources of confusion remain. It is to one of these sources that we would give attention in the pages that follow. Because this source is primarily intellectual, we believe that it can be discussed without undue theologizing or moralizing.

The particular source of the confusion in the mind of the churches and their ministers to which we refer is the prevalent misunderstanding of the nature of war and peace in our contemporary world. Until we see more clearly what we are in when we are in war, and what we may be in when peace, or what men will call peace, comes again, we shall not make much headway in lightening the burden of war or in improving the quality

of peace. Nor shall we as ministers be able to give our people a sense of direction in their quest for a way through the most complex tangle of social and moral issues they are likely to confront in their lifetime.

II

What, then, is war? Webster tells us that it is "a contest by force between two or more nations or states carried on for any purpose." When such a contest is carried on between a state and any part of it in revolt we call it civil war. Whatever the remote causes may be, the great devastating wars among civilized nations of our day result from conditions of tension present in the minds of peoples or their ruling classes. These conditions of tension are due primarily to the fact that the desires or interests of one people are in conflict with the desires or interests of another. The simplest and one of the oldest illustrations of such conflict is that between the desire of one people to dominate another people and to exploit their territory, and the desire of the other people to be free from such domination and exploitation. War is the effort to secure a decision of these conflicts.

Have we found a substitute for war? Some of us asked Professor Shotwell that question at a public meeting a number of years ago. We knew that he had been a foremost advocate of the League of Nations and that he had an intimate knowledge of its work. He replied that the world did not have, as yet, an adequate substitute for war: that the great nations were unwilling to submit issues which involved their national safety to international conference or legal adjustment. Nevertheless, he said, it was worth while working for such institutions as the League of Nations, because the forces of history were on the side of an ordered world—that is, they were on the side of the peaceful settlement, ultimately, of even the grave questions.

It is because we have not found the way as organized societies to such a peaceful settlement of grave questions that we are today in war, a war which may mean, as so many wars of the past have meant, extermination and death for certain peoples, empire for others. It may end in a more stable equilibrium of the nations that may last for a considerable period. It may end without decision, to be renewed by great states after their recovery from exhaustion. Or, to take the most hopeful view, it may end with the peoples more determined than ever to explore the way to the peaceful settlement of their grave conflicts.

In any case, it is important to remember that war is a method of seeking a decision for the grave conflicts of desire and interest which develop between peoples, and that as long as a peaceful method of making such a decision is not found, war is likely to continue.

Turning from this fundamental nature of war, let us look more closely at some of its aspects. We hardly need to be reminded, for instance, that war inspires most humane persons with aversion. The devastation of fertile lands, the mutual slaughter of human beings, the piled-up anguish of vast multitudes of innocent folk—how can one think of such facts of war without feelings of horror. We need take no pride in such feelings. They are not peculiar to Christians. Men of many races and religions have experienced them for centuries.

Moreover, war is sinful. It is certainly a consequence of sin; of selfishness, ambition, pride, desires for retaliation and revenge, callousness to the needs of others, neglect of opportunities, love of comfort and ease, greed and the will to power. To the morally sensitive, it is tainted with sin even while they discharge the obligations it imposes. On the battlefield when the blood runs hot, men may not be conscious of the sinful aspects of war, but afterwards they are. In Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* Anselmo, the peasant who is touched with communism, thinks that even if there isn't any God, there will have to be, following the Spanish war, a great civic act of repentance for all the things the Spanish people have done to one another. Not all men feel that way, but to many the sinful aspect of war is unmistakable, even when war itself seems unavoidable.

And war is tragedy. By this we mean that it comes in part from factors that are beyond immediate human control, factors that represent limitations in the circumstances of men's lives or in their own inner attitudes. The Greeks called these limitations the work of fate, the Hebrews the work of Providence. Whether they are wrought by fate or providence, they are there. Christopher Morley describes them as "the traps life gets you in, so much more puzzling than mere sin." And Edwin Arlington Robinson has them in mind when he writes in *Tristram*:

"There are some ills and evils
Awaiting us that God could not invent;
There are mistakes too monstrous for remorse
To fondle or to dally with, and failures
That only fate's worst fumbling in the dark
Could have arranged so well."

The limitations to which we refer are particularly evident in the collective life of man, so that modern philosophers, such as T. V. Smith, who know politics, have come to emphasize these inexorabilities in man's social relationships which sometimes play havoc with his destiny.

War is horrible, sinful and tragic, and we would all admit that it carries the threat of degeneration to the peoples who participate in it. But war may also be creative. This is doubtless a hard saying for those who have been brought up on the slogan, "All wars are futile." But the facts are there for anyone who is willing to look at them. The revolutionary struggles of men to improve their lot in seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century America and France; the endeavors of peoples to resist or drive out oppressors as in Ancient Greece or sixteenth-century Holland: the present epoch-making quest of the Chinese for national unity through the common resistance of Japan—all these conflicts have had in them creative elements. We are not saying this is true of all war. What we are saying is that along with the degenerative elements there may be also the elements of creation, of new life.

Even the most ardent opponents of war are likely to acknowledge this when they are not engaged in proving their special theory. For instance, a little while ago I ran across a sermon by Dr. John Haynes Holmes which contained his tribute to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. It was preached about ten years after the onset of the revolution, at a time when it had become clear that in terms of violence, brutality and destruction this was one of the bloodiest revolutions of history. Does this make Doctor Holmes denounce it? Not at all. He acknowledges that with his views he could not have taken part in it, for he does not believe in the violent overthrow of institutions. Then comes this interesting comment: "But no sooner do I thus state my attitude toward revolution, than I realize how beside the point this statement is. For revolution is not a matter of belief or disbelief. We do not speak of believing or disbelieving in hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions. These are natural phenomena, which we accept with fear and trembling perhaps but with no question of opinion. And the same is true of revolutions. . . . What is at work are certain cosmic forces of social liberation seething in the hearts of men. . . . If they cannot find their way peacefully they will force their way violently."

Doctor Holmes asserts that the only alternative to the Bolsheviks was the return of Tsarism. "There are persons," he says, "who are not

troubled by this alternative. . . . But I am not one of those persons. I hailed the Russian revolution in 1917, because it drove the Tsar from off his throne. I supported the revolution during the critical years . . . as I support it now, because it kept the Tsar from returning to his throne. The revolution had to be saved . . . the Bolsheviks saved it. Therefore do I hold that the world owes to the Bolsheviks . . . an incalculable debt." He calls the workers' republic created by the Bolsheviks "the finest spectacle of heroic spiritual idealism that our age has known."¹

I have quoted this statement of Doctor Holmes because it describes a revolution which included half a dozen conflicts against both internal and external enemies in terms more optimistic than I could use, but which illustrate the interpretation I have given of various aspects of war. For Doctor Holmes such a war as this was horrible and sinful. It was tragic in its inexorabilities, embracing factors that were beyond human control at a given time and place. It was appalling in its destructiveness. But it was also creative, containing the promise of a "heroic spiritual idealism" which enabled its good results in the long run to outweigh its evils.

III

So much for the nature of war. What about the nature of peace? We have suggested that war is an effort to secure release by violence from the tensions of conflicting desires and interests that accumulate in the interstate relations of the peoples. Peace is the name we give to the period when the tensions are accumulating which eventuate in war. In the present interstate anarchy of the world, war and peace are woven very much of one fabric. The various strands which compose this fabric appear in times of war and peace in different proportions. But the strands are essentially the same. Nothing is more clear than that war is the legitimate offspring of the kind of peace we have had.

Let us make these assertions more explicit. We have said that war is horrible, sinful, tragic; that it carries the threat of degeneration, and that it may be creative. We would make the same statements in regard to peace, certainly in regard to the kind of peace that resulted in World Wars I and II.

Such peace, for instance, has its horrors, even as war has. There are

¹ J. H. Holmes, *What the World Owes to the Bolsheviks*: The Community Pulpit Series 1927-1928—No. III.

the continuing physical horrors illustrated by the degradation of whole populations in Africa, exploited century after century by Moslem and Christian conquerors. There are the horrors of unemployment, impoverishment and starvation in other countries that stand in causal relations with American tariff, fiscal and immigration policies. But I have particularly in mind the horrors of peace that are spiritual, that cannot be felt without some effort of the imagination.

I remember vividly in this connection my deepest feeling of horror associated with World War I. I had seen men blown to pieces on the battlefield, but my feelings then were not as deep as the feelings I experienced on my return home in the winter of 1918 when I discovered that a considerable portion of the American people were preparing to repudiate all responsibility for the League of Nations, our most promising means for preventing another war. I recall especially an address given by a Christian leader in my own city to a large men's Bible class in which he held up the League to scorn and said that it meant giving our money to foreigners and our sons to foreigners to command. When outstanding idealists took that side along with the most reactionary elements in American life, I knew that much of our struggle, though not all of it, had been in vain. To me personally it was like a bereavement. It was like death. It was like that to thousands of men who served in the armed forces.

I wonder whether we shall ever get rid of war until men feel the horror of such a peace as we in America chose to enjoy following the last war, so filled with moral callousness and blindness and the smug sense of isolated security in a world aflame—feel it, as they now feel the horror of war.

Peace, like war, is also sinful and tragic. Here the difference is a matter of proportion. There is more sin in peace, for there is more freedom of action. There is more tragedy in war. But as there is sin in war, so there is tragedy in peace, the limitation of human choices by the inexorabilities of nature and human history. The best analysis of the relations of war and peace in terms of these inexorabilities is probably to be found in *The Federalist*, written by Hamilton, Madison and Jay. These men knew the tendency of nations to think only of their own advantage and to act with less rectitude than the individual. They knew the proneness to prefer local interest to the universal, and immediate interest to the remote. They knew the danger of trusting in treaties that have no other support

than good faith. These and many other inexorabilities that make up the "imperfections, weaknesses and evils, incident to society," in peace as in war, our fathers knew. And when they framed the Constitution they took these enduring limitations on human action into account.

If we have any doubt as to the tragic limitations that condition the actions of men in time of peace we might consult almost any dispassionate account of the coming of the first World War. One finds such an account, for instance, in the writings of G. P. Gooch. His *Before the War* (1936) in two volumes and his *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy* (1940) bring one a fresh sense of how the choices of statesmen were limited by their circumstances. The confession of the German chancellor, Bethman-Hollweg to Theodor Wolff, "If there is anything that could keep me alive after this war, it would be for the purpose of changing the political spirit of the country," speaks eloquently of the inexorabilities in public opinion by which a peace-minded statesman was confined.

Concluding our comparison, we would say that peace is much more likely to be creative than war. If it were not, we would not be seeking to abolish war. But peace may also be, as it has often been, degenerative in its effects. That is why William James said that we needed a moral equivalent for war, an order and discipline of life that would safeguard mankind against the degenerative tendencies of peace.

IV

There are many things about the nature of war and peace that we have not said. We have been fixing the focus of our attention upon a single area—the interstate relations of the peoples. We believe that in this area the connections of war and peace are intimate, peace accumulating the tensions which war seeks to resolve. We have not been far from saying that war is, to use Berdyaev's pregnant phrase, "what peace rots away into."

The best natural analogy we can find for the relations of war and peace comes from the phenomena of the flood. The contour of the land, the nature of the soil and the vegetation, the distribution and rate of precipitation, all affect the flood. When it comes, through an intensification of some factor such as rainfall, a quiet, normally beneficent stream becomes a raging torrent, devastating the countryside, villages and cities, finding sometimes a new channel which may be better or worse (as far as man is concerned) than the old. The engineers attack this problem by developing

drainage basins for the excess waters in the river valleys above the flood areas, by reforestation and other projects for increasing vegetation and by straightening the channel of the main stream so that the waters may discharge themselves with less hindrance. "The river wants out" is one of the mottoes of the engineers working on the control of the lower Mississippi. Flood control is a matter of both emergency measures and permanent changes.

No analogy is complete, but we believe that the above analogy which ascribes the flood to the intensification of factors continuously present is more suggestive for the understanding of war and peace than the black and white distinctions between war and peace which have inspired church resolutions, and paralyzed the moral intelligence of Christians. For generations the dualism between the natural and the supernatural paralyzed the scientific intelligence. As long as that dualism prevailed various diseases, together with insanities, were regarded as the work of evil spirits. There could be no genuine advance until the idea of the organic interconnectedness between conditions of health and disease made it possible to see the relations between them.

So with the war-peace system under which we live. The problem it presents, like the problem of the flood, is one of control. This means the development of some kind of international government to drain off, or to furnish some rational and less violent channel of expression for, the vital forces of interest and desire that now transform peace into war.

It is in the light of some such understanding of the nature of war and peace in our time that we believe churches and ministers have to find their relationship to the present conflict and to whatever comes after it. Our country, together with its allies, is now engaged in a war for survival. That in itself is a great end, and we can only appreciate what it means when we set it over against its hypothetical opposite, our nonsurvival as a free people. But within this struggle for survival there is another struggle. As the ferment of democracy worked within the Cromwellian revolution, as the issue concerning slavery worked in the same fashion within the war to maintain the Union, so the struggle for international government works within the conflict of the second World War. It is the enduring creative element in this conflict, the one element that holds within it vast promise for the future.

The struggle for international government is the peculiar vocation

of our generation. To carry on this struggle is our particular responsibility in history. For it is our own century that has brought the world-wide interdependent technology that now requires control. And it is this technology that has brought the means of communication by which a share in the growing global consciousness has been made accessible to multitudes of humble people over the earth. As the ferment of democracy enabled Europeans and Americans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to begin thinking of themselves no longer as subjects but as citizens, so the network of interconnections in the contemporary world is creating a sense of larger-than-national citizenship. This larger citizenship needs the symbolism and the means of expression that only an international government can furnish.

The time is ripe, and we should begin to give shape to what we hope to see after the war. Probably the implementation of the organization of the United Nations will furnish us the best opportunity for a beginning. We must face the fact from the start that government is compounded of consent and coercion, and that no matter how we magnify the processes of consent, ruthless and hitherto autonomous forces will not be brought under control without episodes and crises of violence. But we must not allow ourselves to be discouraged or diverted by such occurrences. For no matter how crude and inchoate the procedures of international government may be, or how few or how many the nations that co-operate in them, they represent our one hope of achieving a kind of peace that is no longer a mere prelude to war, but "the tranquillity of order" (Augustine) and "the work of justice" (Pius XII).

If the relations between war and peace in our time are as organic as we have tried to show, and if the possibilities within the present conflict are as we believe them to be, then as ministers we do have something to say to the young men who leave us to join the armed forces, and to their friends and parents. Let us tell them that we are in this crisis because of our common sins, particularly in the area of the peacetime relationships of the peoples. Let us not fear to tell them of the difficult and inexorable factors which have helped to put enduring peace beyond our grasp. Let us tell them what we have at stake as a people and what other peoples have at stake in the outcome of this struggle. Let us tell them that within the enterprise in which they are engaged there is this double struggle, for survival, and for a creative advance in the interstate relationships of man-

kind. Then let us carry our preaching, as we carry our prayers, into the presence of God and ask His forgiveness wherein we may have spoken amiss.

If we do speak thus and subject whatever we say to the deepest spiritual intuitions of our hearts, then I believe we shall find a message to our people growing up, not out of the present with its duties, however urgent, but out of the deep subsoil of our religious past. We shall find our religion giving us faith that a better order of the world is within the purpose of God. We shall find it fostering a spirit of charity, seeking among friends and foes the relief of human need beyond any requirements of law. We shall find it creating a hunger for a community that will transcend racial, national and sectarian barriers, a hunger that will lend passion to our struggle for a truly international society. In other words, we believe that the Christian ministry may create among us the spiritual ethos of a truly world order, without which our blueprints for that order will be wholly unconvincing.

And to those of us who do not go out to fight and to die, who remain at home engrossed with many cares, prone as we always are to mistake the small for the great and the great for the small, the minister may well bring once more the message of Hermann Hagedorn's *The Boy in Armor*. The poem came out of the experience of the last war. In it a young soldier appears, luminous, as if a light were shining within him. Behind him is a multitude of other soldiers, all shadowy.

The young soldier speaks for his comrades—the dead. He tells the world that in spite of all the sacrifices it still stands where it did, “no step advanced.” He and his fellows had to die because the world would not *think*. Would it wake up and *think* before it was again too late?

We dead keep watch

. . . . And now you others who must live

Shall do a harder thing than dying is—

For you shall *think*! And ghosts shall drive you on!

There are others who speak these words to us now, sons and younger brothers of those who spoke them first, half a generation ago. God grant that we shall *think*, and that our thinking and their dying shall not be in vain.

Apocalyptic Truth According to Jude

JOHN FIELD MULHOLLAND

TO SOME minds, the explanation of an event is not completed until it has been footnoted by a verse from some prophetic book in the Bible. Tire rationing in the present World War was only a few weeks old, when someone discovered Isaiah 3:18, "In that day the Lord will take away . . . their round tires like moons."

As crises became more acute, this transitory almost news-weekly approach to biblical interpretation is accentuated. The bizarreness of some biblical exegesis may be dismissed as an absurdity, but the persistence of weird explanations shows minds forever receptive to apocalyptic thought. Are such minds abnormal or do they have a valid approach to reality beneath the surface distortions? Many Christians believe that more can be discerned of the will of God and the history of the future in the books of Daniel and Revelation than in any other source. Are they entirely mistaken?

The impact of apocalyptic thought upon Christian thinking and action can be understood by its origins. People who are not free find some method of showing their resentments. During the centuries from 200 B. C. to 200 A. D. the reaction of the Jews to oppression varied from the successful revolt of the Maccabees to the ascetic withdrawals of the Essenes. This resentment was expressed in a literature which had meaning for the oppressed but not for the oppressors. Because it was a literature of hope prediction played an important part in this literature. However the predictions of downfall for the oppressors had to be in allegorical language. So great was the appeal of this type of prophecy in the ancient world that even the Roman senate was duped into believing that a Jewish apocalypse—the Sybilline Oracles—were the lost books of the Sybil. Two apocalyptic books were included in the biblical Canon—Daniel and Revelation, and three others were thought by some to be Scripture—II Esdras in the Old Testament Apocrypha and the Shepherd of Hermas and the Revelation of Peter among Christian books.

Since this literature was so widespread in the early years of the Christian church, we may find some clue as to its importance for Christian

thought and action in considering its influence upon a single Christian of the early centuries. The Epistle of Jude is not itself an apocalypse but it was written by a Christian who was immersed in this literature of allegory and prediction.

All apocalyptic literature is a message of hope set in a pattern of doom. The message of hope is strong in the Epistle of Jude but it was sent to men who expected evil. Men are better prepared to meet evil if they see it as part of a pattern of doom, than are men who have become complacent through unfounded hope.

Those who would be true are warned against "certain men who crept in privily, even they who were of old written of beforehand unto this condemnation." All these were later described by Jude as "sensual, having not the spirit." The use of "sensual" here can be understood only in reference to the Greek triad of body, soul and spirit. Sensual refers to the second part of the triad and has to do with the conscious life of the senses. His condemnation of life as being lived by the senses and lacking in spiritual values has many echoes in our day.

Prof. P. A. Sorokin, of Harvard, has made a monumental study of the forces which influence our culture and our society. In his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, he discusses the motivations which arise from every aspect of our culture and his conclusions deserve the attention of every one in our modern uncertainty. One of his conclusions is that a sensate civilization is essentially unstable and destined to disintegrate, and only a spiritual or ideational civilization is capable of realizing stability.

In the words of Jude, men who are sensual or sensate, having not the spirit, are "clouds without water, carried about of winds, trees whose fruit withereth, raging waves of the sea, wandering stars." The conviction which Jude had concerning his day is identical with the conviction which Professor Sorokin's maintains in our time—a civilization primarily concerned with things is unstable.

Having established an identity in underlying convictions between Jude and our day, we have established the first premise on which apocalyptic thought is based: The times are evil. But it is illuminating to discuss the nature of that evil.

The types of evil which were current in the early Church are illustrated by incidents and legends of Jewish history. All the types of evil have the apocalyptic viewpoint. The Israelites who were saved out

of Egypt and yet perished in the wilderness are the first type. Freedom is spiritual. Men have to be spiritually minded to value freedom. Being sensate, the Israelites perished when separated from the things which they valued. They could build no civilization for only cultures having their strength in the spirit can survive. Every part of our modern life which degrades the spiritual and exalts the sensate is a portent of evil.

Secondly, Jude compared evil men of his time to the angels which kept not their first estate. In this reference Jude is using material from the apocryphal book of Enoch. The question as to whether or not such a use undermines the canonicity of Jude does not enter this discussion. The writer of Jude was an early Christian saturated with all the apocalyptic literature of his time, and the only question which is important in this discussion is how that material affected his outlook upon the society of his time. Pride in not keeping their first estate was the sin of the angels. Pride is a concomitant of the sensate life. Humility always has been the basis of the spiritual life. As surely as angels lost their habitation with God through the sin of pride, so has the pride of things and all the boastfulness of possession made the high hopes of science a mockery.

"Even as Sodom and Gomorrah and the cities about them, having in like manner given themselves to fornication and gone after strange flesh, are set forth as an example suffering the punishment of eternal fire." In this way Jude described another evil of his time—perverted sex practices. The teaching of religion concerning sex is quite plain. "Male and female created he them. . . . And God saw that it was good." Surely our civilization has forgotten the spiritual-mindedness which has so often distinguished the relations of men and women. Sex and bodily charm are used to sell everything from soap to automobiles. We pervert and distort sex in order to sell. The ancient prophets used a vocabulary which we would term vulgar in describing a civilization which was sensual. All ages have had sexual irregularities but it remained for the present age to achieve respectable profitableness in the use of pornography.

In verse 11 of the epistle there is a collective condemnation of other types of evil. "They have gone the way of Cain." Human life has value only to those who have the spirit. When war becomes worldwide, spiritual innocency from the sin of murder becomes an impossibility.

Being your brother's keeper certainly means keeping alive in the world a high regard for human life. Upon every soul, there rests the mark of Cain because our civilization of things makes impossible the spiritual acknowledgment of brotherhood as a reality in the world.

"They ran greedily after the error of Balaam for reward." Balaam was the seer of God's truth and blessed the people whom he had been hired to curse. Yet he was interested in the reward he had been promised, and although he could not lie when faced with the truth of God, he was willing to undermine the people. In our thing-minded civilization we acknowledge the importance of the spiritual whenever we are directly faced with the spiritual. A motion-picture producer, a dance-hall operator, a seller of liquor or any other person who lives by appeals to the sensual, if brought face to face with a great spiritual reality might find himself unable to curse that reality. In the presence of spiritual reality, he would acknowledge its supremacy, yet for gain he would undermine that spiritual good he dared not curse. There are few open, defiant attacks upon spiritual living. There are many subtle destructive appeals to the senses.

The last type of evil was called by Jude the gainsaying of Korah. Korah was not a doubter or a heretic. He was interested in the spiritual life and its development. He wanted for himself the material things which go with spiritual leadership. He envied the prestige of spiritual leadership. He was the first ecclesiastical politician. Our age is one in which men surrounded by the luxury of things, plead earnestly for the supremacy of spirit. No charge against the Church in our time comes with more telling force than the truth that any change in our social order in regard to the ownership of things would disrupt our proclamation of spiritual truth. We are disciples of Korah, envious of the material benefits of spiritual leadership and not followers of Moses seeking a land of spiritual freedom.

To Jude, the apocalyptic teaching brought the conviction that his age was evil, too concerned with things to value freedom, arrogant and proud, distorted in its attitudes in personal living, murderous in intent, willing to profit by the sabotage of the spiritual and finding even its spiritual leadership subject to envy and competition for material benefits. These examples of spiritual failure through absorption in material things still have meaning for our time.

The apocalyptic viewpoint with its expectation of evil, therefore, enabled Jude to discern clearly the types of evil and their infiltration into the Church. Expecting evil were these early Christians able to present any hope for the overcoming of that evil? Jude was very emphatic in his assurance of final victory.

The assurance of final victory was first of all in the nature of evil. Sensate civilizations are disintegrating civilizations. Jude expressed his conviction of the temporary nature of those whose judgments are based upon the senses in the following words: "Clouds are they without water, carried about of winds, trees whose fruit withereth, without fruit, twice dead, plucked up by the roots; raging waves of the sea, foaming out their own shame; wandering stars, to whom is reserved the blackness of darkness forever."

"Have faith," said Jude. He realized that though the clouds might darken the sky and roll and toss with the wind tomorrow they will be gone. The storm may sweep over the ocean but after the great waves have subsided, the sea is not changed, and when the foam has merged again into the sea, the sea is not changed. The flash of a meteorite may light the heavens but after it has sunk into the blackness of night, the eternal stars will still be there.

If there was nothing else which the apocalyptic literature of the early Church did, it did instill the conviction that the most terrible evils would some day pass. The nature of the world which God has made, said these Christians, is such that some day his triumph will come. Evil is transitory. Good is the permanent factor. Sensate lives, sensate civilizations lack stability. Only lives and civilizations which are founded upon spiritual beliefs endure. With such a conviction the presence of evil does not need to be discounted. Evil is apparent to every man. In every age, there is the disturbing sense of helplessness before the power of the evils which exist. Those who have minimized the evils or have overvalued their permanence are frightened when they break with fury upon the world, but those who like Jude see both their present power and their transitory influence, are courageous in their outlook.

The second source of Jude's conviction regarding a final victory was his belief that the final judgments are with God. Quoting directly from the book of Enoch, Jude says, "Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousands of his saints to execute judgment upon all." The victory is certain. The words of his conviction may be the words of a highly

symbolical book but the message is definite. Ultimately, because this is God's world, God's power will prevail. This is the strength of the apocalyptic viewpoint. However long the time, however great the opposition, God will be triumphant. Much millennial teaching and controversy is a mistaken by-path of Christian teaching, but the rejection of all teleological emphases in our Christian teaching will destroy a dynamic part of our faith. Consider alternatives. Are the aims of the Christian Church to be forever defeated? Shall the earth grow cold and life die upon earth without any greater triumph of Christ's teaching on earth than exist today? Are we always to labor and find ourselves still far from our goal? The ancient Greeks pictured unending torment as the stone being forever rolled up the hill only to roll back again when the summit was within reach. Modern liberals say that each time the stone is pushed a little farther and does not roll back quite so far and that is progress. If the knowledge persists that the objective sought is unattainable, of what matter is it that the fluctuations of success and failure are not as great? This strange illusion of modern life in respect to the desirability of having ultimates has wrought disaster. Believing that each advance and each retrogression were part of a process which was inevitable, we discounted each retrogression until we found that every advance was jeopardized. Disbelieving both the prophets of doom and the seers of earthly Utopias, we have neither the courage to face evil nor the intelligence to promote good.

The apocalyptic viewpoint of the first centuries saw clearly the evil existing in their time. It was not minimized, and it was with that knowledge that they believed in the ultimate triumph of their cause. Against the evidence which showed the strength of evil, they maintained that the "kingdoms of this earth shall become the kingdom of our God and His Christ."

Not only did the apocalyptic attitude see both the evil in the world and the transitoriness of its power, but it placed a demand upon the individual who was a Christian. The first demand upon the individual was this, as expressed by Jude, "Build yourself up in your most holy faith." Those who were Christians could see that men about them lived by the senses. They knew unless they had made an attempt, a sincere attempt to live by the spirit, to form judgments by the things which are not seen, but which are eternal, they had no right to feel that the battle was lost to those who live by their senses.

Besides the individual spiritual strengthening, the Christian has a responsibility toward those about him. It is often contended that the apocalyptic viewpoint makes people unconcerned about the world in which they live. Believing it to be evil, they do not expect to change that world. However they do seek to save if not the world, then men out of the world. No clearer statement of this apocalyptic attitude can be found than is found in Jude: "And on some have mercy, who are in doubt; and some save, snatching them out of the fire; and on some have mercy with fear; hating even the garment spotted by the flesh." It is hard for a person who has a multitude of sense satisfactions to enter the kingdom of heaven. Sights and sounds claim immediate attention. The inwardness which is needed for spiritual motivation must be sought. Those who have found the meaning of spiritual living should have mercy upon those who, because of the pressure of things seen, have not seen the glory of the eternal.

"And some save snatching them from the fire." The brand plucked from the burning was the theme of many revival messages. The apocalyptic viewpoint of foredoomed destruction of the world and its evil did not deter Christians from seeking to save individuals from that evil. Each person reclaimed from allegiance to the temporal was another soul saved. Though the world was to go the way of evil to its final destruction, individuals could be saved from the general catastrophe. The apocalyptic viewpoint made Christian action an imperative as it related to individuals. Modern Christianity seeking to redeem the social order has decried all emphases upon individual salvation until the individual stands not only helpless before the domain of things but also unfriended.

The conclusion from the study of Jude is quite favorable to the apocalyptic viewpoint. Far from being an abnormality in the early Christian centuries, this approach to history was valid because it recognized clearly the existence of evil and the source of that evil in sensate living. At the same time it brought to men who lived under the oppression of evil, the knowledge that the evil was transitory and the conviction that the ultimate victory was with the spirit. The contribution to Christian action which came from this viewpoint was the imperative to save individuals. No matter how evil the world some could be saved though plucked from the burning.

In contrast, here has been little recognition in the modern world

that evil was a persistent force and least of all that living by dependence upon things was an evil. With a multiplicity of things, the alliance of the Church with the sensate world has increased and the ability to discern evil has decreased. In consequence, the attacks upon ideologies which are judged evil are made by those who do not wish to have their possession of things disturbed. Most disturbing of all is the identification of the spiritual freedom which is the essence of democracy with the way of life which has grown up as the result of free economic enterprise. Things created within freedom must not be confused with or substituted for the spiritual freedom which is not dependent upon the existence of things. Then the collapse of a society based upon thing-mindedness will not carry with it the collapse of the spiritual insight which has been part of the society. Unless we are prepared to sacrifice our spiritual heritage to maintain our material prosperity we shall have to discover a new attitude toward the world in which we live. That attitude will be the basic attitude beneath the surface of the apocalyptic outpourings of the early Church and will consist of the following certainties:

1. That evil based upon sensate desires can dominate the world.
2. That such evil is transitory by its nature and that the final victory is with the spirit.
3. That the demand upon the individual is for personal faithfulness in his allegiance to spiritual truth, and for the earnest endeavor to reclaim every life with which he comes in contact.

If these are accepted as certainties, the disruption of the purposes of religion by the events in the world will not be as tragic as it will be to those who had thought the present world order was the final result of God's plan for the world.

This dedication of self in personal service to a cause which shall persist in spite of any evil is given its finest tribute in the benediction which closes the Epistle of Jude:

"Now unto him that is able to keep you from falling and to present you faultless before the presence of his glory with exceeding joy, to the only wise God our Saviour, be glory and majesty, dominion and power, both now and ever. Amen."

The Significance of the "Kingdom of God" for Current Christianity

CHARLES E. SCHOFIELD

I

THERE are three aspects of the question of the Kingdom of God to which I should like to direct your attention. In the first place, I should like to underscore what we might term the Inescapable Mutuality of Human Living, which appears to be a clear and obvious implication of the use of such a term as "Kingdom of God." "Kingdom" is a term which refers to the collective aspect of society. It is a term which involves the idea of "community." It represents the life which people share in common. "Kingdom" must refer to that aspect of the experience of men and women which finds expression in corporate social experience.

The use of a term like "Kingdom" inevitably carries with it the implication of life defined in terms of duties and obligations of citizenship. The world, in which this term took on its definitive character, was a world almost totally unfamiliar with the ideas and patterns of any kind of democratic organization of society. It was a thoroughly totalitarian world in which Jesus lived; and it was under a ruthlessly totalitarian government that early Christianity fashioned its institutions and worked out its definitive patterns of thinking. The extreme emphasis upon the individual as a kind of metaphysical entity representing absolute and unimpeachable rights and privileges, quite apart from any community responsibilities, which we have made out of our ideal of liberal democracy and *laissez faire* capitalism, obviously finds little to support it in an atmosphere dominated by such a concept as the "Kingdom of God." Indeed, we are beginning to sense, as we have not before since the birth of the American democratic state, that the confident affirmation in the American *Declaration of Independence*, that "All men are . . . endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights," needs to be supplemented by the corrective observation, that all men are equally endowed with inescapable responsibilities.

This inseparability of rights and responsibilities is a clear implication of the use of the term, "Kingdom of God," as a definition of the goal of history. It may be that we are coming back to a new appreciation of the

wisdom of the Aristotelian concept that the individual finds himself, in his distinctive significance and worth, only *in* and *through* his capacity as citizen. There does not seem to be much question that the manifest absurdity and inescapable tragedy of any attempt to discount social obligations, in the name of individual liberty, that has been so characteristic of the political and economic life of the democratic states during the last hundred years, has been one of the primary factors in precipitating the revival of a totalitarian political philosophy. Before we, too, summarily throw out of the window the violent repudiations of democracy by the fascist leaders, we had better take time to listen, thoughtfully, to the criticisms which they offer of the existing forms of democracy.

We are bravely insisting that our primary objective in this war is to make secure for all men everywhere certain "freedoms." And yet we shall neither succeed in our effort to defeat the enemy who denies those freedoms, nor shall we find ourselves possessed of any freedoms worth the incalculable cost of their preservation, unless we face our task in sober earnestness, with a clear understanding of the chastened and disciplined character of the only real liberty that is possible for men. We cannot hope to maintain for ourselves, or to secure for others, any genuine freedom unless our thought of the meaning and character of individual liberty is defined in the light of a sobering appreciation of the inescapable mutuality of all human living. We who call ourselves "Christians" ought never to forget that it was the man whose proud boast it was that "I am the slave of Christ" who exhorted His fellow disciples to "Stand fast in the freedom in which Christ has set you free." The only genuinely "free" man is the man who has gladly and freely acknowledged the responsibilities and obligations of worthwhile living.

This does not mean that we close our eyes to the intimately individual aspects of Christian experience. It is true, beyond question, that we cannot hope to achieve a redeemed society apart from the redemption of the individuals that constitute that society. Society is made up of individuals, and functions through the attitudes and actions of individuals. We must reckon with the problem of the radical reconstruction and the disciplined nurture of individual character. It is to the radical reconstruction and disciplined nurture of men and women "until we should all attain the unity of the faith and knowledge of God's Son, reaching maturity, reaching the full measure of the development which belongs to the fullness of

Christ" (Mof., Eph. 4:13) that the Church called. It is worth while to remark, however, before we leave this statement of the apostle, that we find it set in the midst of an exhortation whose object is "The upbuilding of the Body of Christ" (v. 12) which is, of course, the Christian community—the Church. Salvation is conceived in terms of corporate experience and community living.

The very point at which individuals most desperately need radical reconstruction is the point of their awareness of their responsibilities to the community in which they and their neighbors share a common life. Our whole evangelistic effort has been seriously compromised by the way in which we have attempted to set each individual completely apart from his fellows, as though there were no one else party to the transaction except the infinite God, and the solitary, naked human soul. We have systematically disparaged the Church as a vital and indispensable element in the saving process. We need to rediscover the truth to which the Christians of the second century bore witness when they declared their conviction that "Outside the Church there is no salvation." It is an essential element in the process of salvation, from the Christian point of view, that the individual finds himself an organic unit in a vital human fellowship. The idea of community is the essence of Christianity. This is just another, but an exceedingly important aspect, of the basic principle of *the inescapable mutuality of all human living*, that finds expression in the Christian idea of a "Kingdom of God."

II

In the second place, the concept, "Kingdom of God," carries with it the implication that *the same principle of rational intelligibility, and unvarying dependability, operative in the field of the natural sciences, governs equally universally in the field of history*. When we trace the history of the development of the idea of a "Kingdom of God" back through the writings of the Hebrew prophets, we find them possessed with an unshakable conviction that there is meaning and purpose discoverable in the tangled threads that make up the skein of history. Life for them was by no means "An idiot's tale, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." All history was a revelation of divine purpose.

The deliverance of Israel from Egyptian bondage became the primary point of departure for their thinking. Here they discerned a magnificent

"deed of God." From this point their thought ranged back over the traditions concerning the racial origins of the Israelitic tribes that had been cherished in the folklore of the race. They read a developing divine purpose evidenced in the course of the lives of their patriarchal Bedouin ancestors. They traced this same thread of unfolding purpose forward through the period of desert migration, through the turbulent years of settlement and conquest in Canaan, and found a climactic expression of it in the establishment of the Hebrew Kingdoms.

The disasters that overtook and finally overwhelmed these people as they found themselves in the pathway of the Rival Contenders for World Empire posed a major problem as they sought to work out their philosophy of history. It was the magnificent achievement of the Hebrew prophets that they were able to incorporate the destruction of the national life of Israel in the framework of their pattern of world history in a fashion that gave added moral significance to the total process.

The Hebrew prophets, doubtless, would not have put their thought precisely in the same terms which we are suggesting today. Neither would we undertake to write the history of our time in the Hebrew language. Still we find ourselves following essentially the same direction in our reasoning. Their notion of a divine Kingdom that was to come was the projection into the future of the same elemental motif, by the application of which to the record of the past, they had been able to read an intelligible meaning in the confused annals of history. They were profoundly convinced that God had a purpose which He was working out through the history of the various nations and peoples of the world. It was a purpose which men could come to understand, and in the light of which they could align their lives as instruments of the Divine Will.

As the prophets saw it, in the developing drama of history, God was the primary actor. He was no absentee, dispassionate observer, holding distantly aloof from the welter and struggle of human living. Nor, on the other hand, was He an interloper. The idea of a *deus ex machina*, an essentially alien force suddenly erupting into the arena of history upon rare occasions in strange and unpredictable action, which we find suggested in Greek drama, and which our contemporary fundamentalist brethren have inherited from eighteenth-century Deism, is utterly alien to the thinking of the prophets and of Jesus. God is eternally present and active in every scene and episode of the drama of history.

There are climactic episodes, in which the presence and the character and purpose of God stand revealed in unmistakable outlines. But this purpose, so revealed, is the governing principle of the whole process. The prophets recognized the presence of God in the deliverance of Israel from Egypt. But they saw God equally present in all of history. The same prophet who could sing of Israel, "my well-Beloved," could say, "O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger." Amos arraigned Judah and Israel upon exactly the same basis of moral judgment as Syria, Philistia, Moab and Edom. Micah saw the clue to the riddle of history revealed in the Law which went forth out of Zion and the "word of the Lord from Jerusalem." This daring conception of history as a developing process whose disparate events are held together in meaningful patterns by a consistent moral purpose, places history upon the same essential basis of meaningfulness and intelligibility, in terms of law and principle, that we have found so fruitful in organizing our knowledge of the physical universe.

We need to sit again at the feet of the prophets of Israel and learn from them how to interpret the meaning of the events that have so dismayed and troubled our faith. The situation which they faced is strikingly parallel to that in which we find ourselves today. Theirs was a day in which long-established political institutions were dissolving in chaos and confusion. Empires that had stood for centuries were crashing in irretrievable ruin. The old securities that had been the solid foundations upon which everyone had built his hopes were being swept away. All of the relationships that had seemed to guarantee the availability and the dependability of God were breaking down. In the face of an outlook far more dark and hopeless than ours can possibly be, they won their way through to new insights concerning the character of God, that enabled them to build, both for themselves and their immediate contemporaries, and for all the generations that have come after them, a grander faith than the world had known before. That which these prophets did for the generation that saw the destruction of Nineveh, and the annihilation of the national life of Israel, we need to do for our time. And we will find the clue for such a reinterpretation of history in this pregnant concept of a Kingdom of God.

The history of philosophy discloses two sharply contrasted types of philosophy of history. One is represented by the symbol of the wheel. It represents history as moving through an infinite series of cycles in which

essentially the same patterns of political experience are endlessly repeated. This reduces history to a fundamental meaninglessness and eventuates in a complete disparagement of all human values. This is the type of philosophy of history that is embodied in Hinduism and Buddhism; and has found vigorous statement in Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*. It underlies the whole Macchiavellian policy of struggle for power, and is closely akin to the Hegelian dialectic which provides the metaphysical basis for both the Fascist and the Communist political programs today.

The other type of philosophy of history is represented by the symbol of an open road. We find it suggested in the Johannine phrases: "I am the door"; "I am the Way." It conceives of history as a developing drama in which action moves forward through climactic scenes to a grand consummation in the fulfillment of goals or objectives that have been the driving force effective throughout the entire process. This philosophy of history has found its most dramatic expression in the Christian concept of a "Kingdom of God." And, from the point of view of the gospel, the clue to the meaning and direction of the process of history is found in the life and character of Jesus.

He is the Eternal "Word"; the "Thought of God"; the elemental Reason that lies at the core of Reality. This is clearly the thought of the apostle, in the *Letter to the Colossians*: "It was through him that everything was created. . . . All things were created through him, and for him. He existed before all things, and he sustains and embraces them all" (1:16-17, Goodspeed). And the same conception inspired the Prologue of the *Gospel of John*: "Everything came into existence through him, and apart from him nothing came to be" (1:2-3, Goodspeed). This is the primary witness of the Christian gospel for our time. We have tried to read the riddle of history, following all manner of other clues. And it doesn't make sense. It is only as we see the confused maze of events, interpreted in terms of a controlling purpose to produce a quality of human living, and a form and pattern of human society "reaching the full measure of development which belongs to the fullness of Christ" (Eph. 4:13, Moffatt) that we can begin to discover intelligible meaning in the process.

III

We cannot deal adequately with the question we have in hand without reckoning with *the Role of Crisis in the Kingdom Process*. Our trouble

has largely grown out of the fact of the persistent stubbornness with which we insist upon reading as literal prose some of the most highly figurative and ineradicably poetic elements in the literature of the Bible. It is not that our western minds are naturally prosaic and literal and, hence, incapable of interpreting picture symbols. We Occidentals are just as strongly given to the use of symbols and figures of speech and to poetic imagery as are any people. Our trouble is that our vernacular of poetic symbolism is different from that of the people out of whose life our Scriptures have come to us. It is a sufficiently difficult undertaking to translate the baldest and most literal prose from one language to another. It is still more difficult to render poetry—when it comes to us obviously as poetry—from another tongue into the poetic vernacular of our native speech. It is immensely more difficult to acquire an intimate understanding of the symbolic patterns and habits of picture-writing of a radically different culture, and then translate their meanings, with all of the immeasurably rich emotional connotations that such symbolic expressions carry with them, into the emotional vernacular with which we are familiar. This difficulty forever dogs our steps when we undertake to translate the apocalyptic sections of the Hebrew-Christian literature, and leaves them for most of us still largely writings in an unknown tongue.

One point, however, seems to be sufficiently clear. That is that back of all this attempt to interpret the cosmic significance of current events, which runs as one of the major motifs through the prophetic writings, lies a conviction concerning the ineradicably catastrophic character of the developing drama of history. The notion of a developing process, moving with untroubled peacefulness toward an inevitable goal of progress, which characterized so largely the outlook of the nineteenth century, now stands exposed as a bit of hopelessly romantic sentimentalism. That is not the manner in which history discloses the relationship of events. There is an element of crisis that appears to be structural to the essential processes of reality, which finds expression in the apocalyptic pattern in which most of the Hebrew prophets, and Jesus as well, conceived their philosophy of history.

It is not only in the area of human history that we discover this catastrophic pattern. We find it manifest in all the ranges of experience. There is an abundance of illustration in the chemical analysis of the material substance of things. Repeatedly, both on the inorganic and on the organic

levels, we come upon compounds whose character would be totally unpredictable upon the basis of the most exhaustive possible knowledge of the character and action of their constitutive elements. Hard-pressed defenders of the faith throw up barbed-wire protected entrenchments back of such epochs as the appearance of organic life and the emergence of the consciousness as marking indisputably the creative acts of God. Such tactics have been proved repeatedly, by unhappy experience, to be futile rear-guard actions that only serve to delay a capitulation already inevitable. The appearance of life and the appearance of consciousness are no more indisputable evidences of the creative act of God than is the combination of hydrogen and oxygen to produce water. This illustrates the persistently catastrophic fashion in which the eternally effective processes of creation operate.

It is more illuminating for our purpose to call attention to the manner in which this crisis motif has appeared in the tangled strands and confused patterns of human history. Over and over we come upon epochs of remarkable creativity that stand as major turning points in the drama of history. Take, for instance, the unpredictable and, to a large degree unaccountable, ferment which possessed the whole human race in the period running roughly from the eighth to the fifth centuries B. C. Out of this period came such characters as Confucius in far Cathay, Gautama the Buddha in India, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the great Greek dramatists and the classic masters of Grecian art, and that amazing succession of gifted souls that produced the prophetic writings of Hebrew literature. It is apparent that a multitude of forces must have been quietly at work, perhaps for generations or for centuries. And then, within a relatively brief compass of time, due to the impact of stimuli which is still impossible for us to identify, an unparalleled outpouring of human genius affecting widely separated peoples, resulted in a permanent cultural enrichment unparalleled in history.

We may readily think of other similar periods. There was that century which brought, in the "Augustan Age," the flowering of Roman genius, both in cultural achievement and in the development of political administration, and also saw the eruption of the Christian evangel. There was that period in which, as a result of the operation of forces which we only dimly have glimpsed, and have never fully fathomed, out of the mysterious womb of Asia, came a succession of eruptions in mass migra-

tions of whole populations that shattered the imposing Roman imperial structure and set the pattern of western civilization in new and distinctive designs. There was the period which saw the Renaissance, and the Protestant Revolt, followed swiftly by the Industrial Revolution, the emergence of the nation-state and the world-wide expansion of western Europe in an unparalleled cultural and political imperialism. It is quite possible that we find ourselves today in the midst of another of these climactic periods in which the developing drama of history takes form in catastrophic patterns.

Thus we see that history develops through recurrent crises and discloses its most significant meanings in catastrophic patterns. This is the substance of truth that lends foundation to the philosophy of history identified by the symbol of the circle. Any close examination of the evidence will quickly reveal that the so-called cycles are far from being mere repetitions. There does appear to be a certain periodicity of crisis. But, again, the recurrence of these catastrophic periods does not lend itself to accurate forecasts.

This is the heart of the apocalyptic motif. The prophets were convinced that a new crisis is always imminent. The pressure of the Divine Purpose constitutes a constant factor eternally operative in the human drama. No one can forecast, or hope to calendar, the periods of its eruption in new creative patterns, just because of the presence of another element—that of a significant degree of creativity and spontaneity, that appears to characterize all reality, including the behavior of human beings. It is at this point that the interpreting of history becomes genuine prophecy. The essence of the idea of prophecy, in Hebrew-Christian thinking, has never been the element of prediction. A prophet was one who spoke in imperiously insistent tones, on behalf of God, to the men and women of his immediate generation. The motive that prompted his speaking was a constraining conviction that men must be inspired to reconstructed patterns of action more nearly congruous with the character and purpose of God. It is the degree of responsiveness of the human to the divine that conditions the climactic expressions of divine purpose in the developing drama of human history.

Here, again, we come upon the critical importance of the Christian concept of a "Kingdom of God" for the Church and for society in our time. We have had not a little to say, in recent years, about the relative ineffec-

tiveness of our attempts at Christian education. There is a sense, however, in which we have been amazingly successful. We have succeeded in giving to mankind, generally, a fairly clear understanding of what the Christian ideal involves. There is not much debate about what an "all-out" acceptance of the Christian ethic and commitment to serve the Christian ideal would mean: with reference to war, for example; or to a mode of living dominated by materialistic objectives; or to the divisiveness of our contemporary social patterns and to the dominant spirit and temper of contemporary society. The unsurpassable beauty and desirability of the Christian ideal is universally recognized. The difficulty arises, at the point at which we begin to insist upon honest efforts to implement this sentimental appreciation through disciplined ethical loyalty, in concrete patterns of action. We are constantly admonished that this is all a beautiful ideal. Sometime, perhaps, we shall be ready for the Kingdom of God—but not now. This is the crucial point at which the Christian doctrine of the imminent Kingdom most sharply challenges the dominant attitude and mores of society.

The Christian witness is a "gospel." It is an "evangel." It is not a mere philosophy. It is a bugle call to action. It is a summons to enlistment. Its object is to precipitate a crisis in the human soul and in human society. It aims to force the issue for immediate decision and action—NOW.

Certainly there has never been a time, in all the Christian centuries, when the Church faced any more imperious summons to bear her insistent witness than she does today. There has never been a time when the ultimate and inevitable futility and tragedy of the old pagan ways of greed and lust and violence and self-centered living have been so obvious. There has never been a time in which the common masses of humanity were more desperately hungry for some confident word of hope. There has never been a time when so many thoughtful leaders, both within the Church and in responsible positions of economic and political administration, seemed more ready to undertake a radical and thoroughgoing reconstruction of established institutions and practices. It may be that the Church today stands before the greatest opportunity of all the Christian centuries. We recall the words in which the author of the *Gospel of Mark* summarized the first preaching of Jesus: "The time has now come; God's reign is near: Repent and believe the gospel" (1:15, Moffatt).

In Caesar's World

MATTHEW SPINKA

WE READ in the Holy Writ that when the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy, the Lord looked upon the work of His hands and pronounced it good. But how can one go Wordsworthian in enjoying the beauty of nature when the world is convulsed in a mortal struggle? More than ever the thought oppresses us that men with their injustice, exploitation and war make God's world hideous. The reason for the evil which is in men is the most difficult problem in theology: the learned but prosaic and pedestrian theologians of old used to speak of it in terms of "the original sin"; their no less learned and no less pedestrian confreres of our day will have none of this particular terminology, although the evil described by it remains the same.

Ever since the human race learned to distinguish between good and evil, its young men dreamed dreams of the golden age to come and its old men saw visions of it. Man has ever aspired to transcend and transform the evils of Caesar's world and to realize his dreams of a glorified, idealized future: the vision of some Platonic *Republic*, or a messianic Kingdom of God, a heavenly Jerusalem come down to the earth, or a *Civitas Dei*, drew men ever onward to strive for the truly good life.

I

So it was with the Jews of the first century of our era, who groaned under the yoke of the Roman Caesar. Jesus, too, made use of the thought-forms of His day to cast the description of the Kingdom of God in the contemporary mold. He inaugurated His ministry with the stirring call, "Repent, for the Kingdom of God is at hand!" The crowds which gladly listened to this message of good news were well aware of its far-reaching and revolutionary implications: the hated Roman rule shall be overthrown, and the Son of David shall reign over His victorious people as well as the vanquished enemies! But Jesus had given the popular concept a new spiritual significance, as the story of His temptation clearly indicates. To Him the Kingdom of God which was "at hand"—that is, shortly to

appear on the earth—signified the inauguration of a new age in which the absolute will of God should hold sway. He expounded the general outline of the conditions of the coming age in the Sermon on the Mount. There are no relativities, no compromises with the Caesar's world, in the matchless delineation of the pure, absolute will of God. When His will is done on earth as it is in heaven, there can be no hatred between man and his neighbor, no selfish strife for mere material well-being, no scramble for pelf or power, no war. Moreover, this glorious future age depends not upon men for its realization. It is to be God's work altogether. In one cataclysmic, truly world-shaking moment, God's Kingdom shall be ushered in. It shall appear as a thief in the night. Our Lord regarded the Kingdom as so imminent that He bade His disciples to cease all truck with the world of Caesar and to live as if the Kingdom were already here. Accordingly, much of His teaching presupposes the conditions which will prevail in the new age, and was not meant to apply to the period prior to the coming of that glorious time. He thought of this intermediate period as being so short that it was not worthy of serious notice. For at the most within the generation then living the Kingdom shall appear. "Verily I say unto you, there are some of them standing here who shall in no wise taste death till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom."

We modern Christians are easily tempted to claim for our own view of the developmental character of Christianity the authority of our Master by pointing to His various parables teaching a gradual change in the world: His gospel, we like to believe, is like the leaven in a measure of meal which in untold millenia shall ultimately permeate the whole lump. Far be it from me, a mere innocent bystander and a harmless outsider in relation to the New Testament learned squabbles, to rush in where angels fear to tread! Moreover, I willingly admit the truth of such contentions, provided they are not urged as if they must be taken in the exclusive sense. For there can be no doubt that Jesus expected the catastrophic manifestation of the Kingdom in the immediate future, and His essential message would be rendered historically inexplicable on any other supposition. At best we may say, and indeed must say, that both views are imbedded in our gospel records. Should anyone doubt this interpretation, I gladly refer him to the latest book of Prof. E. F. Scott, *The Nature of the Early Church*, in which he ably and convincingly argues the case, and defends the thesis here propounded.

No such formidable problem confronts us when we pass to the consideration of the attitude of the early Church. The early Christian lived, moved and had his being in the conviction of the imminent coming of his Lord and the approach of the Kingdom. This was the very heart of his hope and expectation. He greeted his fellow Christians with the expression of this hope—*Maranatha*, the Lord is near. Many Christians gave themselves to a feverish missionary activity throughout the land under the driving impulse of their belief that before they visit all the cities of Judaea the Lord shall appear. They shared all things in common in those early days because of their conviction that the new age was near. They dispensed with any permanent and uniform organization of their brotherhoods, and even neglected at first to prepare a full record of the precious words of their Master, for why should they trouble themselves with such ephemeral tasks when the Day of the Lord is near, yea, even at hand? St. Paul did not think it worth the trouble to marry and wished that others were like him, "for the time is short," as he pithily put it in a phrase which, had he been Scotch, one would suspect of dry humor. His first preserved letters written to the Thessalonian followers of the Way dealt with the perplexing problem as to what is to become of those believers who had fallen asleep in the Lord before His coming. His solution of the difficulty does not constitute one of the chief claims to his immortal fame.

But the unthinkable, the utterly confusing eventuality came to pass! Days slipped by one after another and stretched into months and years, and the Lord still tarried. The fiddling Nero made flaming torches of the hapless Christians in his Vatican gardens, Jerusalem fell before the onslaughts of Vespasian and his son Titus, and Domitian let loose his persecuting fury upon the wretched followers of the Way; and yet the new Jerusalem did not descend upon the earth. For a time, Christians took new courage from the glorious and heartening visions of John on the island of Patmos. But not for long. The gnawing doubt again intruded itself into their minds: is it possible that the Church was mistaken in the expectation of the *parousia*? Were they, after all, to face the world with the terrifying suspicion that it might not come to a speedy, swift destruction amid the flaming scenes of the suddenly appearing new age, ushered in by the dazzling appearance of the Lord with His angels? Let the unworthy thought perish! whispered the frightened believers. And yet, during their weary, wistful vigils of the night they could not forever banish

the benumbing doubts and the paralyzing fears. Perhaps it was all mere wishful thinking! Possibly they were living in a fool's paradise!

II

The first century passed and the worst forebodings of the Christians were realized: the new Jerusalem did not appear. By that time the radical reinterpretation of Christianity—possibly the most revolutionary which this much-transformed movement has ever undergone—was well begun. The new outlook assumed a definite shape. The Church had made up its mind to live. Recruited mostly from non-Jewish converts, it adopted a more rigid, centralized form of government—the monarchical episcopate—and consolidated its organization by the rule of faith and the canon of Scriptures. All these measures of self-defense are so many proofs that the far-reaching change of Christianity from an other-worldly, world-denying, apocalyptic, to a world-defiant, consciously reformatory type had been effected.

The full consequences of this momentous transformation have never been realized. The early Church did not draw them, because it had made its adjustments to the existing order not so much from a clear-sighted conviction that the apocalyptic view is illusory, as from a sheer need of survival; the later ages, particularly our own, because they did not take the apocalyptic character of the first-century Christianity quite seriously and treated it as a nonconsequential aberration which could safely be ignored.

At the risk of oversimplification it may be asserted that the Christian Church now had adopted two types of interpretation of its mission: some sections of the Church continued to adhere to the apocalyptic hope and attempted to live in accordance with the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount. On the other hand, some proceeded on the assumption that the Church must continue, for an indefinite period, to live in the Caesar's world, and therefore to take measures insuring its survival. To all practical purposes it repudiated, or at least ignored, the ancient tenet of the imminent appearance of the Kingdom.

In adopting this alternative the Church did not choose the easy way. In fact, the apocalyptic ideal was much simpler and easier: there was no world to contend with, for it was to perish utterly in the conflagration attendant upon the last days. In the new world, "death shall be no more,

neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain any more." But failing the realization of this glorious, although, alas, illusory dream, the Church had to face the old, familiar Caesar's world with its death, tears, mourning and pain. To live in Caesar's world but not to be of it is exceedingly difficult. How to adjust the absolute ethic of the Sermon on the Mount to this situation? The Church learned that no one can make an omelet without breaking some eggs. In an attempt to solve this exceedingly delicate problem, it gradually developed what might be called an interim ethic—pardon the cumbersome phrase which the German scholars with their inerrant sense for the uncouth chose to call it. This was a rule of life adapted to the actualities confronting the Christian. To this unwelcome, though necessary, transformation of the character of early Christianity the modern Church owes most of its accomplishments as well as failures. For since the Caesar's world failed to be transformed cataclysmically, it must be molded closer to the will of God by the slow process of leavening it by the permeating influence of the gospel. For this great service we must be profoundly grateful to the brave Christian fathers of the second century, for without it a victorious Christian movement within the framework of history is unthinkable. It was this policy which within an incredibly short period of three centuries conquered the Roman Empire and made the Church the dominant, and finally the sole, religious organization in the state.

This type of interpretation prevailed in course of time wherever Christianity was planted. The absolute ethic of Jesus was never abrogated, nor was there any intention on the part of the Church to do so; for it remained the ultimate ideal and goal toward which in the divine Providence the development of the world was tending. But for the time being, an ethic practicable for the intervening period had to be evolved which, to be sure, fell short of the absolute demands of the Sermon on the Mount, but at the same time raised the level of the prevailing ethical standards. Moreover, Christianity furnished the permanent dynamic toward the ultimate ideal, the divine unrest ever disturbing the clod; a Christian can never be satisfied with the ethical level reached no matter how high it is, for his goal is ever receding, ever unattainable, since he is yearning for the absolute. This is the eternal tension of Christianity between the possible and the ideal. Thus the Church made no "compromise" with the Caesar's world, placed no permanent "moratorium" on the absolute

ethic of Jesus, although such a charge could and has been leveled against it from that time to our own.

Nevertheless, when Emperor Theodosius the Great made the Nicene Christianity the sole official religion of the state, the change which had taken place in the character of Christianity as compared with the conditions of the first century could be perceived by anyone who had eyes to see. Instead of the "kingdoms of this world becoming the Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ," the Church became part of the empire of this world. To be sure, the Church undertook to transform that empire, by a gradual change from within, into the Kingdom of our Lord. But the experiment has lasted some fifteen centuries, and the results range from considerable success in some respects to utter failure in some others. There is no use bewailing the attempt, as if it could have been avoided. I do not hold with those who speak disdainfully and sneeringly about the nineteen centuries of the Christianization of the world as if it constituted an incontrovertible proof of the Church's signal failure. Anyone who is acquainted with the cultural as well as the religious wonders which it has performed among the barbarian tribes who had overrun Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire, cannot but speak with respect of the work the Church has accomplished, and feel how unjust and unfounded the contrary view is.

Whatever the concrete circumstances under which the relationship of Church and State began, in theory at least, neither party was to dominate the other. These mighty forces in society, one representing the secular, the other the spiritual realms, were designed for mutual co-operation for the benefit of the people in general, and the mutual aid of each other in particular. To describe the developments of these relationships would be to recount the whole history of the Christian Church. Suffice it to say that in the Christian East, the state soon gained a predominance over the Church which it often abused for its own ends. The heritage of Byzantine caesaropapism passed over to the Muscovite state, along with the imperial title and the double-headed eagle. It was Peter, miscalled the Great, who completed the work of subjugation of the Russian church to the state, begun in the days of Patriarch Nikon. The latest chapters of this agelong drama many of us, if not all, have been witnessing: for the Soviet Union has put an end to the thousand-year-old attempt at co-operation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian government. Such a thoughtful and philosophic-minded thinker as Nicholas Berdyaev freely

confesses that the experiment has been a failure. With this verdict it is difficult to disagree.

In the West the course of events, owing to special circumstances, has been markedly different. St. Augustine in his *Civitas Dei* dreamed of the conquest of the *regna terrena* by the *regnum Dei*, and his work cast a spell upon the world for well-nigh a thousand years. Leaders of culture and action thought his thoughts after him. There was a time, particularly during the Middle Ages, from the days of Pope Gregory VII to Innocent III, when the Church dominated the state. The decline set in with Boniface VIII, who failed to discern the signs of the times. But the claim to the superiority of the Church over the state has never been surrendered by the Roman Catholic Church, although its realization or application has long proved impossible, and at the present time is represented by the vestigial sovereignty over some hundred or so acres of the Vatican City. But let no one underestimate the much more important and effective political influence which the papacy exercises upon a large number of modern governments. It is unwise to do so.

The Protestant churches can boast no greater success in this matter: the Lutheran interpretation in the end has produced the disposition to submit in all matters, except those narrowly "religious," to the dictates of the state. This traditional acquiescence is reflected in the relatively passive submission of the German churches to Hitler's regime. The Calvinistic churches, with their more vigorous conception of the relation of the Church and State, tending toward theocracy, in course of time had to give way before the victorious secularist spirit of the modern era, which eventuated in the separation of Church and State.

Thus, on the whole, in many respects the attempt to transform the Caesar's world by the method of gradual change has met with a considerable degree of failure, although also with some undoubted gains. I am not saying this to condemn the method as utterly unsuitable and inappropriate and to advocate its entire abandonment. I merely draw the conclusion that the hopes of the magical ease with which victories over the world were to be won are unrealistic. Mature Christians know better; they realize that the Kingdom of God is "the far-off event toward which all creation tends." Thus despite all its failures and setbacks, I believe that the Church cannot afford to repudiate its attempt to transform the world by persuading it of the superiority of the ethic of Jesus. This is the essence of the social

gospel which advocates not the absolutistic demand of all or nothing, but rather the gradual but cumulative small advances. The remedy is not a withdrawal from the struggle, but a more persistent and effective application of the gospel to the ills of life. To withdraw is to abandon the world to its wickedness and folly. To remain in the world at the cost of continual tension between the Christian absolute ideal and the necessarily lower level of the actual ethical standard, although ever striving to raise it to a higher one, is the method which the Church has pursued ever since it realized that it cannot leap at one jump straight into the apocalyptic Kingdom of God.

The other type of Christianity has perpetuated itself as well. It attempted to solve the problem by renouncing the world, by repudiating it as evil, by running away from it. This has been and is the Buddhist and Hindu method as well: "close, very close to renunciation is the eternal peace," says the *Bhagavat Gita*. This was the way adopted by those "athletes of the spirit," the monks of the Egyptian desert. They subjected their bodies to incredible tortures and sufferings in order to make the spirit free. Like Simon Stylites, they sat for thirty or forty years on top of pillars. The ascetic mode of life was resorted to by hundreds of thousands of men and women "of whom the world was not worthy." They consciously abandoned and renounced the world to live "the angelic life" by practicing the ascetic precepts of the various monastic rules whereby they hoped to fulfill the absolute requirements of the gospel. The monastic life produced some of the greatest and saintliest souls of the Christian Church. Among them were the peerless Christian theologian, St. Augustine; the kindly Benedict of Nursia, the gentle Anselm, the winsome Bernard of Clairvaux, and the towering intellect of the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas. But as even the most superficial reading cannot fail to disclose, these movements of cloistered piety not infrequently touched the very depths of degradation and spiritual torpitude. Orders which had had their rise in an heroic effort to realize almost superhuman virtues suffered rapid decline when well-meaning but spiritually dull persons showered them with bequests, often to relieve their own burdened and uneasy consciences. The Church then found that nothing corrupts so quickly and thoroughly as wealth and power. It managed to thrive more easily during the periods of persecution when the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the Church, than during times of prosperity and ease. Jesus was right when with the sure insight

of His religious genius He declared all wealth as morally suspect and dangerous to the spiritual well-being.

Many medieval sects, particularly groups of mystics, attempted to reform the current degenerate Church by bringing about a restoration of its pristine conditions by preaching and particularly practicing the world-renouncing, ascetic type of devotion, within or without the monastic orders. One need only cite such choice spirits as the gentle and eloquent Meister Eckhart; the saintly Jan Ruysbroeck; that earnest quester after holiness, Gerard Groote, whose chief fame rests upon his now established authorship of that golden little book, *The Imitation of Christ*, and his organization of the Brethren of the Common Life. A typical example of a radical attempt to restore "true" Christianity is the spiritual father of the Unity of Bohemian Brethren, Peter Chelčický, whose pacifism exercised a potent influence upon Count Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy. This layman, who lived in the first half of the fifteenth century, repudiated the dominant type of historic Christianity as hopelessly secularized, tracing the beginnings of this downfall to the union of Church and State effected in the days of Emperor Constantine. Accordingly, he preached a radical separation of the two realms, asserting that the state is a necessary evil with which the Christian must have absolutely nothing to do. The state, depending for its very existence upon force, must resort to war. But to a Christian, war is wholly contradictory to the fundamental ethic by which he must live. Consequently, he must hold no office in the state, and must engage in no occupation which would involve him in a compromise with his principles—such as commerce, crafts and the learned professions. Practically, the only calling safe for the Christian is agriculture. Learning also smacked of the worldly pomp and vainglory, and was on the whole mistrusted. The early communities of the Brethren actually practiced this rigorous ethic, although within half a century they were forced to liberalize their relation to the world. In the end, the teaching of the group approximated the Calvinist tenets in the matter of the Church-State relationship, as well as others.

The experience of the Unity of Brethren has been repeated by most of those groups among the Protestants, Catholics and the Eastern Orthodox alike who attempted to practice the absolute ethic of Jesus under the relative conditions of this age. Although no group, of course, has ever reached the absolute perfection demanded by the Sermon on the Mount, many Anabaptists, particularly the Mennonites, the Dunkers, the Quakers, the

various groups of Pietists and the Dukhobors, attempted it in their various ways, although rarely displaying the rigorous logic characteristic of Peter Chelčický. Possibly Roger Williams, with his rigorous separation of Church and State, may be classed in this category. But his principles are still not understood and acted upon, despite the lip service which is often paid them. As small, often quite insignificant groups, unable to exercise any marked influence upon the state, the "absolutist" groups were not infrequently able to achieve notable results in Christian virtues. Their very insignificance and political harmlessness served as their protection, although even so they sometimes had to pay for their religious non-conformity by persecution and martyrdom. But could they conduct political control in accordance with their principles? No. When in the early days of Pennsylvania the Quakers found themselves in political control of the colony, they discovered that they could not govern the commonwealth and practice their pacifistic principles at the same time. The military protection of their realm was plainly a necessity, and whatever name they gave the taxes they paid to the British crown, the undoubted fact remained that their payment was used for the support of the military establishment in America, including their own commonwealth. Like the modern pacifists, they found themselves beneficiaries of the very system they denounced. The Quaker legislators in the end could not ignore this fact so plainly staring them in the face. In 1756 the majority ended this flagrant contradiction between their profession and practice by voluntarily surrendering their seats in the Pennsylvania Assembly, and let its non-Quaker members do the dirty work. Moreover, two years later the Yearly Meeting passed a resolution forbidding its members to hold any political office. Peter Chelčický was right: the Caesar's world cannot exist without the use of force, and if it be forbidden a Christian ever to use force, irrespective whether the purpose be good or bad, he better leave the state and all that goes with it severely alone.

III

During the present cataclysmic upheavals, when the very foundations of the hitherto established social order quake, the Christian Church is undergoing an ordeal such as it has not experienced since the Mohammedan assaults of the seventh and the following centuries. In some quarters, its very existence is at stake. Everywhere it is gravely threatened. Should

the pagan forces now let loose in the world secure mastery, the Church would be confronted with a grim struggle for survival. And even in the happy event of the defeat of those awesome four horse-men of the Apocalypse, its task in the postwar world staggers all imagination. What is the Church to do in the face of the hostile world locked in a death grip in which Christianity, along with much that is the most precious in western civilization, may perish?

I have no great doubt that both types of Christianity described hitherto will perpetuate themselves, and will offer their very different solutions for the ills which afflict the human race. As for the world-denying type of the first century, it has not survived in force or pristine purity. There are but few Christian groups which hold the radical otherworldliness of apocalypticism, or the uncompromising logic of Peter Chelčický. Possibly, such bodies as the Adventists or the Jehovah Witnesses come closest to the type. But their solution is not likely to be found satisfactory. Most Christians—not to speak of others—regard their program as visionary, illusory and unrealistic.

But much more influential is the eclectic group which chooses certain elements of the gospel of apocalypticism and incorporates them into the developmental type of Christianity. This is particularly true of the pacifist groups who base their program upon certain isolated elements of the Sermon on the Mount. The early Christian expected the warless world as part of the Kingdom of God which was to be brought about by God, not man. An organized campaign designed to deluge the senators in Rome with tons of mail, a political agitation to dislodge the Caesar then wielding the reins of government from his seat, and aiding a "Palestine first" campaign, were no part of their program. In this respect the modern exponent of Christian pacifism bears but little resemblance to the early Christian, who was a meek, humble-souled quietist devoutly but passively awaiting the end of the world. The program of the modern pacifist is vitiated by a radical self-contradiction: he both accepts and rejects the early Christian apocalyptic ideal. He accepts the conclusion, while rejecting the premise upon which it is grounded. But one cannot have it both ways.

There is indeed a possibility that the Church of the future may have to adopt the world-renouncing, apocalyptic type of life. But I do not see any reason for rejoicing in it. The time may come when a radically secularist civilization will strip Christianity of all but the narrowly-understood

"religious" functions, and will deny it the right of cultural and political activity. It happened in the Soviet Union and elsewhere; it may happen again. Shorn of all possibility of functioning otherwise than as the "life hidden with Christ in God," the Christian Church may well be driven underground, "into the catacombs." Under such conditions, it must of necessity adopt the apocalyptic type of interpretation of its message. But from such a calamity may the good Lord deliver us!

Nevertheless, given more normal conditions of life after the war, as it seems reasonable to expect, there exists but little doubt that the developmental interpretation of Christianity will prove more effective. This type has frankly abandoned all expectation of a miraculous, cataclysmic, catastrophic upheaval which would destroy the Caesar's world and inaugurate a new heavenly order. It brands all such hopes as illusory, visionary, belonging to the primitive age long left behind, and frankly adopts the program based on the religious insight that without spiritual regeneration there can be no fundamental change in mankind. To it the gospel is a grain of mustard seed which in time shall grow into a large tree; it is a bit of leaven which ultimately shall permeate the whole lump; it is the seed cast upon rocky, thorny or good ground, and yielding increase accordingly.

It follows, therefore, that the program of Christianity is that of a slow, gradual transformation of men by persuasion, preaching and example. Our goal is still very, very far off. The Kingdom of God is not just around the corner, and will not begin the first Thursday after the conclusion of the war. Not all Christians engaged in the planning of the post-war world are included in the group I mention; but at the meeting of the General Council of the Congregational-Christian Churches at Durham I saw a chart in which the organization of the postwar world was reduced to neat little diagrams as if it were all a matter of setting up ninepins. Nonetheless, there can be no good world without good men and women. If Jesus taught anything of which we may speak with certainty it is this, that no radical change can be expected before human hearts and wills be converted to the doing of God's will. This is not to be understood in the sense of what used to be called the "individual" gospel. But there can be no social gospel without Christians. To expect a Christian world order before the world is Christian is manifestly a snare and a delusion. And the task of converting the world is hardly begun. The present world is

still largely pagan. Mankind is yet in its spiritual infancy. Moreover, have even the professed Christians reached spiritual maturity?

But I do not wish to be misunderstood as if I were advocating the postponement of all concrete reforms until all men were Christians. Just the opposite. By all means let us work with all our might for social justice, racial equality, international good will and a warless world. All I am urging is that we must put the first things first: *human motivation is primary, all machinery is secondary.*

Since the question of the future world is fundamentally a religious question, a spiritual revolution is the chief and essential need of our time.

I regard it as hardly conceivable that any other world religion or moral force besides Christianity is at present capable of organizing the postwar world on principles which would assure it permanent and just peace. An "Atlantic Charter" without religious dynamic would be as powerless to create a new world as the Kellogg Peace Pact was to prevent the war. Therefore, there can be no such thing as Christian isolationism. For unless the new world is based upon Christian principles, the war has been fought in vain and must doubtless be fought all over again in the near future. But is even the Christian Church good enough for such an appalling task? Assuming the victory of the United Nations, and judging—to put it conservatively and mildly—that Russia cannot probably be counted on as a force in Christianizing the world, are America and England spiritually strong enough to generate the mighty spiritual revolution which alone can transform the Caesar's world into something better? Obviously the Church of yesterday was not good enough. The Church of the future must be better. And since to America will fall the chief task of organizing the future world, the American churches particularly must become veritable dynamos of spiritual power. That Church will be what we make it. Therefore, the reformation must begin with the Church itself. For salvation must come from Zion. Else it will not come.

Catastrophe and Courage

WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE

MUCH of the most notable writing of the present time has to do, of course, with the war. Often it has been said that "truth is stranger than fiction," and contemporary events illustrate that in superlative degree. Events of the war, and the stories of men who have taken part in it or of those who have suffered its tragic consequences, embody the clash of forces, the suspense, the uncertainty and the emotional drama which imaginative writing strives for and does not always attain. War has its desolating elements which we already know and which will be seen in long and bitter reckoning as the years go on; but it does break up the molds of conventional existence, and forces our generation to explore new heights and widths—as well as terrible new depths—of life. Contemporary books reflect these facts. They show that we live in a world which in many ways is worse than we had believed, but which, whatever else it may or may not be, is certainly not dull.

Consider for example such a book as *The Raft*. It has been called, and not without reason, "the story that generations of Americans will be telling their children to illustrate man's ability to master any fate." It is written by Robert Trumbull, a newspaper correspondent, but it is the story told to him shortly after their rescue by three men who had brought into being by their actual adventure what would otherwise have seemed an incredible saga of the sea. Harold Dixon, aviation chief machinist's mate in the United States Navy, and two men with him, Gene Aldrich and Tony Pastula, took off in an airplane from a carrier on a scouting flight one day early in 1942 in the south Pacific. Losing their bearings, they missed the ship when they turned back toward it, and had to come down at sea. Immediately the plane sank, and they were left to save themselves on a rubber raft. Captain Bligh, with his seventeen men from the *Bounty*, made what has become his classic exploit of sailing a 23-foot open boat more than 3,600 miles to safety; but Dixon, Aldrich and Pastula, in a rubber raft only a little larger than a bathtub, kept afloat for thirty-four days, battled through winds and storms and torturing heat of the sun, existed on a few raw fish speared with a jackknife and on such water as they could catch when occasional rain squalls broke, held on both to their

courage and their sanity, and piloted themselves without a compass at length to land.

On the first morning after they had come down into the sea, a searching plane appeared in their sky, but failed to see them, circled away, and disappeared; and from that time on for more than a month they never saw a sign of a human being except themselves. Said Dixon:

"Controlling our craft's progress was my first concern because, while we were entirely without food or water, there was nothing any of us could do about this but wait for the Lord to send us a shower, and bring some food where we could catch it. I figured the Lord would help those who helped themselves, so I set out immediately to take every bit of advantage that I could of the few materials available to me."

Moreover, Dixon discovered that he remembered some Bible stories:

"I found my recollections of the Bible very useful in the last week or ten days, when we were all exhibiting a tendency to brood over our position. One of my hazy parables would snap us out of our depression and start a flood of discussion in which our dismal outlook was momentarily forgotten.

"Many a time I wished a preacher, or someone well versed in Scripture, were present. The wording I used would certainly shock a Bible student."

But whatever his wording was, the heart of the matter was in him, and in the others too. There was just "one time during the entire trip," says Dixon, "that I was truly disheartened. In fact, I was just about ready to give up. I knew that the end of our voyage was very near; we must make an island in a day or two, or die.

"Tony shared my gloom. He considered going over the side; it would be a quick death, without the torture that the sun had in store. But he changed his mind.

"'We've come this far,' he argued, 'and by God we'll go on!'"

And they did!

* * * * *

Another book about the war (or at least about the forces which provoked it) and a book which has much more explicitly to do with religion, is *Until That Day*. It is written by a woman, Kressman Taylor, who wrote also *Address Unknown*, but it is the account, recited in the first person, of what happened to a young theological student in Germany, the son of a Lutheran pastor, who refused—as his father also did—to bow to the paganizing Nazi pressure. "Karl Hoffmann's story," says the author's introduction, "is told here substantially as he told it to me. The story

of what happened to him and to men like him in Germany is something of a modern miracle. The Nazis had prepared a perfect plan. By a subtle scheme that looked on the surface like co-operation they would take over the Lutheran Church and use it to serve their purposes. They would disarm the churchmen and place their own men at the head of a united Church. . . . But the thing they were attacking did not lie in an organization. . . . There were words sounding in the air, commands from an unseen Leader, and against them the Nazis' countercommands rang futilely down the wind."

To tell the story of the book, or to describe Karl Hoffmann and the grand person who was his father, would be to dull the edge of the book's own impact. A better thing is to recommend that everybody who can do so read it. For this is more than an exciting story of conflict and of courage. It is a revelation of the kind of forces of anti-Christ that arose in Germany, and of the subtle and sinister way by which they sought to get possession not only of the state but of the Church. What happened in Germany might conceivably happen in other lands, and the danger of it is precisely in the fact that the evil is not immediately obvious. The Church is not asked bluntly to surrender, but only to compromise its convictions at first in little things, for expediency's sake.

Yet if the book is full of warning, it is vibrant nonetheless with a great faith. In the last chapter, these words are put on Karl Hoffmann's lips:

"The Nazis often use a phrase, 'strength through joy,' but I have not seen it written upon Nazi faces. Yet I remember the joyful strength of the faces in the old Domkirche that last Sunday morning when Luther's ancient battle hymn sounded, and there was no fear in those people after years of persecution and the daily menace that inspires fear in minds that doubt. I have seen that same look on thousands of faces, a look that means more than endurance because it is lighted by hope from within. . . .

"The fight is just beginning. I who have been there know that the battle is not lost."

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A book of a very different kind is *Dialogue With Death*, by Arthur Koestler, who was the author also of the widely read *Scum of the Earth* and *Darkness at Noon*. It is a grim book, with passages in it so full of stark horror and brutality that one flinches from the reading of them. And then the implacable fact drives home: "This horror that you shrink

from even thinking of, actual men have endured and are enduring now in their living flesh." It is well that we be forced to remember this, lest the romantic elements in war should disguise the ghastly realities which underlie them. "I believe," this man writes, "that wars consist of only 10 per cent action and 90 per cent passive suffering."

Koestler, who was born in Budapest, has lived in Palestine and in Egypt, has fought in both the French and British armies, and has been a correspondent in Russia and in Spain. It was in Spain that he began the *Dialogue With Death* which came so near to becoming a monologue, with death saying the last emphatic word. He was a journalist trying to send out news from Spain from the territory of the Loyalists, and when Malaga was captured by the rebel troops he was arrested, journalist or no journalist, and sentenced to execution. Then for two hundred pages the book describes the inside of Spanish prisons, the men who filled their cells and were taken out to be tortured, and many of them at last put horribly to death. There are no histrionics about it; it is the cold, merciless analysis of life in its bleakest degradation, and of its extinction in indignity. As a piece of writing, it is masterful in its macabre power. And the most dismaying question which it raises is this: What will "victory" be worth if a war prolonged enough to have a "victory" sends back to their homes innumerable men who may have seen so much of hideous cruelty and suffering as to have grown callous to the whole fact of human pain?

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With Koestler's book there may well be associated another contemporary writing which produces much the same mood. *Dialogue With Death* is a factual account of a man's experiences. *The Seventh Cross*, by Anna Seghers, is a novel. The impression it makes, however, is not less realistic. Anna Seghers herself is a German and knows the Germany which was coming into being when the Nazi scourge began. The story she has written moves therefore against a background vividly seen and unmistakably in its essential genuineness. The book is not only a story of a manhunt, tense and terrible, but it is a drama in which there move all sorts of people, some of them evil and brutal, some of them frightened and bewildered, some of them desperately and unshakeably courageous, who make up today the terrible ferment of tyranny and secret resistance which the life of Germany includes.

The title of the book has to do with the Westhofen prison camp and the escape of seven prisoners. Crossbars were nailed to seven trees and on these the bodies of those who escaped were to be hung up when they were captured. Six of them were captured. The stories of them come as brief and ghastly interludes, but the main story has to do with the seventh prisoner, George Heisler, and of what he did and what he endured from the moment when we first see him trying to conceal his body in the mud of a swamp while the prison sirens wailed and armed guards were scouring the countryside, until the climax, which had best be left for the reader himself to discover. As the long trail of his attempted escape lengthens, the characters of many men and women are revealed as Heisler's path crosses theirs—the sadistic cruelty of Nazi prison officials, made more virulent by their own secret fear of what will happen to them if prisoners escape; the emotions of a Jewish doctor to whom Heisler goes for treatment of his hand, which had been torn when he had scaled a wall topped by broken glass; the loyalty of men of the underground movement; the cowardice of some whom he had supposed to be his friends, and the courage of others upon whose mercy he chanced.

The book has in it appalling things, not only in its picture of the present but in its suggestion of the future. The prisoners in the Westhofen camp are reported as thinking thus:

"A whole generation had to be annihilated. These were our thoughts on that terrible morning; then for the first time we voiced our conviction that if we were to be destroyed on that scale, all would perish because there would be none to come after us. . . . The best that grew in the land was being torn out by the roots because the children had been taught to regard it as weeds."

But this is not the last word. In the resistance of men in prison camps and in the secret sympathy of many in the world outside, one can sense the cracks that may weaken and at last bring down the walls of tyranny:

"To many of us the enemy had seemed all-powerful. The strong can afford to be wrong at times without loss of prestige, because even the most powerful are after all only human—yes, their mistakes make them all the more human—but he who claims omnipotence must never be wrong because there can be no alternative to omnipotence except insignificance. If one stroke, no matter how tiny, proved successful against the enemy's alleged omnipotence, everything was won."

And the final words in the book, which again are from the lips of those who are still behind the walls of the Westhofen camp, are these:

"All of us felt how ruthlessly and fearfully outward powers could strike to the very core of man, but at the same time we felt that at the very core there was something that was unassailable and inviolable."

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Dialogue With Death has to do with Spain and *The Seventh Cross* with Germany. Another notable novel has to do with the other country which lies—and has lain longest—under the Fascist shadow. It is Ignazio Silone's *The Seed Beneath the Snow*.

Koestler lived through the experience which he recounts. Anna Seghers knew with intimate understanding the Germany which is the scene of *The Seventh Cross*. Silone not only knows Italy, but his own life has been much like that of the central character in his book. He has himself been hunted by the Fascists, and is in exile. As the editor of a labor paper at Trieste he was sought for with warrants of arrest when the Black Shirts marched on Rome. His brother was caught and beaten to death and he himself escaped only after three years of hiding among peasants who sheltered him.

The book is of a different character from the two already reviewed. Their tempo is the quick and breathtaking movement of adventure and immediate danger. The atmosphere of this book is not less charged with danger, but its mood is more contemplative and often more profound. The stories in the other two move like the whirlpools of Niagara. This one moves like the Mississippi, carrying in its wide, deliberate stream the tokens of all that its tributaries have drawn from wide reaches of the earth. It is a book of human sympathy and understanding, of wisdom won from contact with the life of common people, of wistfulness and yet of hope—as its beautifully suggestive title shows. The character who is the center of adventure is Pietro Spina, hunted rebel against the Fascist government. But still more noteworthy in the vividness with which she is drawn is the great matriarch, Donna Maria Vincenza, his grandmother. A single glimpse which one gets of her early in the book through the eyes of her peasant coachman reveals her. There was a devastating earthquake in a village to which he had driven her carriage, and, as she came walking toward the open square where the carriage waited, the houses were toppling into the narrow road.

"I shouted myself hoarse: 'My lady! Donna Maria Vincenza! Hurry! Faster!' As soon as she had reached me, she drew me apart and said under her breath: 'Venanzio, what kind of manners are these? Why were you shouting out

my name in the middle of the square?' 'My lady,' I answered, 'the whole village is falling to pieces!' 'That I know,' she retorted. 'It's not hard to see. But if the earth indulges in such extravagant behavior, need we imitate it?'"

The main pattern of the book is woven out of her efforts to win safety for the grandson whose political commitments would not let him be safe. But into the pattern of these two lives are woven the threads of innumerable lesser figures who together create a picture of what may be going on in the silent multitudes of Italy. It is a book of kindness for little people and of satire for all inflated figures whether of church or state. In reading it, one is aware again of the ultimate stupidity of all tyranny. Moreover, one looks at the contrasted picture of that strange amalgam of superstition and calculating piety which is the Roman Church in Italy on the one hand, and on the other the everlasting wonder of Christianity when its reality is revealed. Near the climax of the book, an unknown person comes to help a peasant woman hoe her field. In her simple and excited faith she comes to believe that the helper is Someone more than human.

"The rest of the parishioners were equally affected. Naturally, every one of them believed, or thought he believed, or pretended to believe the catechism, including what is said about the Real Presence of Our Lord in the bread and wine of the Blessed Sacrament. But the news that He had been seen among the living, in a cornfield only a mile or two away, was quite another matter."

But two of the peasants talked thus together:

"'Do you think that He's still around here, Franci? When he comes to a place, does He pass right through it or does He stay about for a while?'"

"'He is present in every man that suffers, Ameri, He is the dying one that refuses to die. He told us Himself but, since we are prone to forget, we must ever repeat it, that He is in every one of the poor.'"

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J. B. Priestley is widely known both as a novelist and essayist. None of those who have read, for example, that genial and happy tale, *The Good Companions*, can cease to have a feeling of satisfaction that he is one of our contemporaries. In his latest book, a short volume of essays entitled *Out of the People*, he brings a message worth pondering in these critical times. "We are no longer playing with ideas," he says in his preface. "We live too close to destruction and death. And also too close to new life too." The book deals with both these aspects of our contemporary fact. It shows how the British people have met destruction

and death and the daily risk that these may come again. But its main concern is with the new life that may come out of these, not only for England but for America, to which this particular edition under review is addressed.

The heart of Mr. Priestley's message is in his belief that we face a chance now to transcend all selfish barriers of class and privilege through a new sense of identity of all people in a braver and better society which can be worked out by all alike.

After the immense dislocations and the as yet immeasurable destruction of this war there can be no permanently rich life for anyone, Mr. Priestley believes, unless there is a better world for everyone. This better world will not be reached by any magical formulas, but only through hard and bitter tasks; but the tonic quality of the book is in its belief that there are courage and spiritual resources enough to get these tasks accomplished. Specifically Mr. Priestley recognizes the critical importance of religious faith and the indissoluble way in which this is linked with all the worth-while ideals of democracy.

"If we have all immortal souls and are all the children of God," he writes, "then we are all real people. We are members of one vast family. We may not work or play together, but probably we worship together. It is impossible to believe that men have immortal souls and at the same time see people as masses. Behind this conception of the masses is a complete disbelief in immortality, the soul, spirit, deity. And *murder* becomes *liquidation*, so smooth and easy, slipping so quietly off the tongue. What is it but the obliteration of creatures without significance, without dignity, without any call upon our sympathy? The early democrats, in Britain, France, America, even when not religious men, were always insisting upon the fundamental dignity of the human being."

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Get Thee Behind Me is not a war book; but it does have to do with an everlasting conflict—the conflict between the generation that thought it knew, and the young generation which is jauntily confident that it knows. In this case the conflict, though more sober in expression, is also in part more sharp; for the younger generation in *Get Thee Behind Me* are "the preacher's children," and this is the story of how the children notwithstanding their decorous conformity kept getting ideas very different from those that their father was busy putting into his sermons.

It is a very living book, because it tells about real people, with understanding and with wholesome humor. The chief *dramatis personae* are Hartzell Spence himself, "the preacher's son," his father and mother,

his older sister Eileen and his younger brother Fraser; and for chorus there is the frequently vociferous company of church officials and self-important church members who kept strict eyes upon the preacher's children, together with a thoroughly human assortment of other and more genial folk. The central figure is the preacher-father; and the son has certainly fulfilled the injunction which sturdy Oliver Cromwell laid upon the artist who undertook his portrait, "Paint me as I am, wart and all." Here would seem to be the very man himself in all his vital actuality. And a big person he was too: masculine in every fiber of him, with clean-cut principles and convictions and good fighting blood to stir in their defense. He was the kind of man all sorts of people could admire, and did admire, including his son. He could have been a wonderful dad to a growing boy, and would have been—except for one thing. He was so busy being a preacher that being a parent just got left out. And "being a preacher" did not mean anything in the faintest degree hypocritical or shallow; on the contrary, he was so dead in earnest about what he preached, and about the way people ought to live, including himself, that he did not stop to see that there might be more spontaneous things he had not thought of.

"Father did not understand his own children. Perhaps because we were part of his being he assumed that we were out of the same moral mold. 'Like father, like son,' was a truism of his, and we were supposed to be untroubled by doubt, immune to temptation, selfless, and content with spreading the Gospel to the exclusion of all else. When brought up short by some incomprehensible demonstration of our wordliness, father would retire to his study to meditate upon it."

So it wasn't strange that father's ambition to have his son follow his footsteps into the ministry didn't work out. The reason why is something that every living minister, to his soul's good, might well listen to and ponder; and to understand the reason why one needs to read the book.

But at the end, nevertheless, the preacher's son knew something about his father worth remembering. After his sister's wedding, this is the way he set it down:

"A change came over me too. I began to think of those twenty-five parsonage years, what they had meant to us, and what they had done to us. All our past difficulties were smoothed out now into a long road whose end Eileen had reached, and perhaps I too.

"It had been a road with steep hills, hills the climbing of which had given us an enduring strength, a strength upon which we had drawn many times since leaving home.

"And what was that strength? An intangible something from the parsonage, composed of a little perspective, a little tolerance, an unwavering conviction that man and God are good, that the abiding constancy of faith is a shelter against the impacts of all manner of skeptics and cynics.

"This was our heritage, the only legacy a child of the parsonage ever would receive."

The Raft. By ROBERT TRUMBULL. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1942. pp. 205. \$2.50.

Until That Day. By KRESSMAN TAYLOR. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942. pp. 314. \$2.75.

Dialogue With Death. By ARTHUR KOESTLER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. pp. 210. \$2.00.

The Seventh Cross. By ANNA SEGHERS. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1942. pp. 338. \$2.50.

The Seed in the Snow. By IGNAZIO SILONE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. pp. 360. \$2.75.

Out of the People. By J. B. PRIESTLEY. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. pp. 160. \$1.50.

Get Thee Behind Me. By HARTZELL SPENCE. New York: Whittlesey House, 1942. pp. 323. \$2.75.

Book Reviews

How to Win Peace. By C. J. HAMBRO. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1942. pp. 384. \$3.00.

A Basis for the Peace to Come. The Merrick-McDowell Lectures for 1942. By FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL, JOHN FOSTER DULLES, WILLIAM PATON, LEO PASVOLSKY, HU SHIH, AND C. J. HAMBRO. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. pp. 152. \$1.00.

Conditions of Peace. By EDWARD HALLETT CARR. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. pp. xxiv-282. \$2.50.

Now that the United Nations have taken the offensive and victory can be more definitely predicted, interest in the postwar future has quickened. The time for future blueprinting has come. It is the task of students, writers and philosophers to present concrete ideas as to the postwar future to the peoples and the statesmen of the world.

A beginning has been made by the three books under review. The first two definitely envisage the restoration of some form of League of Nations, modified in the light of experience. Mr. C. J. Hambro of Norway, who is still President of the League of Nations Assembly, protests in his book against the idea of Anglo-American peace. "To any international work the small nations and their men and women are needed. They are brought up to be internationally minded. Ignorance is the privilege of great countries. It is a luxury small nations cannot afford if they want to survive. . . . Most of the international movements of modern times have originated in the small countries."

Nevertheless Mr. Hambro admits that the old League system in which a small state has the same voting power as a great one must be modified. In his Merrick-McDowell lecture, he writes, "Small states have got to accept the idea that there exists such a thing as great states." In the old League the great states had major responsibilities, but no more power than that of the small states having virtually no responsibility. This unbalance, Hambro says, must be changed. And he suggests a revised two-chamber world system—a lower house with representation from each state in accordance with its financial contribution to the League, and an upper chamber retaining the principle of equal representation. He also believes the rule of unanimity must be modified in many cases in favor of a binding majority vote.

In addition to Mr. Hambro's address, *A Basis for the Peace to Come* contains five addresses made at Ohio Wesleyan University when the Delaware Conference was in progress. Bishop McConnell well defines the relationship of the Church to the material ordering of the world when he declares, "Surely it comes within the province of the church to insist upon society's right and duty to seek and maintain the material conditions which make the achievement of the higher human ideals possible. . . . If society is not allowed to accumulate something of a surplus of goods any higher values are impossible." Mr. William Paton of London continues this examination in an address on the Ecumenical Church and World Order. He stresses the duty of evangelism; calls upon the Church "to witness the danger

of power," and to accept a common commitment of fellowship across the boundaries of both nation and race.

Three other lecturers treat more directly of the problem of world organization. John Foster Dulles proposed a federal European authority, within a broader world framework, such as an amended League of Nations. He proposes to delegate to this world League vast powers over international finance and trade to be exercised through a Monetary and Banking Corporation, and international chartered companies to carry on foreign trade, immune from national taxation and tariffs. He would give such international agencies the "functions that England measurably discharged during the nineteenth century." He does not define the composition of the world Executive Organ which would exercise such vast functions—i.e., whether it is to be chosen by majority vote of the League members, or whether Britain, the U. S., Russia and China would have a dominant voice. It is unlikely that these powers would turn over their economic systems to an international body which they did not directly control. Nonetheless Mr. Dulles' thesis that it is better for a world League "to accept limited jurisdiction, coupled with direct power, than to have a broad jurisdiction within which practical action depends upon a large number of sovereign states being willing subsequently to concur in taking the necessary implementing steps" has much to commend it.

Mr. Leo Pasvolksy of the State Department reviews in his lecture the economic maladjustments of the past few years, and argues for the Hull Trade Agreements as a means of eliminating discrimination and bringing about world reconstruction. Hu Shih, former Chinese Ambassador, emphasizes the importance of placing power back of any international system. He declares that the most practical way of realizing disarmament and establishing peace is through "pooling and organizing the overwhelming forces of the peace-loving peoples. . . ."

While all of these lectures are worth reading for their succinct and concrete treatment of the world problem, they tend to emphasize questions of superstructure, while neglecting the task of getting rid of the contradictory nationalistic policies, particularly of the great states, which no superstructure can break down without a radical change in the whole orientation of the great powers.

Mr. E. H. Carr, now a leader writer on the *London Times*, tries to attack these problems at their source in a stimulating, well-written volume called *Conditions of Peace*. He rightly insists that the world is undergoing a great crisis in which democracy, self-determination, capitalism and moral standards all are undergoing change. The world in short is going through a great revolution. Hereafter the peoples of the world will not tolerate any political or economic system which chronically produces unemployment and war. While much of Mr. Carr's analysis is sound and even commonplace, he in company with other so-called "liberals" does not inquire *why* the political and economic order have failed, nor does he make any critical analysis of his own alternatives—a system of bureaucratic planning imposed on Europe by the outside powers.

It is hardly accurate to argue, as he does, that World War II is largely a desperate device to provide employment when traditional methods failed. Indeed the weakest part of this volume is the failure to realize that there is an ideological gulf between Fascist totalitarianism and the present ideology of America and Britain. Unconsciously at least Mr. Carr demands us to adopt a form of economic

organization which is similar to the Nazi system, and which I fear would have the same destructive results.

No doubt many will be attracted by his thesis that in the future, economies should be dominated by the concept of "planned consumption" and that we should continue in peacetime the type of economic organization we have created for war; except that our goal should be butter rather than guns for all.

More concretely he proposes that Britain guarantee a minimum standard "for all in the essentials of life." Thus the State should start with primary necessities such as food and housing, but eventually go on "to free electric cookers, subsidized radio sets or cheap motor cars, national theaters and concerts, or free holidays and so forth." At the same time the State should limit profits and strike down big fortunes. It all sounds very much like one wing of the New Deal in the U. S. As far as Britain is concerned, it ignores how Britain is to pay for the imports it will desperately need after this war, even to maintain its pre-war standards; nor does it pay real attention to the role of venture capital in promoting progress. If Mr. Carr has his way, venture capital and technological progress would be very largely destroyed in favor of a state socialism providing full employment, perhaps at bare subsistence level, and of a political system which, as he outlines it, would take more and more a dictatorial form.

Mr. Carr's views as to international organization are hardly more convincing. He intimates that Britain can hardly count upon the U. S. taking a constructive role in world affairs, and is critical both of the U. S. high tariff and of the Hull Trade Agreements program. (His book was written before either Russia or the U. S. entered the present war.) He believes Britain must take large responsibilities for organizing a new order in western Europe after the war, and he would give similar responsibilities to Russia in eastern Europe. He rightly emphasizes the importance of power; but his "sphere of influence" solution will not please the peoples of central Europe who do not wish to be dominated either by Russia or Germany.

As far as Germany is concerned, its productive power must not be destroyed after the war, since this would injure the standard of living of Europe as a whole. But "we must help to build up the German economic system into a larger unit under different forms of control." Instead of attacking trade barriers or reviving *laissez faire*, "the results which we desire can be only by a deliberate reorganization of European economic life such as Hitler has in fact undertaken, but on different premises and for different purposes." He then proposes the creation of a European Planning Authority which would give the most detailed direction to economic life, including the intergovernmental direction of virtually all production and trade.

Mr. Carr is right in saying that Europe needs a unifying economic framework. He is also right in saying that the extra-European powers should take the lead in proposing and underwriting such a framework. But in my opinion, his particular brand of planning would require a Hitler to operate; and his particular form of guarantee under which Europe would be divided into spheres of influence respectively dominated by Russian and Britain, would be scarcely more acceptable in the long run to the peoples of Europe or the world than Axis domination.

Certainly government in every country must assume major responsibility to combat unemployment and insure social security. But that government will best

succeed which uses its controls to unleash private creative energies rather than choke them by the kind of bureaucratic planning which Mr. Carr proposes. Certainly no world system can succeed unless Britain, the U. S., Russia and China are determined to make it go. But no system based on the discredited sphere of influence concept—or a series of regional imperialism—can hope to get very far. The better route is for the great powers to pool their strength and leadership within a United Nations framework.

RAYMOND L. BUELL

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What Man Can Make of Man. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. pp. vii-62. \$1.00.

This is a pungent little book. Sixty-two pages, a long magazine article, an hour's reading. But no. Each sentence is a condensed paragraph, each paragraph a condensed page, and the theme is of such importance as to make one wish for a larger book. It is an admirable diagnosis of recent phases in the modern temper, and prompts one to discuss the trends, rather than comment on the contents.

Its theme is to show why modern man is tired of himself; why he has lost confidence in the world of his own making. No one can ignore the fact that we belong to a disillusioned generation, and many of us are wounded in our theories; and the wettest of wet blankets is a man wounded in his theories, when called on to test them in face of catastrophic change. The greatest delusion of our recent past was the belief in human progress based upon the idea of evolution. Faith in this dogma was founded on the assumption that science could do for man what neither philosophy nor religion could do. Science professed to seek truth; it was not concerned with values; and religious or philosophical postulates were discredited simply because they were based almost entirely on values. From this arose the modern cult of the worship of pure objectivity, and the cultivation of an attitude of scientific detachment which enabled its devotees in the words of Professor Bury "to be affected by that merely historical point of view, which is a note of the present century and its larger tolerances; and more than half disarmed by that wide diffusion of unobtrusive skepticism among educated people which seems to render offensive warfare superfluous." The outcome of this complacent attitude is well discussed in *The Irresponsibles* by Archibald MacLeish.

This attitude however is no longer possible. Today we are confronting a complexity of historical facts of such tremendous gravity that we are not being asked to think about them, but rather what are we going to do about them? The sense of responsibility, without which human rights have no meaning, stands before us to judge our theories and intentions in the stern light of performance. This new mood will no longer be content with facts, but go further and demand the value of facts; for surely philosophy is something more than to teach a man to die like a gentleman; it must arm the mind against depression in face of the grim austerities of change. The values of life must have power to survive if man is to find a basis for confidence in any of his theories.

It is at this point this little book will help an honest inquirer, for Professor Hocking reminds us that value must be sought for in something beyond the ranges of science; in belief in the purpose of God in the universe, especially in rela-

tion to human affairs. Value belongs to the realm of eternal ideas beyond the range of scientific inquiry, and is the true object of philosophical research.

The present limitations that science has imposed upon its data have freed philosophy from the 18th century reproach of being concerned with objects beyond the domain of rational inquiry. Value for the individual or for society must rest upon the idea of purpose. The best service that philosophy can render is not in satisfying this need so much as to help us ask the right questions. Doctor Hocking believes the answer is to be found in religion. But just here the common reader would like the learned writer to be more specific.

There is much talk about religion today among the most unlikely people. Many, a few years ago who were quite content to ignore it entirely, or to speak of it with a strange detachment, are now seeking something more significant; but too many are still under the influence of "those courtly polygamies of the soul" that produced many of the distinctive heresies of the early Christian centuries, being content to find an escape from the world in some form of debased oriental mysticism. But what the common man wants to know is this: Has God spoken? Has He made His intentions regarding man evident in human history? Amid the chaos of voices in the world is there a Voice, a Word of God in which man may truly confide? If Simmias was bold enough to put this question in the *Phaedo* why should it be thought unreasonable to put it today? and endeavor by a fresh consideration to find it in the Christian religion? It may be that little books like this will help us to gain a closer view. It makes one hope that the day is not far distant when the intellectuals will close their philosophy books, and open their New Testaments.

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The Confession of an Octogenarian. By L. P. JACKS. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. pp. 272. \$3.50.

This is no ordinary autobiography; and no one who is interested in the story of religious and social movements in England, and indeed in the English-speaking world in the last two generations should leave it unread. Not only does it tell the unique and important part that the author has played in these movements. It is also the self-revelation of a remarkable personality. My own personal contacts with Doctor Jacks have been few and far between. It happens that I was a schoolboy in Liverpool during two of the six years of his pastorate of the Renshaw Street Unitarian Chapel in that city. But I have no recollection of having heard of him in those years, and that in spite of the fact that my school chum, Dudley Braham, was a Unitarian, and that I went now and then with him to hear Doctor Richard Armstrong preach at the Hope Street Unitarian Church. Incidentally, I may add here that it was this same Doctor Richard Armstrong, in his previous pastorate at Nottingham, who was probably the chief influence in leading the young Jacks into Unitarianism. My own first knowledge of Doctor Jacks was long after this. By that time he had concluded his second and last pastorate at Birmingham, and had become editor of the new *Hibbert Journal* and had besides joined the teaching staff at Manchester College in Oxford. I myself had become a minister in London, in charge of a small Welsh

congregation; and then began my acquaintance with the *Hibbert Journal*. My first actual contact with Doctor Jacks was *apropos* of an article which, greatly daring, I had submitted to him as editor of the *Hibbert*. The last was during his last sojourn on this continent, which included a visit to Montreal. In those days I had something to do with McGill University; and the question of inviting a speaker for the impending graduating exercises was on the boards. I suggested the name of Doctor Jacks. I forget how we managed to waylay him and persuade him to come to Montreal, but come he did, and the impression he made upon his hearers was, and deserved to be enduring. For me and my household, however, the chief event of that day was his afternoon visit to our home, into which we had gathered a group of kindred spirits to meet him. The solemnities of convocation were forgotten and "a good time was had by all."

It would be simple effrontery to write anything like a critical review of a book like *The Confession of an Octogenarian*. It was undertaken, its writer tells us, to distract his mind from overdue preoccupation with the grim events of these times. I imagine that the book has served that purpose amply, not only for the author but for those who have read it. One reader at least has been transported again and again to a world which was far from perfect but was kindlier far than this; and it has been a happiness even to recall some

Old far-off unhappy things
And battles long ago.

For instance, Keir Hardie comes into the book. He was the founder of the Independent Labour Party in Great Britain; and I was a fairly early member of it. Here there is an account of Keir Hardie attempting to address a meeting at Oxford, with Doctor Jacks in the chair, which ended in a tumult raised by a mob of undergraduates. In those days—immediately after my college life—I was doing mission work at Treharris in the South Wales coal field. Hearing of an approaching visit of Keir Hardie to that area, I took steps to bring him into our district and succeeded. I could find no man in the village to take the chair, and had to take it myself. It was a large and orderly meeting. But the next morning trouble began. My landlady gave me notice to quit, lest she should have notice to quit from the colliery officers from whom she rented her house. Presently came solemn rebukes from my ecclesiastical superiors; and finally I was removed to another place where, it was supposed, that I could do no harm. But that is another story.

That is only one instance out of many in this book that have given me acute nostalgia. I made a list of the names of the significant persons whom Doctor Jacks has encountered in the course of his odyssey. It is a very long list; but it is a list of men and women whom I know to be of authentic distinction in their several spheres, and not a few whom I have been privileged to meet. But Doctor Jacks has, as it were, lived with these people and that gives us the measure of his distinction. (The only name that at the moment I miss is that of the Baron von Hügel.)¹ Not indeed that Doctor Jacks was aware of his distinction; for he was saved from any tendency to *tête monté*

¹ May I say that there is a reference in the book to a "Rev. R. Roberts"; but it is not a reference to me, though I was much interested in the movement he was associated with.

by his guardian angel, who was his mother, and a remarkable woman. Perhaps the most vivid picture in the book is that of this mother. The story of her suffering, her widowhood, her struggle with adversity, her careful and deep-seeing motherhood, and her victory are all told in this book with moving faithfulness by her son; and the photograph of her (facing p. 168) shows her in old age—in repose, but showing in her deep-set eyes the signs of her warfare.

In his later schooldays, he came more or less under the influence of two clergymen of the Church of England. One was a curate at the church which his mother and he attended at that time. The curate was a "High" churchman and cherished the hope of shepherding the youth into his corner of the fold. The other clergyman was an evangelical, and at the time, the headmaster of the school which young Jacks attended, and whose plan was to prepare him to win a scholarship in a Cambridge college. But the plans of both miscarried. The youth had a mind of his own, and he decided that he could no longer remain a burden upon his mother. So for the next five years he engaged himself as a teacher in private schools, and found the work as many another has found it, an intolerable drudgery. But that was not the whole of his life at the time. He registered himself as an "external student" in the University of London; and the chapter in which he tells the story of his struggle to prepare for the examinations requisite to a degree is most moving.

I wish that it were within the compass of this article to tell the story of Doctor Jacks up to date. "Up to date" because according to him, religious education is lifelong; and there is no means of knowing what new vistas of the Kingdom of God have revealed themselves to him since the publication of this book. But it belongs to the philosophy (or is it the theology?) of the matter as Doctor Jacks sees it, that everything in his experience has gone into the making of his religion. "Whether catapulting birds in the Gelding fields, 'swotting' for an examination in a bed-sitting room, pursuing heavenly visions, explaining cricket to a German professor, or studying German philosophy, all has had something to do with my religion education, my religion at the present moment being nothing else than the outcome of varied experience in the sum total of more than eighty years." p. 75)

That experience, however, was colored in its early stages by what he calls "two converging streams of tendency." The first was his own home and gathers around his mother's sufferings in her widowhood, and which emerged in his consciousness as "an undying sense of the tragedy of life." "Doctrines and philosophies of life might be taught to me and were taught, some based on authority and some on reason; but if they failed to fit in with that background, they felt wrong, and I could never learn them, never assimilate them." (p. 77)

The other "stream of tendency" was associated with his mother's boarder, Sam Collinson, a stockbroker by calling, a poet by taste and a Unitarian by religion. He appears to have been a man of sterling qualities; and it is no wonder that his walk and conversation should breed in the Jacks's household a respect for Unitarian religion. Moreover, when he found that the young Jacks was being moved by the sermons of Richard Armstrong, and frequenting the Unitarian church of his own motion, he introduced him to Matthew Arnold's famous book, *Literature and Dogma*. There he came upon the great description of God as "a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." This defini-

tion became and remained the foundation of that faith the building of which is the central interest of the rest of the "Confession."

The next step in the development of young Jacks is associated with Harvard. The Hibbert Trustees awarded him a travelling fellowship which he elected to disburse at that university in order to be able to sit at the feet of Josiah Royce and William James. He records in particular that Royce gave him the clue to Spinoza and much beside. For instance, he confirms the student's intuition of "a third party" in the process of knowledge, and gives to this "party" the name of "the Interpreter." One day, the student asked the professor whether the "Interpreter" might not be changed into "the Living God." "You would do better," said Royce, "to call it the Holy Ghost." During his stay in Harvard, Doctor Jacks says that he was in "the House of the Interpreter." "That feeling," he says, "has remained with me ever since—call it mysticism or metaphysics, as you will. No matter what form experience may take, it seems to me to be obvious that a dialogue is going on in two languages, which an Interpreter, lodged in the depths of my being is translating into a third language, a *lingua franca* of truth and falsehood, good and evil, intelligible to me and to all men." Like all generous spirits, Jacks fell in love with Royce's idea of the Beloved Community. "It was his version of the City of God, of the Communions of saints, but so widely conceived that all the loyal and devoted are *ipso facto* its members and lovers."

Another contact in Harvard was with Charles Eliot Norton; and from Norton's readings of Dante, Jacks acquired a conviction that Dante's vision of Hell, Purgatory and Heaven is the truest vision of the Universe yet compassed by the human mind; that the universe, while unquestionably Copernican from without is as unquestionably Ptolemaic when experienced from within. . . . "There is no infinitesimal small enough to represent my insignificance or yours in the material universe; there is no magnitude large enough to measure our importance in the spiritual."

Doctor Jacks, speaking of his Harvard experience, says: "The result of all this was that I began to think of religion not as founded upon Reason, Faith, Emotion, Imagination or any other of the separate faculties to which its origins have been assigned, but as the spontaneous response of the *whole man* to the whole of his experience, a conviction which grew clearer as time went on and has remained with me ever since."

The next step in the story is connected with Jacks's appointment to be assistant to that great man Stopford Brooke at Bedford Chapel in London. He confesses his exiguous equipment for that situation. Of his theology, he says that it was contained within the framework of "belief in a Power-not-ourselves that makes for righteousness, and for all excellent things." Of philosophy there was a considerable amount, but it was miscellaneous and un-co-ordinated. He had no Christology, thinking that the Higher Criticism had discredited the Gospel records. His one sufficient resource for his task was the God in whom he believed as the Power-not-ourselves and whom he saw as a universal illumination, reflected by every object upon which it shone.

He remained in London only two years, having been called from there to the famous Unitarian Church in Renshaw Street in the City of Liverpool. His

predecessor was a great personality, Charles Beard who among other achievements, had written a notable history of the Reformation, which according to him was the beginning of a process which would be completed only when no authority was recognized save that of the Living God. Beard's successor found a vocation at last, which he defined as "completing the work of the Reformation," a phrase which we encounter frequently in the rest of the "Confession."

After six years, Jacks accepted an invitation to another famous Unitarian Church, this time in Birmingham—the church with which Joseph Chamberlain was associated, but rarely visited. About this time too, Doctor Jacks tells us that he discovered "the Common Man." "To discover the Common Man," he says, "is of course to discover that which all men have in common, the discovery therefore of myself in my neighbour and my neighbour in myself, the only condition upon which both can be loved equally." The "common man," says our author, is the man "who lives by reason, who goes straight to the mark, and who lives by the understanding which compares with Reason as a blind man's stick, testing the next step, compares with the pole-star guiding the mariner in the circumnavigation of the globe." . . . Reading his belief from his actions, it is clear that he believes in the everlasting difference between good and evil, true and false. . . . "Yes," said Emerson, after hearing a pessimist prove that this is the worst of all possible worlds, "yes, all you say may be true; but what is that in you which knows it?" Answer: "The Common Man." Here I find myself at a loss. To my knowledge, I have never discovered this Common Man. Frankly he seems to me to be a pure abstraction. That there are two men in me—and common men at that—I have long discovered; and one of them is ashamed of the other. Saint Paul's psychology is nearer to the state of things that I find in myself: "I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." (Romans 7:22-23) The tragedy of mankind is the divided self. Doctor Jacks's *Common Man*, if he ever existed, disappeared long ago, perhaps after a brief experience of an earthly paradise which proved too much for him; and even yet has he not learned the things that belong to his peace. The vast and mounting tragedy of these times is the evidence of his perversity. Nonetheless, in the vast charity of God he may yet be saved. From my point of view, Doctor Jacks is speaking of the *ideal* man.

The space is lacking to summarize the rest of Doctor Jacks's absorbing story; and I trust that many who read this article will read the "Confession" for themselves. But one other part of the story must be spoken of, namely, that which has to do with the *Hibbert Journal*. The story begins in the year 1902 and it still goes on. Jacks was appointed editor by the Hibbert Trustees at the beginning, and so far as I know he still is. From that time the *Journal* has been an open forum for the serious discussion of religion, theology and philosophy, without shackles, and without respect of persons or opinions. The Editor regarded his new office as an opportunity to pursue his purpose of "completing the work of the Reformation" which he had come to regard as a matter of "generating spiritual energy, which is another name for awaking the soul." It was a favorable time for launching such a program as there was a certain quickening of interest in religious matters afoot at the beginning of this century. It has to be

said, and that with thankfulness, that the editor has carried out his plans for the *Journal* with complete success in spite of many difficulties. He is entirely justified when he says that a future historian, writing the religious thought in the first half of this century, will find in the series of its numbers valuable material upon which to base his conclusions. There are few thinkers of eminence in the provinces of religion, theology and philosophy belonging to this period in the English-speaking world, whose names will not be found among the contributors. It has nobly fulfilled its purpose.

There is much more in this book concerning which I would like to speak, but time and space forbid. I trust that I have said enough to quicken a resolve in my readers who have not yet done so to procure and to read for themselves this informing and stimulating book.

RICHARD ROBERTS

Pendle Hill, Wallingford, Pennsylvania.

Where Are the People? By SIDNEY W. POWELL. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. pp. 223. \$1.75.

In his book, *Where Are the People?* Sidney W. Powell has rendered a distinctive service to ministers and other church leaders who are concerned with the unreached and unchurched multitudes of the nation.

It is a timely book. It comes from press with its invaluable suggestions just when millions of our citizens are being uprooted and moved to new communities because of the war. The authorities at Washington tell us that about fourteen million people have changed their residences to different communities within one year after Pearl Harbor. Other millions will move during the second year. What can the minister do more than he is now doing to meet this new and baffling situation? What can a congregation do? This book carries part of the answer.

The author speaks out of experience. He and the congregations he has served have done the thing he talks about in the book. The chapters, twelve in all, speak out of experience. Many methods are suggested. These have been tested and tried. They work.

This book not only reminds us that "the fields are white unto the harvest" but it helps to locate the harvest.

In the judgment of the Department of Evangelism of the Federal Council of Churches, this is one of the finest books on the evangelistic outreach of the Church, which has been produced in the last ten years. The Department has thought so highly of this volume that it sent one to each denominational Secretary of Evangelism as soon as the first copies came from press. Some of these Secretaries because of their high appreciation of the book, have sent copies to the members of their Commissions on Evangelism and field representatives.

The lost word of the Church is "how?" Leaders often urge their fellow Christians to reach the unchurched, but they never explain *how* this may be done. They point out by statistics, surveys and otherwise the multitudes within the nation who are not in any church, but they omit to tell *how* to reach them. This book is filled with valuable plans on how to do it. It puts into the hands of ministers and laymen alike, some tools with which to work.

The book is filled with heartthrobs and drumbeats. It calls to action. It

unfurls a banner. It challenges the Church here and now to face out and "go make disciples."

JESSE M. BADER

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New York, New York.

A Realistic Philosophy of Religion. By A. CAMPBELL GARNETT. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1942. pp. xii-331. \$3.00.

If anyone is tempted to regard this book, after reading a few chapters, as a little commonplace or as too moralistic in its interpretation of religion, I suggest that he turn to Part III and then read the whole in the light of what he finds there. Taken in that way I think that it will be evident to most readers that we have in this book one of the most convincing empirical presentations of Christian Theism that have been written. It does with less religious fervor what Professor Wieman has done for years but does it without the positivistic inhibitions which distort Wieman's constructive thought. Professor Garnett combines his religious philosophy with a proposal for the Church in Chapter Seven which is unsound. He suggests that the Church should not require that its members not be committed as such to the superstructure of belief in the transcendent God but only devotion to the immanent God known "as that within us which goes beyond the seeking of our own good to seek the good of others." In other words the Church should only require its members to be committed to a program that in its theological assumptions is neutral as between Theism and a purely immanent Humanism. I agree that some Churches should be very inclusive in their membership at this point but that is different from suggesting what should be the content of preaching and what should be the assumptions underlying prayer and worship. This ecclesiastical proposal is incidental to the argument of the book though one of Professor Garnett's main purposes is to meet the Humanist on his own ground as far as possible.

Professor Garnett seeks to isolate the distinctively religious strand in experience. He finds this in the "altruistic" or "disinterested" will which is present in all normal human beings at least as a source of judgment upon conduct. The way in which he arrives at this conclusion by cross examining many other theories is one of the most valuable aspects of the book. His view is a good deal like that of John Baillie in *The Interpretation of Religion*. He makes use of a method which is quite similar to that of Baron von Hügel when he asks what intimations there are of the transcendent God in this universal religious experience. His discussion here is most illuminating. He finds three such intimations: (1) the fact of moral conflict; (2) the case for the objectivity of value; (3) the sense of moral obligation which points beyond the higher self and beyond society to God. Professor Garnett's critical though appreciative discussion of the thought of John Dewey in this connection seems to me to be unanswerable. I wish that he might have enlarged upon his one reference to Bergson's later thought which parallels his own.

The final chapters clear the way for belief in immortality and outline a conception of God that resembles that in the writings of Charles Hartshorne though it is presented with much greater clarity.

JOHN C. BENNETT

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The Church in the Social Order. By CYRIL K. GLOYN. Forest Grove, Oregon: News-Time Publishing Company, 1942. pp. 201. \$1.50.

It is interesting that two American students should publish studies this year of Anglican divines of the last century. Professor Gloyn's book enters the field as Charles R. Sanders' *Coleridge and the Broad Church* appears from the Duke University Press. Perhaps, as Gloyn remarks (p. 4), the problems of "sincere nineteenth-century churchmen are the problems most disturbing to churchmen today" and Christian social thought during the war crisis can make the most of Malvern and Delaware findings by going back behind them for perspective. This reviewer feels that both Gloyn and Sanders have revealed that there is little which is relevant or attractive in the Anglicans of a century ago.

Professor Gloyn describes four theories of the Church in relation to social order: (1) the clerisy idea opposed to secularism by Coleridge, (2) the supernatural church in history defended against State authority by the Tractarians, (3) the radical theory of church-state identity (though paternal rather than authoritarian) held by Thomas Arnold, and (4) the combination of national church and religious socialism set forth by Maurice, Kingsley and their associates.

Secularization is still a problem for churchmen as the Oxford Conference made plain, but Coleridge's clerisy (recently revived by T. S. Eliot) smacks too much of the clerical fascism advocated in Spain and Portugal. Gloyn's analysis of Tractarian thought reveals less of its social content than a book like W. G. Peck's *Social Implications of the Oxford Movement* but his refusal to idealize Pusey *et al* has the effect of making them appear futile for not acting on their own logic to demand disestablishment. Arnold and the extreme Broad Churchmen appear as ideological insurance men against revolution, arguing like Coleridge for a *noblesse oblige* solution of class injustice rather than a democratic solution. The same conservatism is revealed in Maurice and the Christian Socialists. What Gloyn says of Coleridge fits them all: "In developing his social ideals he overlooked the growing class struggle."

At a revolutionary moment in history like the present to re-examine nineteenth-century Christian social thought is to realize how much sharper and more analytical our present social concepts are. A comparison with the Anglican thought recorded in the social manifesto of Malvern (1941) reveals how much more confused the divines were a century ago by class-conscious influences.

One fault: Professor Gloyn's study is so "ideological" and indifferent to objective historical forces in the nineteenth century that he fails in important observations, such as the effect upon the Oxford Movement of being driven by persecution from the "good livings" into slum parishes. The "dialectical" result of such an experience is obvious.

JOSEPH F. FLETCHER

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How to Be Your Best. By JAMES GORDON GILKEY. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. pp. ix-166. \$1.75.

This volume continues the goodly list of books by this industrious author in the same field of the practical applications of sound sense and Christian idealism. *How to Be Your Best* takes up a dozen different limitations common to ordinary

folks, the disabilities of "normal" people, and sets forth definite ways of overcoming them. The range of its message may be indicated by a few of its chapter headings: "Making a Hard Life Easier," "Getting All There Is From the Little You Have," "Utilizing Your Hidden Resources," "Meeting and Mastering Defeat," "Controlling Your Anxieties," and "Outwitting a Routine Job."

Doctor Gilkey's twofold method consists first in frankly analyzing the problem under consideration, and then in indicating definite steps toward a solution. The troubles with which the book deals are not the academic or exceptional ones, but the common troubles of men and women who are in the midst of life and who aspire to make it worth while.

The suggested steps toward deliverance are based on sound and modern psychology, with an absence of technical theory and an avoidance of the prevailing fads and frills in this field. Religion finds its fitting place as the chief dynamic. Little is said about theological doctrines, but much about the practical application of Christian resources.

There is frequent and refreshing use of well-adapted verse throughout the book, and a constant string of examples from real life of the problems under study. Here is, incidentally, an abundance of illustrative material and suggestive ideas for the minister who wishes to reach down into the daily experiences of his people.

The title of this little volume does not overstate the case and raise false hopes, as some titles unfortunately do. A persistent following out of the good counsel herein given would inevitably help one toward being the best that God planned for him. The book should be an inspiration to all except "the perfect," and will be especially valuable to young men and women feeling the first heavy pull of the grade. It is a splendid example of the practical possibilities of "Religion in Life."

J. HUDSON BALLARD

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The Spiritual Life. By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. pp. 218. \$2.00.

There is perhaps no greater contemporary need in the field of theological thinking than clearance from ambiguity, terms that have lost their meaning to the rising generation. There is question indeed whether many of them have possessed any definite meaning for the people of a previous period who have loved to use them. About no term has there been more misunderstanding than about the meaning of the word "spiritual." The expression "spirit" has been applied to everything from alcoholic liquors to ghosts, from activities of the football field to the being of God. A real service is done then by Professor Brightman in clearing the theological meaning of the word from the indefiniteness that has long enshrouded it. Obviously any symbol that can be applied to both God and the devil by a change of qualifying adjectives needs clarification in the realm of religion.

Spirit, according to Professor Brightman, is an experience of the person, conscious, powerful, noble or uplifting, rich, courageous, free, rational and personal. "It is the highest development of each person with his unique powers

and talents." He makes the distinction between person and spirit that some prefer to make between individual and person. He takes person in the lower sense of one who is capable of developing higher values, while a spirit is one who has actually developed a conscious attitude toward ideal values. "When we speak of spiritual values we are speaking of personality on its highest levels." To us this means that one is not truly a person until he has begun to achieve on these levels. This seems even more evident when the author tells us that "spirit is meaningless, a barren and unreal abstraction, apart from personality." The spiritual life is then a system of living realization of personal ideals. On this sound definition as a base he proceeds to the discussion of spirit as social, as divine, as developing and as free.

As to the metaphysical aspects of spirit the author, while not seeming to identify his view with that of the "personalistic idealists," perhaps would hold with such that: ". . . all physical reality . . . (is) . . . simply the consciousness of the Divine Person, energizing in one specific type of its experience. For such idealists physical nature is the continuous act of the divine *socius*, so that the whole universe is literally a society. Those who hold to this philosophy do not, of course, think that God's experience is exhausted in physical nature. The personality of God, they hold, includes vast areas of truths and values and purposes unknown to us and countless types of experience unimagined by us, so far beyond the realm of physical nature that God's transcendence infinitely exceeds his immanence. Our phenomenal world is but a tiny island in the mind of God. This means, if it be true, that the Other whom we discover at work in nature is far richer and more worthwhile than nature ever could reveal it to be. Nature is but a fragmentary clue to other realms."

Whether or not he believes that putting of it we are truly grateful to Doctor Brightman for the clear and beautiful wording of the personalistic creed. The book fills a need and performs a real service to the theism of our time and should be read by all religious teachers for its definiteness and force. We find ourselves so much in accord with its contents that we even feel like forgiving the author for the repeated defense of Hegelianism, which seems extraneous to the discussion.

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING

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Leaves of Healing. By ARCHER WALLACE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. pp. x-168. \$1.50.

Archer Wallace, an editor of the publications of the United Church of Canada, has written much and well for boys. In his recent book, *Leaves of Healing*, he has written for adults, a book of insight and wisdom. The book is so simple, and its insights so spiritually self-evident and happily put that the reader realizes that only a genius could have strung so many pearls, of his own and of others, in so comparatively a brief volume. Mr. Wallace handles both the commonplace and the exceptional so well, giving both such rare settings that it is easy to understand his popularity as an author. The book is "a series of devotional meditations, each followed by a brief prayer."

Readers will find almost everywhere in the book, insights as happily put as the following: "Love is much nearer the truth than any other mood." "There

is not enough room in any heart for both love and hate. When love comes in it expels envy and destroys every form of animosity." "No one upon whom cynicism or despair has settled can make a permanent and serious contribution to life." "We must convince men that, no matter what people say or think about their weaknesses, God believes in them and yearns over them in infinite tenderness and compassion." "At the end of the day we shall see clearly how gracious and abundant was His mercy."

Mr. Wallace's gleanings are among the finest to be found in the literature of today, and of yesterday. Take this that he quotes twice, from Arthur Guiterman:

When I loathed and hated I was wrong,
And where I loved and pitied I was right.

This also, from Augustine, shows what pure honey the author has gathered from the finest flowers of the human spirit: "I heard Thy Voice from on High crying unto me, I am the food of the full grown; grow and thou shalt feed on Me." And as Mr. Wallace himself puts it, "We grow by surrender to the Spirit of God, and by allowing His fullness to round out our incompleteness." In passages like the following, he reveals a poetic quality: "Naturalists tell us that there was once a time when birds did not have wings. Thus they were the prey of stronger and fleetier creatures. Then came the desire for wings, and eventually the desire was rewarded."

Desire wings long enough and hard enough and you get wings.

In common with the prevailing mood of present-day liberalism, Mr. Wallace puts his emphasis upon the fruit of the Vine, just as the fundamentalism of yesterday tended to substitute praise of the Vine for union with the Vine and the bearing of the fruit. Early Christians experienced, in the ascended Jesus, omnipresent through the Holy Spirit, that Jesus is both Lord and Master, Vine and Fruit. The Spirit is seeking to call us back to Jesus as Lord and Master, as the Way and the Way-Shower; as the Perfect Vine and the Perfect Fruit. We cannot have the perfect fruit apart from union with the Perfect Vine, and we cannot continue, and increase, in union with the Vine except in bearing the fruit of the Vine.

J. R. MOSELEY

The Macon Telegraph, Macon, Georgia.

The Christian and the War. By CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co., 1942. pp. v-145. \$1.50.

The Editor of the *Christian Century* has put together the series of editorials which he wrote when, after Pearl Harbor, his mind was caught between his pacifist and isolationist opinions and his patriotic emotions. These chapters are admirably written with Doctor Morrison's usual journalistic flair. They contain moving passages prompted by deep religious feeling. They say a number of true things in most telling phrases. But taken as a whole they give the impression of a trapped mind trying desperately to rationalize its new position and to defend a course with which the heart is not in sympathy.

A revealing sentence toward the close of the argument tells us where he really stands:

"We may still believe, as the *Christian Century* certainly does, that the worst thing America could have done for herself and for mankind was to get into this war."

If that be his basic conviction, how does he rationalize his present willingness to go along with his country in this conflict until the United Nations gain a preponderance or a stalemate is reached and "a negotiated peace" becomes possible.

He starts with the statement that our involvement in the war created a totally new moral situation for American Christians. War is now for us "an unnecessary necessity." It is a necessity because, once started it cannot stop or be stopped until it runs its course; "it is beyond even God's power to stop it until it stops itself." It is unnecessary because in the past we might and should have followed courses which would have prevented it. The war is tragic, and the Christian sees it as God's judgment for our guilt in making an unrighteous world. War can never be God's will, nor can it be righteous for a nation or an individual to participate in it. War is hell, the penalty for sin, and hell is a realm in which conscience does not function, distinguishing between right and wrong. "We are fighting for the preservation of our national existence and independence." This is "the truth and the whole truth" about our present course. Doctor Morrison is apparently a patriot of the "my country right or wrong" variety, and now goes along with the nation, but he will not say that either he or his country is right.

One may agree with him that war is the tragic result of man's disobedience of God, and that we as well as our allies and enemies are guilty. But is there no moral distinction between the two sides in this conflict? Doctor Morrison slurs what to most of us is fundamental. Can his basic assumption that the events of December 7th created a completely new moral situation be sustained? The same moral situation had been staring us in the face certainly from the outbreak of the war in Europe. Many of us saw an inescapable conflict several years earlier. Doctor Morrison confesses:

"I inwardly pushed the issue into the future with the excuse that, after all, it was an academic question so long as there was no crisis."

It seems incredible that an intelligent Christian could have been so provincial in his outlook. Even if the Nazi movement did not seem to him critical for mankind, how could he feel there was "no crisis" when Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium were raped?

And is war hell? According to the New Testament, hell is essentially banishment from the presence of God. "Depart ye." War is as hideous as Doctor Morrison paints it. In it men do many things utterly repugnant to the principles by which they act in time of peace; but happily even in war conscience functions and makes distinctions between right and wrong in the treatment of prisoners, of civilian populations, etc. More basic yet is the purpose for which a nation asks its sons to fight. May any citizen's conscience abdicate for the duration? Must it not ask whether the war be the nation's obligation to itself, to mankind and to God?

For can war be divorced from God's will? If He be the Lord of history His will is involved in every event. The Christian always has to discover that will amid circumstances for which his own sins and the sins of others are in some

part responsible. When lands are ruthlessly invaded and their peoples enslaved has God no will for the checking of aggressors and the freeing of the oppressed? And does not that will present a challenge to any nation possessed of power? "Am I my brother's keeper?" War is never a preferred course; but suppose no other effective means be available to deal with the aggressors and deliver their victims, may not a nation see in this historical situation its use of force on behalf of justice and liberty to be the will of God?

The author appears to the present reviewer to be less than fair in his representations of the positions of both Christian pacifists and Christian interventionists. He is unfair and intolerant when he declares that neither of them can have true repentance for the sins which have brought on this catastrophe. He calls his own position "Christian realism." One wishes that his "realism" had begun to function before Pearl Harbor. It has added to the tragic situation that a religious paper, which both in this country and in Canada had so large a following, should have been blind to the moral situation in 1939-40 and failed to give realistic Christian leadership to the Church and nation.

HENRY SLOANE COFFIN

Union Theological Seminary, New York, New York.

Invitation to Pilgrimage. By JOHN BAILLIE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. pp. 131. \$1.50.

There is something quintessential about this little book. There are fifteen chapters but only 131 pages, or less than ten pages to a chapter. But each chapter is as concentrated as a small bottle of Bovril, and each paragraph is similarly condensed, and each sentence in each paragraph. This high degree of compactness makes it a book less to be read at a sitting than to be taken in small doses or pondered clause by clause. A reader who habitually underlines as he reads or makes comments in the margins will be kept very busy.

Professor Baillie whom Scotland gave to the United States and Canada and then repatriated had already written much of this book when he was invited to deliver three lectures at Princeton "in defense of the Christian religion," and he borrowed heavily on the chapters of *Invitation to Pilgrimage* in his lectures. It may be said that they contain the very essence of Professor Baillie's theological thinking. He presents a defense of historic Christian experience, and yet relates this historic theology to the social tasks which the Christian must inevitably undertake if he is to help to create on earth the blessed community even if it can never be realized except at the end of history—whatever that may mean! Thus, within the confines of historic theology and despite the obvious emphasis on the divine initiative rather than the human initiative, there is an attempted synthesis of the individual and the community, of time and eternity.

The approach is, of course, theological, not sociological. Indeed, Doctor Baillie seems to take no little satisfaction in the collapse of all humanisms that minimize the fact of God or chafe under the "historical particularity" of the Christian revelation, or stress mere morality and social-gospel. He refers to those whose idealism has been brewed in the vats of science rather than of theology as "men of the afterglow." The tendency to assume that these rosy ideals are only the hangovers of a discarded Christian terminology is challengeable.

The dawn is also rosy fingered as well as the afterglow. So, too, the frequent attacks on mere morality current in modern theology with its *hauteur* toward Jewish legalism might well be met. The more one surveys the history of Judaism which shows, even today in the face of the most awful persecution, a vitality and realism too often lacking in Christians, both liberal and neo-orthodox, the more one is impressed by the fact that the persistence and survival of the Jew were in large measure the result of the imprint of a practical concern for the maintenance of the laws governing the relationship of man with man. The tremendous ethical and social concern of Judaism has often been in the vanguard of historical development (the word "progress" must of course be repressed) where the saints, mystics and philosophers of Christianity have been asleep at their posts, resting in the Lord. When Christian theologians can combine social realism and moral concern with their theology—and Professor Baillie comes very close to it at times—the casual reader will be more indulgent with their stress on "historical particularity." The immediate problems confronting us all are in part transcendent to be sure, for tragedy is inescapable even in the best of all possible worlds, but they are replete with situations in law and moral adjustment, and if the theologian prefers to stress the eternal values and to minimize the art of social adjustment, the sociologist is equally justified in minimizing the absolutes and seeking the clarification of international law. Mutual sneering is unnecessary, especially when the theologian is more at home with absolutes and the sociologist with implications.

The author states that "it is his intention to present the grounds of Christian beliefs in such a way as to make clear to others the nature of the constraint which they exercise over myself." In this, he has been eminently successful, and ministers will find his book, for the digging, a mine of rich ore. It should be read slowly, thoughtfully and critically, for even the brilliance of his aphorisms may sometimes blind the reader to necessary qualifications which should be made. The Church, for instance, is ideally a blessed community, but would anyone with a minute knowledge of the horrible divisiveness of churches in community and nation be able to maintain the thesis that the Church, historic or actual, is *the* blessed community? This reviewer, much as he loves the church and much as he insists on the togetherness of life, cannot possibly identify the Church as the only society which reflects the spirit of God.

CLARIS EDWIN SILCOX

Canadian National Council of World Alliance, Toronto, Canada.

He Is Risen. By HAROLD PAUL SLOAN. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941. pp. 192. \$1.50.

This book deals with the central doctrine of the Christian religion. As Doctor Cairns of Aberdeen once said: "The resurrection is the land where the great mists lie, but it is the land where the great rivers spring." For the Christian believer the resurrection of Jesus is not merely the greatest event in history, it is the hinge on which all history turns. This tremendous fact created the Church, gave us the Lord's Day and transformed a group of men who changed the world. Doctor Sloan well says: "The Christian Church rests down ultimately upon one most astonishing fact—the fact that the original Chris-

tian witness did proclaim Jesus of Nazareth to have risen from the dead—leaving his sepulcher open and empty behind Him.”

In his introduction to this volume Bishop Francis J. McConnell says: “Dr. Sloan has given us a fresh and vital treatment of the resurrection of our Lord in a book which is the outcome of earnest and devout brooding.” It is a stimulating, valuable and timely piece of work. For even though open attacks upon the resurrection have largely died down there are many attempts to explain away the Gospel records and to give their simple statement a meaning which would have amazed the writers. It will richly repay preacher and layman alike to read and reread the arrangement of dates, the objections with which he deals, and the “New Testament Witness and Its Appraisal.” His observations concerning the “Easter Fact and the Easter Faith” are unanswerable, for if the fact be surrendered the faith will not survive. Not the least merit of the book is the author’s insistence on the relation between belief and conduct and the contemporary scene gives him tragic illustration.

Discussing the Cross and the Resurrection on p. 16, Doctor Sloan says: “There is no room for two opinions with respect to the circumstance that these two events are indeed the center of gravity of the New Testament. Personally I am coming to regard them as the center of gravity of human history. I have no doubt that modern men are just now in danger of losing both political freedom, and every other sublimity of life, because they have allowed these two supreme values to be diminished and called in question.” The author rightly observes that the Resurrection was the burden of Apostolic preaching. They did not try to explain it; they declared it.

It would not have hurt the book if it had been a little less dogmatic and a little more persuasive. At times the writer drives the nails so hard he almost splits the wood. Doctor Sloan preaches better than he writes. His fondness for certain words impair smoothness and felicity.

It is a notable contribution on a great theme by one who writes about his Christian certainties in a convincing fashion. In an age of confusion it is a tonic to read something by a man who is sure and “who believes his beliefs.” It is a book to buy, to study and to keep.

ALBERT S. MORRIS

Mary A. Simpson Methodist Church, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

We Believe. By JOHN J. MOMENT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. pp. v-134. \$1.25.

In this brief volume of Doctor John James Moment, the minister of the Crescent Avenue Presbyterian Church, Plainfield, New Jersey, has rendered a distinct service to Christian people of all denominations. His book is a study of the three traditional Creeds of the Church: The Nicene, The Apostles and The Athanasian. The book comprises five chapters with an appendix and notes. The chapter titles are: “God the Father,” “God the Son,” “God the Holy Spirit,” “Man in the Creeds” and “The Heritage of Faith.” In the Appendix is to be found the text of the three Creeds.

As is to be expected, most of the volume is given to the Doctrine of the Trinity: “God in Three Persons.” The framers of the ancient Creeds did not

mean three persons in the sense in which that term is ordinarily understood. The confusion comes from the misinterpretation of the Greek and Latin originals of our word "Person." The Greek word "prosopon" originally meant "face"; the Latin "Persona," an actor's mask. In the early years of the fourth century, however, the Greek theologians dropped the word "prosopon" altogether and substituted for it the word "hypostasis" which is identical with the Latin word "substantia" and equivalent to our word "substance."

An easy explanation would be to think of the three Persons as three manifestations of the Deity, and this type of explanation was offered at various times, and by different leaders, in the history of the Early Church. One is reminded of such objectionable names as Sabellianism and Monarchianism. The Fathers had before them the problem of trying to reconcile the statements of the New Testament which indicated that Father, Son and Holy Spirit were not only divine, but in some manner distinct from one another. The Doctrine of the Trinity was their attempt to reconcile certain incongruities in the references found in the New Testament, and at the same time to present the truths of their religion in a way to meet the highest demands of the human reason.

It is the facts of Christian experience which prove the fundamental truth of the Doctrine of the Trinity. These facts are: "That in the man Jesus of Nazareth, carrying love to its supreme consummation on Calvary, we see God Himself incarnate; that, therefore, through Him, we see God as love, and that to Him whoever commits himself in faith is himself baptized with the divine Spirit of love and peace."

This little book will prove of inestimable value to busy pastors and to inquiring laymen anxious to know something of the backgrounds of the Christian faith.

WILLIS J. KING

Gammon Theological Seminary, Atlanta, Georgia.

Marcion and the New Testament. By JOHN KNOX. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. pp. ix-195. \$2.00.

The thesis of this book is that the creation of a distinctive Christian canon of Scripture was due primarily to the opposition aroused after the middle of the second century by Marcion's claims of authority for his "heretical" canon. It is not argued that this was the sole contributing factor, only "that Marcion's canon served as the decisive occasion for its creation, just as the addition of a single element to a highly complex chemical solution often produces the precipitate" (p. 161). In the development of this hypothesis the influence of Marcion is traced in the tendencies which brought together the separate Gospels into one fourfold gospel and stimulated the collection of other "apostolic" writings to supplement the Pauline Letters, thus setting the pattern of the gospels and Apostolic Writings which dominates the organization of our New Testament today. Besides being an "Essay in the Early History of the Canon," as the subtitle indicates, the book includes important treatments of related New Testament problems such as the authorship and occasion of Ephesians and the Pastoral Letters; the Ephesian imprisonment of Paul; the authorship, date and nature of Luke-Acts, its relationship to Paul's Letters and Josephus, the Infancy Narratives of Luke's

Gospel; and the Synoptic Problem. In other words, the shadow of Marcion hovers over many areas of New Testament study.

In treating these problems the author reveals not only a thorough grasp of previous investigation, and in particular a great indebtedness to the classic work of Harnack, but also an original analysis of primary sources, the whole being dealt with critically and creatively.

By its very nature the book will be of more direct interest and usefulness to the scholar than to the layman, and its hypotheses will be variously estimated by the former. At least it cannot help but stimulate the kind of thought and discussion which are necessary to the prevention of stereotyped thinking about the so-called "settled" issues in the field. One thing is certain, there are few, scholar and nonscholar alike, who cannot learn much from the temper of the author and the manner in which he has approached and worked out the problems involved. His work is a model of what scholarly procedure should be in dealing with intricate and controversial matters. The limitations imposed by the data are clearly envisioned, great care is taken in matters of precise and unambiguous definition, the temptation is scrupulously avoided to force round pegs of material into square holes of preconceived theory and discriminating thoroughness pervades every page. Above all, the dry bones of historical fragments become alive by means of a valid but temperate use of historical imagination.

DONALD T. ROWLINGSON

Emory University, Emory University, Georgia.

Paths of Life. By CHARLES MORRIS. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. pp. 257. \$3.00.

Mr. Morris' book incorporates a somewhat novel approach to the problems of "comparative religion." He is not interested in providing an objective historical account for its own sake; nor is he interested in appraising other religions from within the standpoint of an existing faith. He is the advocate, rather, of a new religion—Maitreyism (named after the future Enlightened One whose coming, according to legend, was predicted by Gautama) which he hopes may provide the integrating center for the next epoch of culture.

The whole plan of the book is based on an analysis of human nature into three fundamental tendencies which the author calls "Buddhist," "dionysian" and "promethean." These stand, respectively, for detachment from desire, abandonment to desire and ceaseless construction; but no existing religion embodies any one tendency exclusively. Instead, the six main religious types—Buddhist, Dionysian, Promethean, Apollonian, Christian and Mohammedan—combine these three components in varying degrees. For example, Buddhism and Christianity place most stress on renunciation, but in Buddhism the promethean element is stronger than the dionysian, while in Christianity the reverse is the case; Dionysian and Mohammedan types place most stress on aggressive and uninhibited qualities, but in the former the Buddhist element is stronger than the promethean, while in the latter the reverse is true.

Maitreyism, of which at present there are only fugitive anticipations (as in a passage of Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain*), will combine all three components in harmonious balance, being sufficiently enthusiastic in its attach-

ments to give expression to the many-sided nature of man, and yet sufficiently detached to maintain the desired equilibrium. Hence each of the six other "paths" has something to contribute to this new world religion, although each must be corrected against defects which the author specifies in detail. The volume concludes with a series of poems which express the Maitreyaan outlook.

Mr. Morris writes gracefully and with considerable psychological insight. He realizes that some of the major conflicts of modern life result from a maladjustment between powerful individual drives and the prevailing pattern of a given culture. He also realizes that neither moralistic repression nor scientific detachment can solve the problem. His discussions of Nietzsche (the Dionysian), John Dewey (the Promethean), Aristotle (the Apollonian) and Nazism (the most powerful contemporary embodiment of the "Mohammedan" path) serve to illustrate how a restricted type is taken as normative for human nature generally. Nevertheless, the author has to go to questionable lengths in order to retain his neat scheme. Specifically, he is neither convincing nor illuminating when he tries to show that Christianity is more dionysian than promethean, and more Buddhist than dionysian. While he has some penetrating things to say about the tension between Christianity and the pragmatic (promethean) temper of modern western culture, he overlooks the balance between ethical and eschatological interests which has characterized Christianity from the outset.

Concerning Mr. Morris' vision of a Maitreyaan world religion, the most obvious comments are at the same time the most pertinent. One can be grateful for the fact that he does not assume the pose of detached objectivity; he acknowledges that he is the advocate of one religion among others. But it is amazing that so well-informed and sensitive an author should forget that living religion can never be an artefact; and what he proposes (despite his statement to the contrary) is an artefact. He offers an almost purely ideological blueprint of human nature in which all the resources of intellect, feeling and conation shall function without issuing in destructive psychological or social conflict; but instead of recognizing that this would involve a radical reconstitution or rebirth, he assumes that it could be achieved merely by a more equitable extension and balance of these capacities as they now exist. In other words, because he fails to provide an adequate analysis of the causes of dislocation and stress within human nature, his religious solution is synthetic; and despite the fact that it covers every phase of life, this solution remains one-sidedly abstract and schematic.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

Union Theological Seminary, New York, New York.

The Contemporary Christ. By W. A. SMART. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. pp. 164. \$1.50.

W. A. Smart's book on *The Contemporary Christ* faces frankly the situation, deals fairly with the claims of the critics and "with extraordinary spiritual insight answers the question, What shall we do with Jesus?" The book begins with a chapter on "The Elusive Galilean" and concludes with a chapter on "The Author of Salvation." These two chapter heads not only reveal the exquisite, poetic diction of this fascinating author but also show the pilgrimage of the book. In considering the various theories to account for Jesus he makes this declaration, "We gain nothing by quarreling with scholarship in the interest

of piety." He states the objections of those who object to the lordship and centrality of Christ clearly and then answers them convincingly.

The author stresses the fact that those who represent Jesus as simply a superb ethical teacher and the sermon on the mount as the sum total of his teaching have not fathomed the depth of his revelation. First and foremost was his teaching about God.

The most wonderful characteristic of his earthly career was that he lived in conscious and constant awareness of the reality and love of God. "God was not a theory to be debated. Edison did not bother to prove the existence of electricity nor does an artist prove the existence of beauty. They discover them and adjust life to them. And so Jesus found God and adjusted life to him. God was in the unconscious beauty of the lily, in the sparrow's love of life, in the prostitute's recovered womanhood, the thief's new-found honesty, in the Samaritan's uncalculating helpfulness and in the deep inexpressable wistfulness of Jesus' own heart. All this meant God or else meant nothing."

But as a natural result of being "the Son of the Father" Jesus had a deep interest in "These my brethren." There has been a superficial conception of Christianity which thinks of it simply as a good-natured belief in the brotherhood of man. As we have already seen, this is not the view of Jesus. He starts with God, but because he starts with God, because he is the Son of the Father, he has a passionate concern for human values. Institutions, even such sacred institutions as the sabbath and the temple, are important only insofar as they make human life finer and fuller and gladder. This interest was not merely passive. Montefiari the great Jewish scholar said that the way in which Jesus differed from the rabbis was that it was his passion not only to be good himself, which was the rabbi's interest, but to go as a missionary to the outcasts. This was something entirely new in Judaism.

His concern was not merely what we call a religious interest. He was interested in the *whole man*. The timeliness of his message is almost startling. That's what we are fighting about now—human values vs. institutional values, the worth of persons. In considering the lofty ethical teachings of Jesus, Doctor Smart takes the position that they are like the polar star by which we set our course but never hope to reach. This does not excuse us from earnest trying. It will be seen that here the author is a relativist, rather than an absolutist in such matters as war and peace. He also breaks with those who go back to the first century for the teaching of Jesus in doctrine and conduct. The attempt to find in his spoken words the justification for the modern temperance reforms, the anti-slavery movement or social service creed is bound to end in failure. It is the Spirit which Jesus has released in the world and especially in the hearts of his followers that brings about these reforms which we recognize as Christlike.

What we need is not more instruction. We may well remind ourselves that so far as ideas are concerned, the Jews had everything that Jesus had. The rabbis taught the people but Jesus saved them. The rabbis could give them new ideas, but Jesus gave them new birth.

This salvation so earnestly taught by Paul is based not on a system but a person, Jesus Christ. Our hearts still turn to him.

He is the **CONTEMPORARY CHRIST**.

RAYMOND H. HUSE

District Superintendent, The Methodist Church, Syracuse, New York.

The Ages of the World. By F. W. J. SCHELLING. Translated with introduction and notes by FREDERICK DE WOLFE BOLMAN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. pp. xiii-251. \$3.00.

As Professor E. S. Brightman says in his foreword, the Schelling of the later period is almost unknown to American students. Bolman's excellent translation¹ provides access to Schelling's "positive" philosophy, i.e., a philosophy of factual existence. The whole essay on *The Ages of the World* is an extension of that on *Human Freedom* (translated by J. Gutmann, 1936), and at the same time is a reworking and limiting of absolute idealism.

Though Schelling realized in writing *The Ages of the World* (about 1811) that the time had not yet come to be a perfect "narrator" instead of a struggling "explorer," his ambition was "to sing the greatest heroic poem," comprehending what was, what is and what will be. *The Ages of the World* was thus to be a trilogic introduction to the philosophy of historical existence, to be developed later on in the philosophy of mythology and revelation. In this earlier stage, however, Schelling completed only the metaphysical ground of that philosophy of history, working out the analysis of "The Past" ("Nature is an abyss of what is past"). The second book on "The Present" was never written; something of the intended third book on "The Future" is preserved in the dialogue "Ueber den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt." To understand this outline of Schelling's later philosophy one must free oneself from the modern distinction made between "science" and "poetry" as well as that made between "philosophy" and "theology." Like any great philosophy his is neither sterile science nor mere poetry, but a genuine metaphysical empirism. In some respects it seems to be very close to the recent enterprises of voluntaristic, vitalistic, and existential philosophies; in other respects, however, it far surpasses them in its intellectual power of ontological reflection and speculative vision. Schelling was perhaps the most platonic genius of German idealism and was certainly its most human personality.

For him the main function of all philosophy is the solution of the problem of the being of the world, to find the answer to the final and desperate question: "Why is there anything at all, why not nothing?" Reason, in order to inquire into the abysmal ground of actual existence of nature and history, must be put outside itself, in ecstasy. Positive philosophy limits reason by asserting existence, the bare fact that something exists, and thus proceeding to the contingent facts of history. To recall the true significance of "Da-sein" man must retrace the long course of developments from the present back into the deepest night of the past, and must inquire into the immemorial beginning of being or creation, facing thus the "horror of being." From time to time every physical and moral existence requires a reduction to its innermost origin for its preservation. The result is a vision which has many affinities to Nietzsche's "Dionysian World" of an eternal cycle producing and consuming itself, though for Schelling this is not the ultimate truth of being, but only an eternal Past within it. Being is an essential contradiction, embracing the hatreds and loves, despairs and hopes,

¹ It is excellent not only in translating but also in realizing what is untranslatable. The translation of a few terms, however, may be questioned. I wonder if such terms as reality (for *Wirklichkeit*), circular movement (for *Umbtrieb*), discontent (for *Unmut*), enveloped (for *befangen*), ability to be (for *Seinkönnen*), to grow away (for *entwerden*) could not be rendered more adequately.

pains and pleasures of human history, its Yeses and its Noes. A real affirmative philosophy and theology must recognize the primordial negative power which appears most clearly in the phenomenon of the will, for what is willed or intended to be is thereby posited as not being, and negation is everywhere the first transition from nothing into something. If there were no No then the Yes would be without power. A deep anger and bitterness is the driving power of life, and dread the basic feeling of each living creature. Life is not meekness and kindness but is terrible, and it is the fear of God which is the beginning of wisdom. Also divine benevolence cannot reveal itself without first manifesting anger and negation. Unfortunately modern Christianity has idealized reality to the point of emptying it and thus has lost all its strength in denying the power of negation. "In the nocturnal vision in which the Lord passed before his prophet, there first came a powerful storm which rent the mountains and cleft the rocks, after this an earthquake, finally a fire. The Lord Himself, however, was not in any of them. But there followed a still, small murmur in which he was. Thus must power, force and severity precede in the revelation of the eternal, until he himself can appear for the first time as himself, in the gentle wafting of love."

KARL LÖWITH

The Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, Connecticut.

The Hope of a New World. By WILLIAM TEMPLE (Archbishop of Canterbury). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. pp. 125. \$1.35.

This is one of the notable books of the year both on account of its author and of the brevity and weight of its content. William Temple delivered the Gifford Lectures, 1933-34, and recently was elevated to the archepiscopal See of Canterbury; a scholar of world-wide repute and the foremost churchman of his time. But his scholarship and his churchmanship are brought into the service of prophetic Christian statesmanship. While he is loyal to the United Nations, he subjects all men and nations to the judgment of God as He is revealed in the Bible and incarnated in Jesus Christ. His interpretation of history and the present condition of the world reminds one of the prophets from Amos to Ezekiel.

The ultimate cause of international chaos is described in a short sentence: "We have neglected God and His laws." He therefore sounds the note of repentance to all men everywhere: "This war is itself a call to us to return to God, to become aware of Him as a supreme reality and to dedicate ourselves to Him, both individually and as a nation." For the Hope of a New World is in God and the freedom men find in His service.

Since each page and paragraph bristles with thought-provoking and quotable sentences, I must confine myself in the space allotted me to a statement of the headings of the six chapters—the first with six subordinate topics. I. The Hope of a New World: (a) What Is Wrong With the Old World?; (b) God and Freedom; (c) Prayer and Its Answer; (d) International Justice; (e) Social Justice; (f) A Christian Civilization; II. The Armour of God; III. Our Hope for the Future; IV. Principles of Reconstruction; V. Evangelism in Our Time; VI. The Sovereignty of God. Apparently these subjects were discussed over the radio and from the platform.

At the end of the first section the author says: "I have spoken about the

definitely religious subjects. Now we pass to the expression of faith in practical obedience . . . the principles of conduct in all departments of life belong to the sphere of religion; for God is supreme over all life and at all points we must obey Him if we have faith in Him; and this obedience must in the new world order take the form of an endeavor to establish international and social justice." At this point the reviewer cannot refrain from citing a passage which, in his judgment, ranks as a classic definition of the meaning of worship. "If you are really worshipping at all, then you are doing just what is needed to enable you to take your part in bringing in the new world for which we hope. For to worship is to quicken the conscience by the holiness of God, to feed the mind with the truth of God, to purge the imagination by the beauty of God, to open the heart to the love of God, to devote the will to the purpose of God."

With the insight of a prophet, the clarity and sanity of a scholar, the loyalty of a churchman, the diffidence of one who recognizes the difficulties of a just and durable peace, and an unquestionable devotion to the welfare of men of every race and clime, of friend or foe, he expounds and applies the gospel to individual, social, economic and international life. He is an embodiment and an interpreter of the ecumenical significance of the Carpenter of Nazareth, the Christ of God, and the Prince of Life. One would like to see a man sitting at the peace table and representing the Church of the living God, who writes as follows: "The permanent settlement must aim at Distributive Justice. All nations including Germany, taking part on equal terms in the negotiations, and all having equal claims to consideration and their fair share in organizing the common life for the common good."

I heartily recommend this book to ministers of the gospel, teachers of youth in public and church schools, to discussion groups and to laymen and laywomen of all churches. The language is simple, the thought is profound and the spirit is Christian. Men may not agree with all the views of the author, but no one, who thinks seriously and labors zealously for a New World, will pass by what William Temple has spoken and written.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS

Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

The Old Testament in the World Church. By GODFREY E. PHILLIPS. London: Lutterworth Press, 1942. pp. vi-165. 10 s.

The author of this volume was for twenty-five years a missionary in India. He is at the present time holding the chair of Missions at Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, England. His book represents the outcome of an inquiry conducted by leaders in the various missions of Africa, India and China to ascertain the place of the Old Testament in the missionary activity of the young churches. While directed to the specific problems of the mission field, it bears suggestively upon the wider and even more important question of the place of the Hebraic-Christian Scriptures in the life of the Church. The book exhibits wide experience and knowledge of missions and unusual understanding of what the Old Testament has to say to the world.

The Old Testament has a peculiar appeal to the primitive races of Africa. The nomadic and pastoral life of the tribes, the influence of the Semitic Arabs,

the prevailing folk customs and the fascination of the Bible stories themselves make of these ancient Scriptures the best possible manual for evangelistic effort. The situation in India and China is, of course, quite different because of the great difference in cultural mentality and history. To the Indian, who is by temperament and thought an alien to our Semitic heritage with its concrete and personal character, the Old Testament does not make so ready an appeal, though the Psalms with their warmth of personal religious devotion (*bhakti*) frequently strike a cordial response. In China, on the other hand, it is the Book of Proverbs with its straightforward moralistic teaching that is most widely read. Where the historical point of view is unknown, the Old Testament encounters peculiarly serious difficulties. One thoughtful Chinese leader comments that for the Chinese "reading the Old Testament is like eating a crab"!

But despite the difficulties the Old Testament encounters in many missionary areas, it has occupied an important place in the history of Christianity. The extent of its influence upon the gospels and the early Church is exceedingly impressive, if Doctor Phillips has not exaggerated the amount of evidence. Seldom has the Jewishness not only of Jesus but of many of the New Testament writings been more emphatically and, for the most part, correctly stated. Scarcely less impressive is the use of the Old Testament, above all of the Psalms, by Augustine and the Church of the Middle Ages. In two resounding paragraphs on the Confessional Church in Germany, Doctor Phillips shows how Christian leaders "have helped us all, where we needed much help, to perceive that these books are not preparation for, but part of, the communication of God to man which is the eternal gospel; that without them, even having the New Testament, we shall read it with distorted vision, get its perspective wrong, miss its fullness of truth about God in His redemptive dealing with man and even falsify the picture of the Lord Jesus Christ Himself" (p. 85). The primary emphasis throughout is that the Old Testament must be read as a Christian literature; its interpretation is provided, according to the author, by the revelation of Christ.

Protestantism has been acutely responsive to the crisis of the world in its return to theology and appreciation of Christian tradition. It has concerned itself with the work and function of the Church in the midst of a world where national matrices are crumbling. But it has done little of real importance in pointing to the place of Scripture in its corporate life. Protestantism greatly needs a statement which will do justice to the results of historical criticism and the religious needs of men and of nations in our time. This book on the Old Testament in the World Church may be a precursor of others which will occupy themselves more centrally with this problem. If so, it is significant that it comes to us out of the life of the young churches of the Orient.

JAMES MUILENBURG

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Five Marys. By ISABEL WARRINGTON HEAPS New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. pp. 101. \$1.50.

What Manuel Komroff did for Lazarus in his memorable novel, *In the Years of Our Lord*, Isabel Warrington Heaps does in these biographical studies for Mary the sister of Lazarus, Mary the Mother of Jesus, Mary the wife of

Cleophas, Mary the Magdalene and Mary the mother of John Mark. Unfortunately, these women who knew the Master best and loved Him most have been for many of us only gaunt figures in a frieze or haloed faces in a sepulchraly illustrated Bible. In this book the Five Marys suddenly "rise from the dead" and walk blithely, bravely through the small-town streets of Nazareth, along the wharves of Magdala and the garden paths of Bethany, and up the tortuous steeps of Calvary. Each of them emerges as a pearl of great price, precious, very costly, because Mrs. Heaps has properly set them solidly into the shining background of Oriental life and the golden years in the life of our Lord, their son, or favorite nephew, or splendid friend.

A less skillful author might have allowed this natural familiarity to breed the proverbial contempt for Jesus in his seemingly casual journey from Main Street, Nazareth, via the fish piers of Capernaum and Magdala to the Cathedral City of Jerusalem and Gallows Hill beyond. But Mrs. Heaps, in spite of a few "folksy" lapses in dealing with "Aunt Mary," the wife of Cleophas, and Martha, the sit-by-the-fire sister of Lazarus, keeps both narrative and conversation on the high level of reverence which the Elizabethans established for the King James version of the Bible. She may lose a little in vividness by this rigorous method but, eventually, she gains enormously in validity and dignity. Consequently the reader is left kneeling, with the Five Marys, in an unclean leper's house, at the foot of the Cross, or before the Riven door of an empty tomb. All of it prefigures unconsciously, and so more artistically, the unique contribution of women to the life and continuing ministry of Jesus: insight, reverence, sympathy and hope—always hope of something more, something better than even love can buy with "blood, sweat and tears."

Perhaps Mrs. Heaps is most effective in her studies of Mary the Mother of Jesus and Mary the mother of John Mark. Each of them is most womanly and most admirable when she is defending her wonder-son against the complaints of more mercenary brothers, who cannot understand why he must always be going somewhere, or parroting psalms, or telling little stories about "certain" people he thinks are more redeeming than "big shots" on Main Street or "tin gods" in the Temple. With mother wit or feminine intuition the Marys somehow see deeper into the heart of things than the Josephs or Johns or Judases ever can. Thereafter they use this keener vision, like a surgeon's knife, for the defense of their sons and the healing of the nations.

Blake-like lithographs by David Roberts give the book a mystical loveliness which makes it, indeed, a Lenten pilgrimage to "alabaster cities" undimmed by time, tears and the tides of many battles.

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Lee's Lieutenants. By DOUGLAS SOUTHALL FREEMAN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. pp. 773. \$5.00.

In 1934 there was published Doctor Douglas Southall Freeman's *R. E. Lee*, and that four-volume life of the great Confederate leader deserved and won the Pulitzer Prize as the most distinguished American biography of the year. It was recognized then and probably will continue to be regarded as the definitive

summary of Lee's achievements and character. After this monumental work had been finished, Doctor Freeman turned his thought to the preparation of a life of George Washington, but the whole subject of the Civil War proved to have too strong a hold on his mind. The thought possessed him that a study ought to be made of the men who were Lee's lieutenants, through whom Lee had been obliged to operate, and to whose abilities were due some of the successes and to whose failures were due some of the frustration of Lee's plans for the army of Northern Virginia. So for the last six or seven years Doctor Freeman has been gathering material for this second study, and there is now published the first of what are to be three volumes on what he calls in his subtitle "A Study in Command."

The book begins with a foreword in which Doctor Freeman explains his purpose and the method of treatment which he means to pursue. Then follow eight full-page portraits of the most important of Lee's lieutenants and brief characterizations of these eight men and of more than a score of lesser but important commanders. Then come 675 pages of narrative and description, covering the period from the beginning of the Civil War through the Battle of Malvern Hill in 1862; and this particular volume concludes with six appendices, of which the first one on "The Military Geography of Virginia" is as interesting as any part of the main text.

In this volume there are exemplified the extraordinary diligence of research, the passion for thoroughness and exactitude and the gift for synthesizing varied material which have made Doctor Freeman one of the great American historians. The casual reader might be dismayed by the meticulous precision with which Doctor Freeman describes the military movements which have become like meat and drink to his own imagination. Not only is every statement documented and not only is the book illustrated by many explicit sketch maps of battlefields and military movements, but there is also a voluminousness in the account of these which includes every least detail of topography, of weather and the condition of the roads, of the timing of assaults that succeeded or failed and of the minor incidents as well as the large tactics of battles. Nevertheless, even the reader who is untutored in military matters will discover, perhaps to his surprise, that all these innumerable strokes of description blend into a picture that is irresistibly alive. He is not reading of "old forgotten things and battles long ago." He is living in the very mood and atmosphere of the Civil War and seeing its collisions as though through the eyes of some of the actual men who directed them.

Frequently in the book also there are delineations of men which flash with unforgettable vividness. Here, for example, is one of Stonewall Jackson at the Battle of First Manassas.

"Jackson's horse had been wounded under him; one bullet had made an ugly gash in his coat near the hip; another missile had broken the bone of the middle finger of his left hand. To reduce the bleeding and to ease the pain, he had carried his arm upraised through the remainder of the action. Observing this, some of his men thought he was invoking the blessing of Heaven. He believed that he had received that blessing. The day after the battle, he wrote his wife: 'Whilst great credit is due to other parts of our gallant army, God made my brigade more instrumental than any other in repulsing the main attack. This is for your information only—say nothing about it. Let others speak praise, not myself.'"

And this is the description of Major Roberdeau C. Wheat:

"At the head of his battalion, in a charge, he had been shot down. The surgeon who examined him shook a sage professional head: a bullet wound of that nature, through both lungs, was necessarily fatal. 'I don't feel like dying yet,' Wheat avowed. The medical man held to his contention. 'There is no instance on record,' said he, 'of recovery from such a wound.' 'Well, then,' answered Wheat, in a phrase that became a lawyer, 'I will put my case upon record.'"

As "A Study in Command" the book has sharp relevance for America and for the United Nations in this present time. As one remembers Pearl Harbor and as one reviews also the changes in the leadership of the British Army both before and after Dunkirk and in the struggles in North Africa, one sees again how the forces of a nation may be frustrated or welded into power according to whether the right leadership is lacking or may painfully be found. As Doctor Freeman says in his introduction:

"Something, perhaps, may be gained by printing in the first year of this nation's greatest war, the story of the difficulties that had to be overcome in an earlier struggle before the command of the army became measurably qualified for the task assigned it. . . . The Lee and the 'Stonewall' Jackson of this war will emerge. A Second Manassas will follow the blundering of backward-looking commanders and of inexperienced staff officers during any Seven Days' Battle the new army must fight."

It will be remembered that this volume is the first of three. Its story and its portraits are incomplete, but enough is given in this volume to show that in the reading of the whole work there will doubtless happen to the reader what has happened to Doctor Freeman himself:

"At first, one had the feeling that these Confederates had ridden so far toward oblivion that one could not discern the figures or hope to overtake them before they had passed over the horizon of time. In the end, there was the sensation of reaching their camp, of watching the firelight on their faces and of hearing their brave and genial conversation."

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Washington Is Like That. By W. M. KIPLINGER. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. pp. 522. \$3.50.

This is a book not only about a city but about a whole social order of today, and perhaps of tomorrow, which is finding expression there. Everybody recognizes that there is in Washington now a complexity and concentration of governmental functions ramifying out into the most vital concerns of life and work for millions of people. Often the multiplicity of governmental agencies is referred to with a kind of contemptuous jocularly and often also with annoyance. Many persons, and particularly those who belong to the groups who have had hitherto the positions of business and commercial control, speak the list of the alphabetical agencies in Washington as though they were poison to their

tongue. But whatever one's opinion may be, it is important that this opinion finally should be determined not by instinctive emotions, but by an intelligent understanding of the forces now working in this country which they represent. In Burnham's recent notable book, *Managerial Revolution*, the thesis is set forth that the era of capitalism and so-called free enterprise is at an end, and that we have already passed over the threshold into a new era in which the controlling group in society will be the experts in technical production and organization, many of whom will henceforth be representatives not of individual business but of government ownership and control.

This particular book is no hasty or shallow journalism. Its author, W. M. Kiplinger, is widely known in America, and especially in business circles, as the founder and head of Kiplinger's Washington Letter, which has established its place among wide business and commercial circles as an authoritative source of factual information about what is going on or is likely to develop in the Capital. As he points out, however, no man could have gathered together all the detailed information which was requisite for a book of the sort projected, and consequently he enlisted the assistance of thirty-one men and nine women, many of whom, as news gatherers, correspondents and special writers, had expert knowledge of particular elements in the Washington picture. Mr. Kiplinger himself has done an able job in bringing together a mass of detailed information into what is an exceedingly readable as well as informative account. Here one may learn what all the different divisions and bureaus of the government of the United States actually mean and what they are about, and will get exceedingly vivid glimpses also of the human beings who move through the governmental scene. On the whole, the estimates of personalities seem to be remarkably objective and impartial. If there is political bias anywhere, it has been kept under control. Sometimes the delineations are surprising because they are so far removed from the hasty judgments which people at large have formed from some sensational incident or newspaper criticism in the course of a man's career. For instance, here is a paragraph describing Justice Black of the Supreme Court.

"He was never a scholar by trade, but he is generally recognized, even by those who dislike his ideas, as one of the best educated men in Washington. He is also coming to be recognized as one of the Court's great judges. He has made himself that, in the years since he was appointed to the Court."

The descriptions of President Roosevelt and of Mrs. Roosevelt give a similar impression of pictures which are drawn not to please any particular constituency, but to get as near as honest human judgment can to the essential facts.

Altogether, this is a thoroughly good book for American citizens to read in these critical and perhaps creative days. As Mr. Kiplinger says:

"The book is written for *people*. If the people know what's going on, they can be trusted to think straight and to guide straight. It is desirable that people not look *up* to Washington excessively, for the habit numbs the brain. And it is equally desirable not to look *down* too much on Washington, for that's a way of using only one eye. The aim of this book is to help people to look Washington square in the face, on a level, with both eyes, and see inside it as it really is."

W. RUSSELL BOWIE

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Consider the Days. By Maude Royden. Woman's Press. \$1.50. To those who would "think on these things," this book of daily readings will promote a spirit of renewed devotion to a God who reveals himself in the storm and tempest, and in the "still small voice."

The Open Door. By Floyd Van Keuren. Harper. \$1.25. An inspirational story of Paul, a cynical crippled beggar who found the open door to happiness through faith.

The Desires of a Religious Man. By Donald H. Tippet. Revell. \$1.50. Sermon-essays on, what Saint Thomas Aquinas called a "list of perfect desires," The Lord's Prayer.

Your Child's Religion. By Mildred and Frank Eakin. Macmillan. \$1.75. An invaluable aid for all who are engaged in the spiritual development of young children.

Central Certainties. By Arthur J. Moore. Abingdon-Cokesbury. \$1.00. The Church, the Kingdom, the Gospel, world missions and life after death—these are the affirmatives that Bishop Moore presents as encouragement to "live like men who 'face the morning.'"

The Edge of the Abyss. By Alfred Noyes. Dutton. \$2.00. An indictment of bureaucracy and totalitarianism and a challenge to the intelligentsia to defend the principles of wisdom.

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Who Crucified Jesus? By Solomon Zeitlin. Harper. \$2.50. An age-old contention refuted, and the blame placed upon Pilate, the Roman procurator.

Crisis on the Frontier. By Arthur A. Cowan. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh via Scribner's. \$2.50. A worthy collection of sermons in the "Scholar As Preacher" series.

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Achieving Results in Church Finance. By Boyd M. McKeown. Abingdon-Cokesbury. 60 cents. A program of church finance which is essentially Christian and basically sound.

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A Growing Person. By Frances Cole McLester. Abingdon-Cokesbury. 60 cents. A penetrating and efficient guide for church and church-school workers who in turn must guide others in a Christian Way of Life.

The Risen Lord. By Walter Russell Bowie. Abingdon-Cokesbury. 25 cents. An Easter pageant, a pantomime with reader and choir. Full directions are given for staging, costuming and music.

A History of the Evangelical Church. By Raymond W. Albright. Evangelical Press. \$3.50. A clear statement and comprehensive historical analysis of the beginning and development of the Evangelical Church.

Jewish Postwar Problems. Unit I—Why Study Postwar Problems. Unit II—The Two World Wars—a Comparison and Contrast. A study course prepared by the American-Jewish Committee. 10 cents per unit.